WUNRN
This is a very serious report for consideration by women’s programs that are monitoring the human rights impact of trade agreements. Indeed, in this complex world where
power and money often dominate non-transparent negotiations on trade and commerce, investment agreements, and marketing treaties as for free trade. Civil society has made efforts to protect human rights, social justice, and such issues as health, land rights, the environment; but the challenges remain. This report is highly insightful!
Website of the UN Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IntOrder/Pages/IEInternationalorderIndex.aspx
To Access Full 50-Page Report – Go to Website: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session30/Pages/ListReports.aspx
and Scroll Down to A/HRC/30/44, and then Click on UN Language Translation of Choice.
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United Nations |
A/HRC/30/44 |
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General Assembly |
Distr.:
General 14 July
2015 Original:
English |
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Human Rights Council
Thirtieth
session
Agenda item 3
Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights,
including the right to development
Report of the Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order, Alfred‑Maurice de Zayas*
Summary |
This report
addresses adverse human rights impacts of international investment
agreements, bilateral investment treaties and multilateral free trade
agreements on the international order, both from the procedural aspect of
their elaboration, negotiation, adoption and implementation, and from the
substantive side, focusing on their constitutionality and effects on
democratic governance, including the exercise of the State’s regulatory
functions to advance the enjoyment of civil, cultural, economic, political
and social rights. It calls for ex ante and ex post human rights, health and
environmental impact assessments, and proposes a plan of action for systemic
change. |
Because all States
are bound by the Charter of the United Nations, all treaties must conform
with it, in particular with Articles 1, 2, 55 and 56. While recognizing
that globalization may contribute to human rights and development, experience
suggests that human rights have frequently been subordinated to dogmas of
market fundamentalism with a focus on profit rather than sustainable
development. Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates
that “[i]n the event of conflict between the obligations of the Members of
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter
shall prevail”. Accordingly, international investment agreements and
investor–State dispute settlement agreements must be tested for conformity
with the Charter of the United Nations and never undermine the ontological
State function to ensure the welfare of all persons under its jurisdiction,
nor lead to retrogression in human rights. Conflicting agreements or arbitral
awards are incompatible with international ordre public, and may be
considered contrary to provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties and invalid as contra bonos mores. |
There is an
emerging customary international law of human rights reflecting a consensus
that human rights provisions in international agreements, including
International Labour Organization (ILO) and World Health Organization (WHO)
Conventions, constitute an internationally binding legal regime with erga
omnes implications. The Independent Expert invites United Nations expert
committees, as well as regional human rights courts to reaffirm the
precedence of human rights over other treaties. He also invites the General
Assembly and United Nations specialized agencies like ILO and WHO to refer
pertinent legal questions to the International Court of Justice for advisory
opinions. He also invites the Human Rights Council through the universal
periodic review and all Special Procedures pursuant to their mandates to
review the conformity of these treaties with human rights norms. |
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I. Introduction
1.
Pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 18/6, 21/9, 25/15 and 27/9, the
Independent Expert has endeavoured to identify obstacles to the realization of
a democratic and equitable international order, including lack of transparency
and accountability (A/HRC/21/45 and A/67/277), lack of genuine democratic
participation in domestic and global decision-making (A/HRC/24/38), asymmetric
economic, financial and trade practices (A/68/284), military expenditures
(A/HRC/27/51) and denial of self-determination (A/69/272).
2.
In this report, the Independent Expert addresses the adverse impacts of free
trade and investment agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral, on the
international order. The report to the General Assembly will focus on the
impacts of investor–State dispute settlement arbitrations. The Independent
Expert has relied on the advice of economists and given attention to the
reports of other Special Procedures mandate holders, including the Special
Rapporteur on the right to food (A/HRC/19/59/Add.5 and A/HRC/10/5/Add.2); the
Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health;[1] the Special Rapporteur on the
human right to safe drinking water and sanitation;[2] the Special Rapporteur on extreme
poverty and human rights;[3] the Independent Expert on
the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial
obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly
economic, social and cultural rights;[4] the Special Rapporteur on the
independence of judges and lawyers; the Special Rapporteur on the rights to
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association (A/HRC/29/25); the former
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights and
transnational corporations and other business enterprises;[5]
and the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises (A/HRC/29/28, paras. 30–31). He
strongly endorses articles 1 to 10 of the 2011 Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (A/HRC/17/31, annex) and the United Nations “Protect,
Respect and Remedy” Framework.[6] He relies on pertinent general
comments and concluding observations of treaty bodies including the Human
Rights Committee, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the
Committee on the Rights of the Child. He welcomes the perceptive diagnoses,
recent conferences and pertinent reform initiatives by UNCTAD.[7]
3.
