WUNRN
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642987.2015.1075301
The International Journal of Human Rights, Volume 19, Issue 7, 2015 – Special Issue
Pages
883-895 - Karen Bennetta*, Danna
Ingletonb, Alice
M. Nahc & James
Savaged
Critical Perspectives on the
Security and Protection of Human Rights Defenders
Consider for Women Human Rights Defenders
Abstract
Since the United Nations General
Assembly's adoption of the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders in 1998, there
has been considerable effort to recognise and protect the right of individuals,
groups and communities to promote and protect their own rights and the rights
of others. Over time, a multi-level, multi-actor international protection
regime for the rights of human rights defenders has emerged, derived from the
international human rights regime. Actors in this goal-driven regime adopt a
human security approach, emphasising the importance of having a holistic,
multi-dimensional understanding of ‘security’. In this article, we note
positive developments in state commitment to the protection of defenders, as
well as the debates, tensions and contestation that continue to exist. We
emphasise the need for critical appraisal of the construction, function and
evolution of this protection regime as well as its multi-scalar social and
political effects, both intended and unintended. We highlight three specific
areas where critical scholarship is needed to understand the nature of this
protection regime, discussing the contributions of authors in this special
issue: the definition and use of the term ‘human rights defender’; the
effectiveness of protection mechanisms; and the complex relationship between
repression, activism and risk. In conclusion, we identify key areas for further
research related to human rights defenders, stressing the need for the
development of theory and practice related to their ‘risk’, ‘security’ and
‘protection’.
The human
rights defender protection regime
The United Nations (UN) General
Assembly's adoption of the 1998 Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (commonly known as the
Declaration on Human Rights Defenders)1 marked
a milestone in the development of a multi-level, multi-actor international
protection regime for the rights of human rights defenders. This regime has had
a long genesis; the declaration itself was a product of a ‘slow and drawn-out
drafting process' lasting over 15 years, marked by tension, disagreement and
compromise.2 Since
its adoption however, there has been considerable effort to recognise and
protect the right of individuals, groups and communities to promote and protect
their own rights and the rights of others.
What are the key features of the
human rights defender protection regime? First, it derives its ‘principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations
converge'3 from
the international human rights regime. The declaration itself did not create
new rights, but ‘reaffirms rights that are instrumental to the defence of human
rights'.4 Over
time, a number of key principles have emerged in the operation of this regime.
These include: the recognition of local actors as key agents of change; the
importance of promoting and protecting ‘civil society space’5;
the need to tailor protection interventions to meet the unique and specific
needs of individuals, groups and communities6;
and the necessity of complementing reactive measures with efforts to build a
‘safe and enabling environment' for the defence of human rights.7
Second, the regime is goal driven –
its aim is to protect and support defenders who operate in their own contexts
in the face of threats and risks. Depending on the circumstances and the actors
involved, these threats and risks might include surveillance, harassment,
verbal and written threats, stigmatisation, criminalisation, restrictions on funding
and registration as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), arbitrary arrest and
detention, spurious investigations, fabricated charges, unfair trials,
kidnapping, torture, ill-treatment and killings.8 Perpetrators
range from state actors to non-state actors – such as government officials,
armed forces, police officers, religious fundamentalists, transnational
corporations and criminal gangs. In a significant number of cases, defenders do
not know the identity of those who attack them.9
Third, the regime adopts a human
security paradigm, with individuals, groups and communities as subjects of
security rather than states. Its goal-driven, practice-oriented, rights-based
nature helps actors in this regime sidestep some of the debates that question
the usefulness of the human security paradigm for meaningful action, policy and
research.10 Similar
to proponents of a ‘broad’ human security approach (in particular, those who
adopt a feminist framework11),
defenders and practitioners have emphasised the importance of having a
holistic, multi-dimensional understanding of ‘security’. Women human rights
defenders, in particular, emphasise the importance of understanding how
discrimination, stereotyping and stigmatisation – rooted in social structures
in society, such as patriarchy and the militarisation of society – compromise
security.12
Jane Barry and Vaida Nainar reflect
on how women human rights defenders define security as including: freedom from
constant threats, economic security, political security, environmental security
and health security, which resonate with definitions of human security that
encompass the dimensions of ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’.
