WUNRN
I’M A
EUROPEAN ROMA WOMAN – WEBSITE
http://www.romawoman.org/?page=mission
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ROMA
INCLUSION INDEX 2015
Direct Link to Full 76-Page 2015 Report:
http://www.romadecade.org/cms/upload/file/9810_file1_roma-inclusion-index-2015-s.pdf
MULTIPLE REPORT COMPONENTS RELATE TO ROMA WOMEN.
The Roma Inclusion Index 2015 is
the first publication to propose a list of relevant indicators and test the
availability of existing data to measure progress or the lack thereof in
addressing the exclusion of Roma according to the Decade priorities. It is not
a data collection exercise – it only attempts to identify and gather in a
comprehensive yet easily readable form existing data collected either
officially by governments or by others. Hesitation to publish something similar
before was due to the scarce existence of official periodic comparable data,
but also the lack of agreement among Decade partners on indicators relevant for
Roma inclusion. The Secretariat therefore decided to propose such a list
itself, based on the work of experts such as those in the Fundamental Rights
Agency Working Party on Roma Integration Indicators, to gather all the
available quantitative data, although not sufficiently comparable and
representative, and to publish the results. We hope this experience will assist
the FRA and the European Union in establishing a standardized system of
indicators and data collection on Roma inclusion.
The Decade aimed at “eliminating
discrimination and closing the unacceptable gaps between Roma and the rest of
society”, notably in the areas of employment, education, health and housing,
taking into consideration the cross-cutting areas of non-discrimination, gender
equality and poverty reduction. Therefore, the Roma Inclusion Index contains a
selection of indicators in all of these areas. Gender is mainstreamed in all
the indicators by reporting on gender disaggregated data where they exist. For
all the indicators the Roma Inclusion Index is looking for the difference (gap)
between Roma and the overall population as the goal of the Decade was to close
the gap. The indicators of the Roma Inclusion Index are intended to be fully
consistent with the larger set of indicators being developed by the Fundamental
Rights Agency.
The Roma Inclusion Index applied a
very simple and flexible methodology for gathering existing data. Consultants
were engaged for each Decade country to identify and gather data. They
prioritized official data, but also used data produced by international
organizations or civil society. They gathered data for the years 2005 and 2014
if available, or otherwise data from years closest to the target dates.
Definitions of the indicators were applied as strictly as possible, and in
cases where data fitting these definitions were not available, available data
as close to the definition of the indicator as possible were provided. In some
cases of unavailable data consultants combined datasets and performed
estimations.
In the Roma Inclusion Index 2015,
after the introduction of the publication and the summary of the findings, the
reader will find country-by-country visual presentations of the data for the
total population, Roma and Romani females for each indicator. Concluding notes
on the gap between the total population and Roma (as well as Romani females)
and on the trend during the Decade period are drawn for each indicator.
Crosscutting Issue: Gender
While data collection on Roma inclusion should be
generally improved, standardized and made more frequent, the situation with
gender disaggregation should be more seriously considered. In many countries for
a significant number of indicators it was difficult to gather gender
disaggregated data for Roma. Gender disaggregated data are less common for
indicators closely related to households, such as housing and poverty. Such is
the case in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Macedonia. In some
countries gender disaggregation is missing also in the areas of education,
employment and health for some of the indicators (in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Spain, Hungary and Romania).
In the Czech Republic, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovakia
only a few indicators lack gender disaggregated data. Gender disaggregated data
for the total population has not been used in the Roma Inclusion Index. The
comparison of the situation of Romani females is done against the total population,
because it makes more sense to assess vulnerability and exclusion against a
group that is included than against another vulnerable and excluded group.
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REPORT: A LOST DECADE? REFLECTIONS ON ROMA INCLUSION
2005-2015
http://www.romadecade.org/cms/upload/file/9809_file1_final-lostdecade.pdf’
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Open Society Foundations - https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/why-europe-s-roma-decade-didn-t-lead-inclusion?utm_source=europe&utm_medium=email&utm_content=IzF6NjfsYSIXLcqz1Top8XZ9Gv3nSGp5dO5leBfP2q8&utm_campaign=europe_092415
WHY EUROPE’S “ROMA DECADE” DID NOT LEAD TO INCLUSION
September 21, 2015 - By Zeljko Jovanovic
For many Roma, life has gone from bad to worse.
The Decade of
Roma Inclusion has ended. This unprecedented collaboration between
12 European countries, encouraged by the World Bank and the Open Society
Foundations, started in 2005 in Sofia, Bulgaria. At that time, the prime
ministers of these countries made a promise to “close the gaps between Roma and
the rest of society,” and committed their domestic public institutions to
fulfill this promise by 2015.
Did governments deliver on the promise? In short, no. The Roma Inclusion Index shows some progress in
literacy levels, completion of primary education, and access to health
insurance. But all in all, the daily life of Roma remains a struggle no other
ethnic group in Europe faces.
On average, in the Decade countries, only one in ten Roma completes
secondary school, almost half of Roma are unemployed, and more than one in
three Roma still live in absolute poverty, meaning they are severely deprived
of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation
facilities, health care, and shelter.