Advocates of free trade and investment agreements may question the analysis in
this report because of a lack of hands-on experience. Critics, however, cannot
delegitimize the human rights recommendations contained herein, which
correspond to the Human Rights Council’s resolutions pertaining to the mandate.
An international order of sovereign and equal States under the Charter of the
United Nations, committed to the rule of law, transparency and accountability
must not be undermined by private attempts to replace it with an international
order ruled by transnational enterprises lacking democratic legitimacy.
4.
This preliminary report on a complex and multifaceted subject does not question
the axiom that, in principle, free trade is a good thing that has promoted
development for centuries. A breakdown in trade can even usher economic
contraction, as happened with the decline of the Roman Empire into the “dark
ages”. Although bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements may
foster international
exchanges, one should
not be so optimistic as to equate trade with welfare or to pretend that “[o]ne
could almost say that trade is human rights in practice”.[8]
Given that tariffs are already low, do they need to be reduced further at the
expense of domestic regulation of social policy? The focus has shifted to
non-trade barriers, which many countries — both developed and developing —
maintain to protect their domestic markets. Some observers contend that
bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements are geopolitical
constructs having little to do with trade liberalization, while others like
Professor Yash Tandon point to the history of trade as a form of imposing
economic dominance.[9] In any case, a sensible
compromise that allows foreign direct investment while ensuring the protection
of human rights[10] is possible, as recognized by the
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Such obligations are derived
from customary law and treaty law, notably the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. By definition, every State’s legitimacy depends on its ability
to advance the welfare of the population under its jurisdiction. Every State
under the rule of law must fulfil this responsibility and cannot divest itself
of human rights obligations by outsourcing or privatizing activities that are
fundamentally State functions. Before and after entering into international
investment agreements, States should conduct human rights, health and
environmental impact assessments.[11]
5.
Many observers have expressed concern about certain investor–State dispute
settlement arbitrations that have effectively overridden the State’s fulfilment
of its function to regulate domestic labour, health and environmental policies,
and have had adverse human rights impacts, also on third parties, including a
“chilling effect” with regard to the exercise of democratic governance.
Arbitration tribunals are credible institutions only when they operate in a
demonstrably independent, transparent and accountable manner, as required under
article 14 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
concerning suits at law. Investor–State dispute settlement tribunals do not
operate in a separate legal context, but are bound by the erga omnes
obligations imposed by the international human rights regime,[12]
which permeates all areas of human activity, including by non-State actors.
Some observers consider certain arbitration awards frivolous and manifestly
ill-founded, yet not appealable.
6.
A fundamental problem arises concerning the tension between legally binding
human rights treaties and the operation of international investment agreements.
As Bohoslavsky has observed: “There is a need for coherence in order to avoid
the fragmentation of an international legal order that aspires to legality and,
consequently, consistency.”[13]
II. Investment protection versus human rights protection
7.
“Corporations everywhere may well agree that getting rid of regulations would
be good for corporate profits. Trade negotiators might be persuaded that these
trade agreements would be good for trade and corporate profits. But there would
be some big losers – namely, the rest of us.”[14]
8. International investment agreements are not new phenomena in the international arena. Bilateral investment treaties currently number over 3,200. After years of experience with investor–State dispute settlement, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and other arbitrations, it has become apparent that the regulatory function of many States and their ability to legislate in the public interest have been compromised. The problem has been aggravated by the chilling effect of certain awards that have penalized States for adopting regulations to protect the environment, food safety, access to generic medicine and reduction of smoking, as required under the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. The legality of such awards is questionable as contrary to domestic and international ordre public, and may be considered, in some cases, contra bonos mores.