Drawing upon reflections of women human rights defenders around the world, they
introduce the term ‘integrated security’:
For us, security has to be
integrated, which means employment, social wellbeing, development and national
sovereignty in terms of natural resources. Security is not only for the
individual, but also for the community.13
This concept – especially its
emphasis on self-care and personal wellbeing – has resonated deeply with
defenders around the world.14 Organisations
that conduct security training (such as Front Line Defenders, Protection
International and Tactical Technology Collective) draw attention to the
importance of interventions in three interconnected domains – physical
security, digital security and self-care. Some defenders and practitioners
argue that self-care is both a necessary act of physical and psychological
protection as well as a political strategy for sustaining and furthering the
work of defenders.15
Fourth, it is a multi-level regime
– formal protection mechanisms for human rights defenders exist at the
national, regional and international levels. In Mexico, for example, defenders
are able to seek protection measures from the government through the 2012 Law
for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists16;
make urgent appeal to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights Defenders to request the government to take all appropriate action on
behalf of a human rights defender at risk; gain practical support from European
Union (EU) embassies on the basis of the EU Guidelines on Human Rights
Defenders; and make petitions to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) in the hope that it will request Mexico to adopt precautionary measures
to prevent ‘irreparable harm’ to the defender. However, there is geographical
unevenness in the availability of protection mechanisms. Many countries have
neither enacted laws nor created institutions that recognise and protect the
rights of human rights defenders.
Fifth, the regime has many
stakeholders – civil society groups, donors, national human rights
institutions, states, multilateral bodies and individual defenders – who create
and use different types of tools, strategies and tactics to identify, support
and protect the rights of human rights defenders. These include the provision
of emergency grants, temporary relocation initiatives, security training,
advocacy, accompaniment, trial monitoring, networking and capacity building.17
In the next section of this article
we show how there has been growing commitment by some governments to protect
human rights defenders around the world. We then contrast these developments
with examples of how other governments continue to challenge the legitimacy of
defenders and restrict their rights. We turn to three specific areas where
critical scholarship is needed, highlighting the contributions of authors in
this special issue: the definition and use of the term ‘human rights defender’;
the effectiveness of protection mechanisms; and the complex relationship
between repression, activism and risk. Emphasising the need for critical
appraisal of the construction, function and evolution of this protection regime
as well as its multi-scalar social and political effects, intended and
unintended, we identify key areas for further research.
Developments
in the normative framework
Over the past three years, there
have been a number of initiatives that strengthen the normative framework for
the protection of human rights defenders. At the national level, Switzerland's
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs published guidelines on the protection of
human rights defenders in 2013, aimed at making the work of Swiss diplomats and
officials in this area of work more coherent, systematic and effective.18 That
same year, the United Kingdom issued its first National Action Plan to
implement the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which
included strengthening support to defenders engaged in business and human
rights problems.19 In
2014, Côte d'Ivoire adopted the Law on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights Defenders – the first African state to enact specific legislation to
protect human rights defenders.20
At the regional level in Europe,
both the Council of the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) have strengthened their contribution to this protection regime
through recent policy developments. In 2014, the EU marked the 10th anniversary
of its European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders by committing better
support for vulnerable and marginalised human rights defenders, women human
rights defenders and those operating in remote regions; advocating for the
creation of a safe and enabling environment for human rights defenders; and
strengthening the implementation of an effective and coherent policy on human
rights defenders.21 The
OSCE (within its Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) initiated
extensive consultations with human rights defenders and other human rights
experts across the OSCE geographic regions to develop the OSCE Guidelines on
the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, published in June 2014, to harness
better protection and support for human rights defenders by member states.22
Internationally, in 2013, the Group
of Eight (G8) adopted a Declaration on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict
that acknowledged the vital role of women human rights defenders, committing to
provide them with better protection.23 In
2013, the UN General Assembly passed the first ever resolution on the
protection of women human rights defenders.24 The
UN Human Rights Council has also passed a number of important resolutions that
signify its commitment to the protection of human rights defenders. This
included Resolution 22/6 on Protecting Human Rights Defenders in March 2013,
which outlined the gravity of the deteriorating climate for human rights
practice around the world. This resolution emphasised that more must be done to
address attacks and reprisals against defenders, unjust laws that criminalise
defenders, and impunity for actions against defenders.25
States have also recognised that
some human rights defenders are particularly vulnerable – such as those who
work on contested issues (such as sexual and reproductive rights, and rights
abuses related to extractive industries, land and the environment) as well as
those who hold particular identities and come from specific communities (such
as women human rights defenders, LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and
intersex) defenders and indigenous people).26 States
have also raised concerns about the security of defenders in a number of ways,
including through the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process.