One change is noticeable: when the Decade began, there was less money and
more political will to deliver; today there is more money, but less political
will.
How did this happen?
One contributing factor is, paradoxically, the accession of Eastern
European countries to the European Union. Ten years ago, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania saw the Decade as an opportunity to
demonstrate their fulfillment of EU accession criteria on human and minority
rights. As they were granted membership in the EU, the Decade quickly lost its
relevance for them.
Another influence was the financial crisis, which brought with it anger and
economic anxiety. Against this backdrop, a backlash ensued against governments
and the EU committing millions of euros “for Roma.” Opportunistic politicians
quickly realized the potential of empty slogans like “Gypsy criminality,” “Roma
privilege,” and “unwillingness to integrate” to gain quick and cheap votes.
Others realized they risked losing votes if they did anything positive for
Roma.
This toxic mix increased opposition to Roma children in ethnic-majority
schools and Roma families living in ethnic-majority neighborhoods. Anti-Roma
riots, forced evictions, violence, and killings became part of life for
Roma—particularly in Hungary and Bulgaria, where the Decade was born. The
economic crisis catalyzed anti-Gypsyism as an effective weapon in domestic
politics.
In western EU countries, the fear of Roma immigration coupled with
long-entrenched anti-Roma stereotypes fueled antimigration and anti-EU
politics. Mainstream political parties, wary of far-right electoral gains,
implemented a dual strategy of hardline anti-Roma politics at home, with sympathetic
policy gestures internationally.
For instance, domestically France and Italy took a hard line against Roma.
Italy launched a policy of fingerprinting Roma and placed them in apartheid-like encampments, while France bulldozed Roma settlements.
At the same time, at the international level, both countries pushed for
measures on Roma inclusion in eastern EU countries in order to discourage those
Roma from migrating to the West. This was one of the major reasons behind the
creation of the EU Framework for Roma Integration Strategies,
which called on all EU member states to develop a targeted approach to
Roma inclusion, and to submit their strategies by the end of 2011.
This hypocrisy had devastating effects on Roma in eastern EU countries like
Bulgaria, for instance. Although the EU provided generous funds, Bulgaria did
not use them to prevent evictions or offer alternative housing. It simply
signed on to the EU Framework, just as it signed on to the Decade of Roma
Inclusion, to create the appearance of pushing positive change, while in
reality making few real efforts.
Indeed, last summer, the government calmed ethnic-majority protesters by demolishing
hundreds of Roma houses. Today, Bulgaria and countries like it have
ample funds to improve the situation of Roma—but national political elites
don’t dare risk punishment at the ballot box by enacting policies favorable to
Roma.
The Decade of Roma Inclusion and the EU Framework for Roma Integration were
two of the most significant international political developments for Roma in
the last 10 years. Did they improve life for Roma in Europe? On the
contrary—for many, life has gone from bad to worse.
What the Decade Revealed about Change in Institutions
This status quo exposed by the Decade of Roma Inclusion—the international
appearance of progress concealing a devastating regression at home—works well
for a narrow elite. Too many politicians, civil servants, experts, staff of
international organizations, donors, and local NGOs comfortably entrench
themselves in the industry of report writing, conferences, and usually
EU-funded projects.
These activities might lead to limited improvements, but at the domestic
level they have been ineffective at creating equal access to public services
for Roma.
We, who claim to be most concerned about and committed to inclusion, need
to change the way we work. This starts with some hard truths about the real
obstacles to inclusion.
Anti-Gypsyism, as a form of exclusion, is not haphazard. It is embedded in
our domestic institutions and structures. It runs through public offices,
schools, hospitals, the labor market, the welfare system, police, and
elections. A Roma child denied schooling with everyone else is not the result
of one rogue, racist teacher—a whole system, built and entrenched over time,
has led to this.
Anti-Gypsism, as a form of exploitation, brings political power to
some—anti-Roma campaigns bring in votes—and economic gain to others. Increasing
the number of Roma children in schools for those living with disabilities, for
instance, increases those schools’ revenues.
Nor is anti-Gypsyism a unique instrument. The poor, the young, women,
migrants, Jews, Muslims, LGBTI, and people with disabilities are excluded and
exploited too, although the instruments against them—male supremacy,
Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and others—are different.
Individually, these groups are not powerful enough to challenge comfortably
entrenched elites and institutionally embedded exclusion. It is essential to
form broad coalitions among all those excluded and together force change in
public institutions.
The Decade, the EU Framework, and EU funds are not without merit. They
might help in raising awareness about challenges and possibilities for change,
but they should not serve as fig leaves for governments to conceal their lack
of commitment at home. Such international interventions and funds can help only
if they expand participation in sharing domestic political power and public
budgets beyond the narrow elites.
Only when the excluded and the exploited are a constituent part of setting
priorities for public institutions and funds will we experience a change in the
way schools educate, hospitals cure, police protect, the economy works, and
elections give free voice.
Only then will we have trust in our public institutions.