9.
Observers have noted retrogression in the protection of rights including the
rights to life,[15] food (A/HRC/25/57), water and
sanitation,[16] health, housing, education,
culture, improved labour standards, an independent judiciary, a clean
environment and the right not to be subjected to forced resettlement. Moreover,
there is a legitimate concern that international investment agreements might
aggravate the problem of extreme poverty,[17] foreign debt renegotiation, financial regulation and the rights of indigenous
peoples, minorities, persons with disabilities and older persons and other
vulnerable groups.
10. The
Working Group on business and human rights has stressed in its reports that the
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights stipulate in principles 8
and 9 that “States should ensure that governmental departments, agencies and
other State-based institutions that shape business practices are aware of and
observe the State’s human rights obligations” and that “States should maintain
adequate domestic policy space to meet their human rights obligations when
pursuing business-related policy objectives with other States or business
enterprises, for instance through investment treaties or contracts”.
Accordingly, all international investment agreements under negotiation should
include a clear provision stipulating that in case of conflict between the
human rights obligations of a State and those under other treaties, human
rights conventions prevail.
11. The
1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is an
example of an agreement that has led to relocation of manufacturing industries,
resulting in loss of employment in the United States (estimated at 850,000
jobs) and the proliferation of assembly centres in Mexico,
known as maquiladoras,[18] where labour costs are lower and
social protection below ILO standards. NAFTA “provided investors with a unique
set of guarantees designed to stimulate foreign direct investment and the
movement of factories within the hemisphere … . Furthermore, no protections
were contained in the core of the agreement to maintain labor or environmental
standards. As a result, NAFTA tilted the economic playing field in favor of
investors, and against workers and the environment”.[19]
Several international investment agreements are currently being negotiated,
mostly in secret, including the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP), the Trade in Services Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.[20]
12.
Numerous scholars and Nobel prize laureates in economics have already signalled
the dangers to democratic governance and human rights. Stiglitz states: “These
agreements go well beyond trade, governing investment and intellectual property
as well, imposing fundamental changes to countries’ legal, judicial, and
regulatory frameworks, without input or accountability through democratic
institutions. Perhaps the most invidious — and most dishonest — part of such
agreements concerns investor protection. Of course, investors have to be
protected against the risk that rogue governments will seize their property.
But that is not what these provisions are about. There have been very few
expropriations in recent decades, and investors who want to protect themselves
can buy insurance from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, a World
Bank affiliate (the US and other governments provide similar insurance). … The
real intent of these provisions is to impede health, environmental, safety,
and, yes, even financial regulations.”[21] With regard to developing
countries, the 2014 report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) further notes: “Foreign capital flows to developing and
transition economies may support investment, economic diversification and
growth, or generate macroeconomic instability, external imbalances and boom-and-bust-credit
episodes. … For macroprudential and developmental reasons, governments need
sufficient policy space to be able to manage foreign capital flows, influence
their amount and composition, and channel them to productive uses.”[22]
This correctly points out that foreign direct investment and other capital flows can generate problems in areas
beyond human rights.
13.
Observers have noted grave democratic deficits with international investment
agreements and investor–State dispute settlement tribunals and wondered why
States continue to engage in negotiations, based on partisan studies and overly
optimistic forecasts about gross domestic product (GDP) growth and employment.
Not only is there a failure of States to proactively disclose information about
the agreements, but key stakeholders are excluded from the negotiating table,
where mostly corporate lawyers and lobbyists[23]
participate. There is even an attempt to circumvent parliaments by
“fast-tracking” the adoption of these agreements, manifesting a gross absence
of due process and hence of democratic legitimacy.
14.