In 2014, the outgoing UN Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya, used
her last report to the Human Rights Council to set out a framework for building
a ‘safe and enabling environment’ for defenders.27The
new Special Rapporteur Michel Forst, in his first report, reemphasised the
importance of disseminating the declaration and raising the visibility of the
situation of human rights defenders. He committed to addressing national
legislative impediments to the work of defenders; challenging impunity for
human rights violations against defenders; and tackling reprisals against
defenders, in particular those who engage with the UN and other international
and regional human rights mechanisms.28
Debates,
tensions, contestation
While there have been positive developments
in the evolution of this regime, some states continue to challenge the
recognition, legitimacy and integrity of the work of defenders. Defenders
continue to be attacked, even in countries where they have legally enforceable
rights to promote and protect human rights. National laws and administrative
practices that criminalise defenders have been justified by some states in
terms of their measures to protect national sovereignty; counter terrorism and
extremism; further economic security and development; and assert particular
cultural, traditional and religious norms and practices. In September 2014, for
example, the Egyptian government revised Article 78 of its Penal Code
introducing severe penalties for those accessing or facilitating access to foreign
funding. In India, every NGO receiving funds from ‘foreign sources’ requires
either prior permission or registration under the Foreign Contribution
Regulation Act (FCRA) 2010. This legislation has been used to target those
dissenting from the economic model pursued by successive governments that
violates the human rights of Adivasi tribal peoples and other communities.29
In countries where laws are enacted
to criminalise human rights defenders’ practice, more research is needed to
document the immediate impact on defenders, and to consider how such laws may
have wider regional influence and multi-sectoral impact. For example, following
Russia's clamp down on civil society practice through oppressive legislation
(i.e. limits on foreign funding for NGOs), we now see similar laws being
debated by legislators in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.30Such
measures are used not only in repressive regimes but also in nominally or fully
democratic states.31 In
the United Kingdom, for example, the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party
Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 restricts civil society
organisations (CSOs) in the period before an election by setting financial
limits on regulated campaigning activities above which there is a legal duty to
register. Indeed, the International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law has
documented the introduction or enactment of measures to constrain civil society
in more than 50 countries between January 2012 and December 2014.32 Protection-oriented
actors who support defenders around the world struggle to respond effectively
to this diverse and rapidly changing legal and administrative environment that
impacts defenders. While there have been a number of notable initiatives to
address these restrictions,33 more
research and analysis is needed to understand, prevent and respond to them
effectively.
Another troubling development is
the extent to which states conduct surveillance and share intelligence on
defenders. In some cases, spurious intelligence reports and statements by
public officials purportedly based on intelligence data misrepresent defenders
and NGOs as impediments to economic growth and threats to national economic
security.34 States
also continue to use anti-terrorism legislation and measures to criminalise
defenders and restrict the activities of NGOs. For example, Uzbekistan has
consistently used anti-terrorism laws as part of an aggressive campaign against
defenders, criminalising – and in some cases torturing – them for purported
religious extremism, terrorism and ‘wahhabism’.35 A
number of states have also drawn upon Recommendation 8 of the Financial Action
Task Force's International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the
Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation to regulate and restrict NGOs under
the guise of preventing terrorist financing and money laundering.36
Increasingly, human rights
defenders find their recognition by and access to the UN under attack. The
legitimacy and integrity of their work has been called into question during
Human Rights Council sessions and in General Assembly resolutions related to
human rights defenders and to civil society space.37 This
has been the case not only by states such as China and Eritrea that see any
form of civic protest or challenge to state authority as anathema to social and
political stability, but by democratic states with growing geopolitical
influence, such as South Africa and India.38 In
addition to direct confrontation with the human rights defender framework
within the UN, states hostile to the work of defenders impede defenders’ access
to the UN by delaying applications for United Nations Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) status and engaging in reprisals against those who attempt to
engage with human rights mechanisms.39 There
have also been cases where human rights defenders experience harassment,
intimidation and threats during and following their engagement with the Human
Rights Council. Such was the experience of journalist Gnanasiri Kottegoda from
Sri Lanka in 2012, who was subjected to a state-sanctioned smear campaign. A
pro-government TV channel broadcast images of him and called him a traitor. He
was forced into hiding when military intelligence sought him out, and
eventually fled the country. Some states have held back from working with the
Special Procedures mechanisms, and some states have also demonstrated a lack of
engagement with requests made through the UPR process to protect the rights of
human rights defenders.
Although the Declaration on Human
Rights Defenders itself does not use the term ‘human rights defender’, in
practice, the definition is derived from Article 1, which states that:
Everyone has the right,
individually and in association with others, to promote and to strive for the
protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the
national and international levels.
This term has been used to refer to
a broad range of individuals and collectives promoting or protecting human
rights, including lawyers, journalists, activists, trade unionists, members of
community-based organisations, people in social movements and staff of human
rights organisations involved in different work in very different contexts. It
has been used to refer to those less obviously characterised as rights
defenders, including protesters, teachers, students, social workers, health
care professionals, community workers, sexual minorities, religious minorities
and peace builders, amongst others.40 The
term ‘human rights defender’ tends to be invoked when those engaged in
rights-related work are threatened or put at risk for what they do – it is a
way of legitimising, bringing visibility to and reiterating their right to do
this type of work.
There are clear reasons and
benefits for using this term, not least that it confers on defenders
recognition and status within the international human rights framework through
which they can access support, protection and redress for violations.
Furthermore, many funds, programmes and resources are specifically allocated
for work related to human rights defenders, and NGOs and individuals who want
to access these funds use this term in their proposals and activities. However,
being called a human rights defender is not always advantageous – in some
cases, the use of the term can inadvertently raise the level of risk that
defenders face and be used to politicise their work. Some aggressors have also
started to appropriate this term, referring to themselves as human rights
defenders, to the consternation of civil society groups who see them as
perpetrators of rights abuses.41
Protection-oriented actors are
concerned about ensuring that the definition corresponds to the breadth of
actors put at risk for defending human rights. Matters are complicated by the
fact that, in many cases, human rights defenders do not refer to themselves as ‘human
rights defenders’. Furthermore, the declaration and associated protection
mechanisms do not set out clear decision-making processes to help with status
determination.
The Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights has tried to provide guidance on who should
be referred to as a human rights defender through a factsheet called Human
Rights Defenders: Protecting the Right to Defend Human Rights (henceforth
Fact Sheet 29).42 Fact
Sheet 29 suggests three ‘minimum standards’ required for a human rights
defender: that the person accepts the universality of human rights; that the
person's arguments fall within the scope of human rights (regardless of whether
or not the argument is technically correct); and that the person engages in
‘peaceful action’. However, some essential questions remain, including: To what
extent does a defender need to demonstrate that his/her actions are
‘non-violent’? To what extent should a defender be expected to demonstrate
knowledge of and respect for the universality of human rights? What criteria
and process should be adopted to determine this?43
Enrique Eguren and Champa Patel44 (this
issue) suggest that the current basis for this definition does not provide
enough guidance for those determining if a specific individual, organisation,
group or community is a human rights defender. They are concerned that such
ambiguity potentially hinders the protection of defenders. Eguren and Patel
argue for the development of a critical and ethical framework that focuses on
analysing ‘what a defender does or does not do in context', making it a relational definition
rather than one of identity per se. This, they assert, provides a
clearer framework for decision-making, which increases the effectiveness of
protection mechanisms and forestalls misappropriation of the term by states or
other aggressors. In their article, they analyse the three ‘standards’
presented in Fact Sheet 29 to show how critical theory can enable an ethical
understanding of who behaves as a human rights defender.
The
effectiveness of protection mechanisms
A frequent
criticism of protection mechanisms – including by the Women Human Rights
Defenders International Coalition – is that they often do not take a holistic,
gender-sensitive approach to protection.45 Defenders
and practitioners have also expressed concern about the uneven and inconsistent
protection and support provided to defenders, resulting in some defenders from
particular groups and those in specific geographic regions being partially or
completely excluded. There is scant research evaluating how different
protection mechanisms perform for defenders.
Karen Bennett46 (this
issue) examines the effectiveness of the implementation of the EU Guidelines on
Human Rights Defenders since the revision of this policy directive in 2008.
Drawing upon participatory research conducted in Kyrgyzstan, Tunisia and
Thailand, she identifies reasons for gaps in implementation and shortcomings in
the integration of the guidelines in the EU's human rights country strategies.
Bennett points to good practice in implementation, but also barriers to and
constraints upon the capacity and willingness of diplomats to implement the
guidance and defenders from accessing the envisaged support. Bennett argues
that the EU's policy on defenders needs coherence with other EU human rights
foreign policy commitments and that wider foreign and economic policy
directives should adopt a rights-based approach that is inclusive of the
guidelines. Bennett provides both a ‘practice’ and ‘policy’ review of how the
implementation of the guidelines on human rights defenders, as an evolving
regional mechanism contemporaneous with other EU human rights policy
initiatives, can be utilised more consistently in supporting and protecting
defenders.
At times human rights defenders at
risk have also gained protection from an older, more established international
regime – that created for refugees. Martin Jones47 (this
issue) observes there has been little attention paid to the intersection
between these two protection regimes. Arguing that direct engagement can be
productive, he suggests that the provision of asylum to individuals who flee
because they champion human rights causes could provide new ideological
currency to the refugee regime, which has seen the gradual erosion of popular
support since the end of the Cold War. He also notes that defenders face an
additional problem to the difficulties commonly experienced by other refugees –
how to remain effective in their human rights work while living in another
country. Tracing the development of ‘temporary international relocation
initiatives’ for human rights defenders at risk, Jones suggests that these
provide a productive example of the intersection of the two regimes. His
contribution underscores the importance of examining the interaction between
this evolving protection regime and other more established (protection)
regimes.