There is no lack of good diagnoses about the challenge. The problem lies in
part in an anachronistic and uncritical commitment to the philosophy of market
fundamentalism. Joseph writes perceptively: “Free trade is not an end in
itself. … The fervour with which free trade advocates continue to promote their
cause is astonishing.”[24] Stiglitz notes the lack of
empirical evidence that trade liberalization has significantly increased GDP
and employment, notwithstanding dogmatic assertions to that effect and
amazingly optimistic forecasts for agreements currently under consideration.[25]
As Joseph observes, because trade law spills over into other areas of law, the
desire for certainty cannot legitimately quarantine trade rules from allegedly
non-trade considerations such as human rights and labour standards.[26]
With regard to ongoing negotiations on the TTIP, Capaldo questions current
assumptions and the projections: “Projections by different institutions have
been shown to rely on the same Computable General Equilibrium Model that has
proven inadequate as a tool for trade policy analysis. … [W]e assess the
effects of TTIP using the United Nations Global Policy Model, which
incorporates more sensible assumptions on macroeconomic adjustment, employment
dynamics, and global trade. We project that TTIP will lead to a contraction of
GDP, personal incomes and employment. We also project an increase in financial
instability and a continuing downward trend in the labor share of GDP.”[27]
……………………………………………………………………
Guiding
Principles on business and human rights: Implementing
the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework – excerpts
20. The
Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles in its resolution 17/4 of
16 June 2011.
Guiding principle 9
States should maintain adequate domestic policy
space to meet their human rights obligations when pursuing business-related
policy objectives with other States or business enterprises, for instance
through investment treaties or contracts.
Commentary
Economic agreements concluded by States, either
with other States or with business enterprises — such as bilateral investment
treaties, free trade agreements or contracts for investment projects — create
economic opportunities for States. But they can also affect the domestic policy
space of Governments. For example, the terms of international investment
agreements may constrain States from fully implementing new human rights
legislation, or put them at risk of binding international arbitration if they
do so. Therefore, States should ensure that they retain adequate policy and
regulatory ability to protect human rights under the terms of such agreements,
while providing the necessary investor protection.
Guiding principle 25
As part of their duty to protect against
business-related human rights abuse, States must take appropriate steps to
ensure, through judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate
means, that when such abuses occur within their territory and/or jurisdiction
those affected have access to effective remedy.
Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/29/28 – excerpts
Transparency in investment arbitration
21. A
significant opportunity for increasing transparency in the area of
investor-State arbitration has arisen from work of the Working Group on
Arbitration and Conciliation of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The UNCITRAL Working Group started working on
transparency in 2010, with a mandate that stressed the importance of ensuring
transparency in investor-State dispute settlements (A/6317, para. 314). In
a written submission in support of that mandate, a Member State observed that
the lack of transparency in investor-State arbitration was contrary to the
fundamental principles of good governance and human rights upon which the
United Nations is founded (see A/CN.9/662, para. 20).
That work has culminated in two major texts: (a) the rules on transparency
in treaty-based investor-State arbitration, which came into effect on
1 April 2014; and (b) a convention on transparency[28]
(the United Nations Convention on Transparency), which was finalized by the
Commission in July 2014 and opened for signature on 17 March 2015. The Working
Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other
business enterprises welcomes these new transparency rules.
22. Both
the Guiding Principles and the UNCITRAL work on transparency back procedural
and legal transparency and take a practical approach to achieving that aim. The
new UNCITRAL rules on transparency seek to address a regular concern with
investor-State dispute settlement cases – namely that their typically
confidential and non-participatory nature does not allow for involvement by
affected stakeholders, or for an adequate balance between the need for States
to ensure that they retain adequate policy and regulatory ability to protect
human rights and provide investor protection, as clarified in Guiding
Principle 9. With the new UNCITRAL rules and the United Nations Convention
on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, States have a
practical means to promote good governance and respect for human rights with a
broader policy framework that is aligned with the Guiding Principles.[29]
23.
These rules, when they apply, provide a transparent procedural regime under
which investment treaty arbitrations are conducted. They can be used in
investor-State arbitrations initiated under UNCITRAL arbitration rules, as well
as under other institutional arbitration rules or in ad hoc proceedings. States
can now incorporate them into investment treaties concluded on or after 1 April
2014, but for the rules to apply to disputes arising under the more than 3,000
investment treaties concluded before that date, the States parties to a treaty,
or disputing parties in an investor-State arbitration, would need to agree to
apply the rules under that treaty or to that dispute. This highlights the
importance of the Convention on Transparency, which provides an efficient,
multilateral mechanism by which States can agree, subject to relevant
reservations, to apply the rules to all arbitrations arising under their
investment treaties concluded before 1 April 2014. The Working Group welcomes
the rules and considers that an obvious step for States to remedy incoherence
between current modes of investment with norms for good governance and human
rights considerations, including those set out in the Guiding Principles, would
be to sign and ratify the Convention.