Repression,
activism and tactics for managing risk
A complex relationship exists
between the repression of defenders and their defence of human rights; in some
cases, repression triggers new forms of mobilisation and activism. The tactics
and strategies that defenders use to manage their own security and to respond
to risk are diverse, creative and highly adapted to local contexts. As some
have observed, there is sometimes a gap between what defenders do and how
transnational actors understand and support them, which can lead to ineffective
protection and support measures.48
Two articles in this collection
examine the ways in which human rights defenders have developed and adapted
tactics to respond to repression in non-democracies. Elisa Nesossi49 (this
issue) examines human rights practice by China's weiquan(‘rights-defence’)
lawyers over a 12-year period (2003–2014), analysing how these lawyers use the
courts and the media to protect vulnerable groups, challenge power and
highlight problems with access to justice. Noting that the Communist Party has
publicly denounced weiquan lawyers and that they work in spite
of political adversity and direct personal risk, she observes that repression –
paradoxically – creates new opportunities for action. In particular, Nesossi
observes how weiquanlawyers maximise opportunities for change that
emerge as a result of repressive action and divisions amongst the political
elite; and that they do so with the support of influential allies, by drawing
upon the diversification of the media, and through developing social networks.
In a similar vein, Laura
Lyytikainen and Freek Van der Vet50 (this
issue) provide useful insight into how two different groups of Russian human
rights defenders – youth activists participating in public protest campaigns in
Moscow and lawyers bringing the cases of victims of the conflict in Chechnya to
the European Court of Human Rights – respond, perceive and manage the high
levels of risk involved in their work. Drawing on research conducted from 2005
to 2013, at a time when the Russian State Duma passed a number of laws that
significantly restricted the activity of defenders, these authors show how
human rights defenders who operate in highly repressive contexts experiment
with new tactics to conduct advocacy, manage fear and challenge the boundaries
of state power. These tactics include developing flexible work methods, routinising
protest, building legal literacy and mental resilience and using vulnerability
to demonstrate state violence and repression.
Key
reflections and ways forward
Amongst some defenders and
practitioners, we see growing consensus about what constitutes ‘security’ and
‘protection’, and how this is to be achieved, by whom and for whom. However,
while systematisation and standardisation in protection activities can provide
some clarity about who should act, how and to what end, there is also a risk
that orthodox ways of thinking will result in rigidity and exclusivity in
policies and practices. As such, they may fail to keep pace with emerging
threats to defenders, the changing nature of civic action, and actors and
actions that promote and protect human rights. The five papers in this special
issue provide timely and important contributions that raise vital questions
about the evolving protection regime for human rights defenders. Yet, critical
gaps in knowledge and understanding remain.51 In
particular, these articles point to the need for further research on:
·
The construction, function and evolution of the
human rights defender protection regime (including changes in its ‘strength’,
‘organisational form’, ‘scope' and ‘allocation mode’52
). This includes examining: the
means and conditions under which state and non-state actors cooperate with each
other to strengthen – or undermine – the protection of defenders; how power,
interests and knowledge shape the protection regime; the governance of
protection mechanisms and how those that operate at different levels relate to
each other; how this protection regime relates to other international
(protection) regimes; and how different factors such as technological
evolution, regional security concerns, and political alliances influence this
protection regime at different levels;
·
Issues arising from the institutionalisation of
the definition of ‘human rights defender’. This includes examining: the
benefits and drawbacks of the use of this term; to whom it is applied and to
whom it is not; the power-relations, politicisation, inequality and ethical
issues that arise from the use of this term;
·
Perceptions of and attitudes to risk amongst
human rights defenders. This includes: the subjective conceptualisation of
‘security’ and ‘protection’; the relationship between the social construction
of risk and identities; the strategic use of risk for advocacy; the security
behaviours of defenders in the way they manage their risk; how defenders build
resilience and strategies for safety in different types of risky environments;
how culture, gender and diversity give rise to protection needs for those who
challenge societal and institutional discrimination, especially women and LGBTI
rights defenders;
·
How the quality, quantity and type of networks
– amongst human rights defenders and between them and their supporters – have
protection effects. This includes: the relationship between trust, solidarity
and security; the way stigmatisation is resisted through counter-narratives and
community support; how alliances are built, and how they are weakened; and how
local relationships have been reconstituted in the light of the development of
the protection regime for human rights defenders.
We strongly encourage the facilitation
of collaborative research and the circulation of ideas between academics,
practitioners and defenders. This might be through: academic research, seminars
and conferences; research embedded in civil society programmes and projects;
and more strategic and sustained foci in the form of new
research hubs that develop theory and practice related to ‘risk’, ‘security’
and ‘protection’. Such initiatives help us to interrogate how the protection
regime for human rights defenders has evolved and strengthens our imagination
of what it should be.
Notes
1. Adopted by UN General Assembly
Resolution 53/144, 9 December 1998, A/RES/53/144.
2. Michel Forst, Human
Rights Defenders (Front Line Defenders, 2008),http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/files/en/Background%20to%20the%20UN%20Declaration%20on%20Human%20Rights%20Defenders.pdf.
3. Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural
Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, International
Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 185.
4. UN Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Commentary to the Declaration on
the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to
Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, July 2011, 5.