24. The
Working Group is pleased to have had the opportunity to engage with UNCITRAL,
including at its forty-seventh session in July 2014, and to note that in the
report of that session the Commission agreed that the UNCITRAL secretariat
should monitor developments in the area of business and human rights, in
cooperation with relevant bodies within the United Nations and beyond and inform
the Commission about developments of relevance to UNCITRAL work (see A/69/17,
para. 204).
Guiding principles on human rights impact assessments of trade
and investment agreements, A/HRC/19/59/Add.5 – excerpts
25. All
States should prepare human rights impact assessments prior to the conclusion
of trade and investment agreements.
26.
States must ensure that the conclusion of any trade or investment agreement
does not impose obligations inconsistent with their pre-existing international
treaty obligations, including those to respect, protect and fulfil human
rights.
27.
Human rights impact assessments of trade and investment agreements should be
prepared prior to the conclusion of the agreements and in time to influence the
outcomes of the negotiations and, if necessary, should be completed by ex post
impact assessments. Based on the results of the human rights impact assessment,
a range of responses exist where an incompatibility is found, including but not
limited to the following:
(a)
Termination of the agreement;
(b)
Amendment of the agreement;
(c)
Insertion of safeguards in the agreement;
(d)
Provision of compensation by third-State parties;
(e)
Adoption of mitigation measures.
28. Each
State should define how to prepare human rights impact assessments of trade and
investment agreements it intends to conclude or has entered into. The
procedure, however, should be guided by a human rights-based approach, and its
credibility and effectiveness depend on the fulfilment of the following minimum
conditions:
(a)
Independence;
(b)
Transparency;
(c)
Inclusive participation;
(d)
Expertise and funding; and
(e)
Status.
29.
While each State may decide on the methodology by which human rights impact
assessments of trade and investment agreements will be prepared, a number of
elements should be considered:
(a)
Making explicit reference to the normative content of human rights obligations;
(b)
Incorporating human rights indicators into the assessment; and
(c)
Ensuring that decisions on trade-offs are subject to adequate consultation
(through a participatory, inclusive and transparent
process), comport with the principles of equality and non-discrimination, and
do not result in retrogression.
30.
States should use human rights impact assessments, which aid in identifying
both the positive and negative impacts on human rights of the trade or
investment agreement, to ensure that the agreement contributes to the overall
protection of human rights.
31. To
ensure that the process of preparing a human rights impact assessment of a
trade or investment agreement is manageable, the task should be broken down
into a number of key steps that ensure both that the full range of human rights
impacts will be considered, and that the assessment will be detailed enough on
the impacts that seem to matter the most:
(a)
Screening;
(b)
Scoping;
(c)
Evidence gathering;
(d)
Analysis;
(e)
Conclusions and recommendations; and
(f) Evaluation mechanism.
[1] A/69/299, A/HRC/11/12 and
A/HRC/20/15/Add.2. See also E/CN.4/2005/51/Add.3 and www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SForum/SForum2015/DainiusPuras.pdf.
[2] “Extraterritorial violations may
occur, for example, when … (d) States fail to respect human rights or
restrict the ability of others to comply with their human rights obligations in
the process of elaborating, applying and interpreting international trade and
investment agreements” (A/HRC/27/55, para. 71).
[3] “States should take into account
their international human rights obligations when designing and implementing
all policies, including international trade, taxation, fiscal, monetary,
environmental and investment policies” (A/HRC/21/39, para. 61).
[4] Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky and
Juan Bautista Justo, “The conventionality control of investment
arbitrations: enhancing coherence through dialogue”, Transnational Dispute
Management, vol. 10, No. 1 (2013), pp. 1–12.