5. UN General Assembly Human Rights
Council, Resolution 27/31, Civil Society Space, A/HRC/RES/27/31 (3 October
2014); UN General Assembly Human Rights Council, Resolution 24/21, Civil
Society Space, A/HRC/RES/24/21 (9 October 2013).
6. Inmaculada Barcia, Our
Right to Safety: Women Human Rights Defenders' Holistic Approach to Protection (Toronto:
Association for Women's Rights in Development, 2014); Asia Pacific Forum on
Women, Law and Development, Claiming Rights, Claiming Justice: A
Guidebook on Women Human Rights Defenders (Chiangmai, 2007);
Inmaculada Barcia and Analía Penchaszadeh, Ten Insights to Strengthen
Responses for Women Human Rights Defenders at Risk (Toronto:
Association for Women's Rights in Development, 2012).
7. UN Human Rights Council, Report
of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Margaret
Sekaggya, 'Safe and Enabling Environment for Defenders’,
A/HRC/25/55, 23 December 2013.
8. East and Horn of Africa Human
Rights Defenders Project, ‘Networks for the Protection of Human Rights
Defenders: Notes from the Field', Journal of Human Rights Practice 5,
no. 3 (2013): 522–34; Vanessa Kogan, ‘Protecting Human Rights Defenders in the
North Caucasus: Reflections on Developments from 2009 to the Present’, Journal
of Human Rights Practice 5, no. 3 (2013): 500–11.
9. Todd Landman, ‘Holding the Line:
Human Rights Defenders in the Age of Terror’, British Journal of
Politics & International Relations 8, no. 2 (2006): 123–47.
10. For a discussion of these
debates see: David Chandler, ‘Resilience and Human Security: The
Post-Interventionist Paradigm’,Security Dialogue 43, no. 3 (2012):
213–29; Taylor Owen, ‘Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus:
Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition’, Security
Dialogue 35, no. 3 (2004): 373–87; Roland Paris, ‘Human Security: Paradigm
Shift or Hot Air?’, International Security 26, no. 2 (2001):
87–102.
11. Betty A. Reardon, ‘Women and
Human Security: A Feminist Framework and Critique of the Prevailing Patriarchal
Security System’, in Betty A. Reardon: Key Texts in Gender and Peace,
eds. Betty A. Reardon and Dale T. Snauwaert, Springer Briefs on Pioneers in
Science and Practice 27 (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015),
109–28; J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist
Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1992).
12. Barcia, Our Right to
Safety.
13. Jane Barry and Vahida
Nainar, Women Human Rights Defenders' Security Strategies: Insiste,
Resiste, Persiste, Existe(Ottawa: Urgent Action Fund for Women's Human
Rights; Kvinna Till Kvinna; Front Line Defenders, 2008), 88.
14. East and Horn of Africa Human
Rights Defenders Project, ‘Networks for the Protection of Human Rights
Defenders: Notes from the Field’, Journal of Human Rights Practice 5,
no. 3 (2013): 522–34; Kogan, ‘Protecting Human Rights Defenders in the North
Caucasus'.
15. Barry and Nainar, Women
Human Rights Defenders' Security Strategies; Jane Barry and Jelena
Đorđević, What's the Point of Revolution If We Can't Dance? (Boulder,
CO: Urgent Action Fund for Women's Human Rights, 2007); IM–Defensoras, ‘A
Feminist Alternative for the Protection, Self-Care, and Safety of Women Human
Rights Defenders in Mesoamerica’, Journal of Human Rights Practice 5,
no. 3 (2013): 446–49; Audre Lorde, A Burst of Light: Essays (Ithaca,
NY: Firebrand Books, 1988).
16. Daniel Joloy, 'Mexico's
National Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders: Challenges and Good
Practices’,Journal of Human Rights Practice 5, no. 3 (2013):
489–99.
17. For a list of such
organisations, see: https://ihrfg.org/sites/default/files/Directory_EmergencyResponseGrants_2014.pdf.
18. Federal Department of Foreign
Affairs, Swiss Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (Bern:
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2013),https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/en/documents/topics/aussenpolitik/Menschenrechtsverteidigerinnen_Menschenrechtsverteidiger/2013-Leitlinien-Schutz-Menschenrechtsverteidiger_EN.pdf.
19. Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs, Good Business: Implementing the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, September 2013,https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/236901/BHR_Action_Plan_-_final_online_version_1_.pdf.
20. Draft Law Regarding the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Defenders, adopted by Ivorian Council
of Ministers, 4 September 2013, http://www.gouv.ci/conseil_print_1.php?recordID=173.
See also International Service for Human Rights, Côte d'Ivoire: New Law
will Strengthen Protection of Human Rights Defenders (16 June
2014), http://www.ishr.ch/news/cote-divoire-new-law-will-strengthen-protection-human-rights-defenders.
21. European Union Delegation to
the United Nations, 'EU Council Conclusions on 10th Anniversary of EU
Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders’, 23 June 2014, http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_15216_en.htm.
22. Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe, ‘OSCE Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights
Defenders', June 2014, http://www.osce.org/odihr/119633.
23. Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, Declaration on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict (London,
11 April 2013),https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/185008/G8_PSVI_Declaration_-_FINAL.pdf.
24. UN General Assembly, Resolution
Adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2013: Promotion of the
Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs
of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms: Protecting Women Human Rights Defenders, 30 January
2014.
25. UN Human Rights Council, Protecting
Human Rights Defenders (UNGA, A/HRC/RES/22/6), 12 April 2013.
26. For example, the Human Rights
Council adopted a resolution on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity(A/HRC/27/L.27/Rev.1, 24 September 2014).
27. UN Human Rights Council, Safe
and Enabling Environment for Defenders.
28. Human Rights Council, Report
of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders,
A/69/259, 5 August 2014.
29. Amnesty International, Annual
Report 2014/15: Republic of India, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/india/report-india/ (accessed
16 June 2015); Aloke Tikku, ‘Home Ministry Cancels Registration of 9,000
Defaulting NGOs', Hindustan Times, 28 April 2015, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/home-ministry-cancels-registration-of-9-000-defaulting-ngos/article1-1341658.aspx (accessed
16 June 2015).
30. United States Mission to the
OSCE, ‘Statement on Draft Legislation in Central Asia Impacting NGO Operating
Space’, 22 January 2015, http://osce.usmission.gov/jan_22_15_central_asia.html (accessed
16 June 2015).
31. Thomas Carothers and Saskia
Brechenmacher, Closing Space: Democracy and Human Rights Support Under
Fire(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014).
32. The International Center for
Not-for-Profit Law, A Mapping of Existing Initiatives to Address Legal
Constraints on Foreign Funding (Washington, DC: The International
Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 1 July 2014).
33. See projects such as the Civil
Space Initiative (http://www.wmd.org/projects/civic-space-initiative), the
Enabling Environment Index (http://civicus.org/eei/),
Lifeline: Assistance Fund for Embattled Civil Society Organisations (https://freedomhouse.org/program/lifeline#.VJoeg7gCB),
Making All Voices Count (http://www.makingallvoicescount.org), Digital Defenders
Partnership (https://digitaldefenders.org),
and the Community of Democracies' Working Group on Enabling and Protecting
Civil Society (http://www.community-democracies.org/Working-for-Democracy/Initiatives/Governmental-Bodies/Working-Group-on-Enabling-and-Protecting-Civil-Soc).
34. A leaked report entitled Concerted
Efforts by Select Foreign Funded NGOs to ‘Take Down’ Indian Development
Projects, from the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs' Intelligence Bureau to
Prime Minister's Office, 3 June 2014, was the subject of much media and
third-sector commentary. See: Ram Mashru, ‘India's NGO Backlash: Foreign
Policy’, Foreign Policy, 21 July 2014,http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/21/indias-ngo-backlash/;
Salil Tripathi, ‘NGO: Three-Lettered Angels – Livemint’, Live Mint,
18 June 2014, http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/vqgZM09LRCwmp9erDtKGSI/NGO-Threelettered-angels.html;
The Hindu, ‘Answering to Law, Not to Caesar’, The Hindu, 18 June
2014, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/answering-to-law-not-to-caesar/article6123746.ece.
35. Archana Pyati, Karimov's
War: Human Rights Defenders and Counterterrorism in Uzbekistan, ed. Neil
Hicks (New York: Human Rights First, 2005). The report notes the government of
Uzbekistan's use of the term Wahhabi to describe its radical
opposition to such Islamic groups perceived as a threat to national security.
In April 2014, the Initiative Group of Independent Human Rights Defenders
estimated there were 12,000 persons currently imprisoned in Uzbekistan on vague
and overbroad charges related to ‘religious extremism’, with over 200 convicted
this year alone. See also Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2014: Uzbekistan’,
2014.
36. Financial Action Task
Force, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the
Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations (Paris:
FATF/OECD, February 2012). See also Financial Action Task Force, Best
Practices: Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations (Recommendation 8) (Paris:
FATF/OECD, June 2013); Financial Action Task Force, Risk of Terrorist
Abuse in Non-Profit Organisations (Paris: FATF/OECD, June 2014); Human
Security Collective, European Center for Not-For-Profit Law, and European
Foundation Centre, The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Measures to Fight
Abuse of NPOs for Terrorist Financing – Draft Position Paper, September
2014.
37. For example, the UN General
Assembly only adopted Resolution 68/181 on Protecting Women Human Rights
Defenders on 18 December 2013 after a crucial paragraph was removed – one
calling on states to condemn all forms of violence against women and to refrain
from relying on tradition, religion or custom to avoid obligations for the
elimination of violence against women. This wording had already been agreed
upon in a previous resolution. See International Service for Human
Rights, UN Adopts Landmark Resolution on Protecting Women Human Rights
Defenders, 28 November 2013,http://www.ishr.ch/news/un-adopts-landmark-resolution-protecting-women-human-rights-defenders.
38. The language used by these
states during debate of resolutions on human rights defenders and on civil
society at UNHRC 25 and 27, for instance, repeatedly refers to the
‘responsibilities’ of human rights defenders and CSOs to ‘act within domestic
law' (without acknowledging that said domestic laws often contravene
international human rights law), accuses human rights defenders and CSOs of
allowing themselves to be manipulated by foreign funders seeking to undermine
national sovereignty, or of pursuing ‘erroneous ideologies’, and insists they
act ‘ethically' and with greater ‘transparency and accountability'. Coming from
states that use laws to restrict freedoms of association, assembly and
expression to criminalise and prevent dissent, this represents an ominous,
thinly veiled message.
39. Criticism has been made by NGOs
and even UN Special Procedures of states blocking NGOs through deferral by the
Committee on NGOs that scrutinises NGO applications for ECOSOC status. See:http://www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/article/files/letter_to_us_secretary_of_state_re_idsn.pdf (accessed
16 June 2015).
40. See for example: Gwen Burnyeat,
‘On a Peak in Darien: Community Peace Initiatives in Urabá, Colombia’, Journal
of Human Rights Practice 5, no. 3 (2013): 435–45; Cynthia Soohoo and
Cynthia Hortsch, ‘Who Is a Human Rights Defender? An Essay on Sexual and
Reproductive Rights Defenders', University of Miami Law Review 65,
no. 3 (2011): 981–98; Kate Sheill, ‘Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and
Gender Identity at the UN General Assembly’, Journal of Human Rights
Practice 1, no. 2 (2009): 315–19; Lauri R. Tanner, ‘Kawas v. Honduras
– Protecting Environmental Defenders', Journal of Human Rights Practice 3,
no. 3 ( 2011): 309–26.
41. Robert M. Cutler,
‘De-authoritarization in Uzbekistan?: Analysis and Prospects,’ in Irina
Morozova (ed.), Towards Social Stability and Democratic Governance in
Central Eurasia: Challenges to Regional Security (Amsterdam: IOS
Press, 2005):120–41.
42. Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the
Right to Defend Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 29, 2004.
43. These questions are raised by
Raghad Jaraisy and Tamar Feldman, ‘Protesting for Human Rights in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory: Assessing the Challenges and Revisiting the Human Rights
Defender Framework’, Journal of Human Rights Practice 5, no. 3
(2013): 421–34.
44. Enrique Eguren and Champa
Patel, ‘Towards Developing a Critical and Ethical Approach for Better
Recognising and Protecting Human Rights Defenders', The International
Journal of Human Rights 19, no. 7 (2015): 896–907.
45. Barcia, Our Right to
Safety.
46. Karen Bennett, ‘European Union
Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders: A Review of Policy and Practice towards
Effective Implementation’, The International Journal of Human Rights 19,
no. 7 (2015): 908–934.
47. Martin Jones, ‘Protecting Human
Rights Defenders at Risk: Asylum and Temporary International Relocation’, The
International Journal of Human Rights 19, no. 7 (2015): 935–960.
48. Masa Osama Amir, ‘A Study of
the Experience of Women Human Rights Defenders in Eleven Egyptian
Governorates',Journal of Human Rights Practice 5, no. 3 (2013):
460–77; Kogan, 'Protecting Human Rights Defenders in the North Caucasus’.
49. Elisa Nesossi, ‘Political
Opportunities in Non-Democracies: The Case of Chinese weiquan Lawyers', The
International Journal of Human Rights 19, no. 7 (2015): 961–978.
50. Laura Lyytikainen and Freek Van
der Vet, ‘Violence and Human Rights in Russia: How Human Rights Defenders
Develop their Tactics in the Face of Danger, 2005–2013′, The
International Journal of Human Rights 19, no. 7 (2015): 979–998.
51. Alice M. Nah, Karen Bennett,
Danna Ingleton and James Savage, ‘A Research Agenda for the Protection of Human
Rights Defenders’, Journal of Human Rights Practice 5, no. 3
(1 November 2013): 401–420.; also, notes from the Expert Roundtable on
Innovative Thinking for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders – meeting
organised by Amnesty International, the University of York's Centre for Applied
Human Rights, London Metropolitan University's Human Rights and Social Justice
Research Institute, and the International Service for Human Rights, Geneva, 12
March 2014.
52. Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, ‘Theories of International Regimes', International Organization 41, no. 3 (1987): 491–517.