[6]
business-humanrights.org/en/un-secretary-generals-special-representative-on-business-human-rights/un-protect-respect-and-remedy-framework-and-guiding-principles.
[8]
Pascal Lamy (former Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO)), “Towards
shared responsibility and greater coherence: human rights, trade and
macroeconomic policy”, speech at the Colloquium on Human Rights in the Global
Economy, Geneva, 13 January 2010. Available from
www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl146_e.htm.
[9]
Yash Tandon, Trade is War: the West’s War against the World (OR Books,
2015). See also the history of the Opium Wars to force the opening of China to
European trade in Jack Beeching, The Chinese Opium Wars (Orlando,
Florida, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975); and Susanna Hoe and Derek Roebuck, The
Taking of Hong Kong: Charles and Clara Elliot in China Waters (Richmond,
Surrey, Curzon Press, 1999).
[10]
See Stephan W. Schill (ed.), International Investment Law and Comparative
Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010); Joseph François et al.,
“Reducing transatlantic barriers to trade and investment: an economic
assessment”, IIDE Discussion Paper No. 20130401(Institute for International and
Development Economics, 2013); V. S. Seshadri, “Trans-Atlantic trade and
investment partnership”, RIS Discussion Paper No. 185 (New Delhi, Research
and Information Systems for Developing Countries, 2013); Jeffrey J. Schott
and Cathleen Cimino, “Crafting a transatlantic trade and investment
partnership: what can be done”, Policy Brief No. PB13-8 (Washington, D.C.,
Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2013); and U.S. Business
Coalition for TPP, “VOICES: Asia-Pacific Policy Experts Support TPP”, 28 April
2015, available from
tppcoalition.org/voices-asia-pacific-policy-experts-support-tpp-and-tpa.
[11] See A/HRC/19/59/Add.5; www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/report_hria-seminar_2010.pdf and www.humanrights.dk/business/impact-assessment.
[12] Bruno Simma and Theodore Kill, “Harmonizing
investment protection and human rights: first steps towards a methodology”, in
Christina Binder et al. (eds.), International Investment Law for the
21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford University
Press, 2009).
[13] Bohoslavsky (see footnote 4
above), p. 10. See also the report of the Study Group of the International
Law Commission on fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from
the diversification and expansion of international law, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission 2006, vol. II (Part Two), para. 251.
[14] Joseph Siglitz, “On the wrong
side of globalization”, New York Times, 15 March 2014. See also Pope Francis’ statement http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-276806-2015-07-10.html
[15] The right to life is impacted
when a person dies because of lack of access to medicine because pharmaceutical
monopolies have “privatized knowledge” and, through “evergreening” of patents,
delay or make the introduction of significantly cheaper generic medicine
impossible. The right to life is also violated when farmers and other labourers
have their livelihoods destroyed by “free trade” without protective
governmental action. For instance, bilateral investment treaties and free trade
agreements impacted millions of farmers in India and caused a significant rise
in suicides, see Devinder Sharma, “‘Free’ trade killing farmers in India”,
November 2007, available from
www.bilaterals.org/?free-trade-killing-farmers-in.
[16] www.cepal.org/es/publicaciones/3839-proteccion-del-derecho-humano-al-agua-y-arbitrajes-de-inversionhttp://cap-net-esp.org/document/document/181/agua_y_saneamiento_
tratados_de_protecci%C3%B3n_a_las_inversiones.pdf.
[17]
www.globalresearch.ca/the-free-trade-agreements-the-asia-europe-peoples-forum-call-to-action/5416888?print=1.
[18] See
www.hrw.org/news/1996/08/17/mexicos-maquiladoras-abuses-against-women-workers;
sdmaquila.blogspot.ch/2010/02/maquiladoras-101-english.html; and www.researchgate.net.
publication/266820089_Human_rights_violations_in_the_Maquiladora_Industry.
[19]
Robert E. Scott, “The high price of ‘free’ trade: NAFTA’s failure has cost the
United States jobs across the nation”, Briefing paper No. 147, Economic Policy
Institute, 17 November 2003, available from
www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp147.
[20]
See www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/RCEP/;
donttradeourlivesaway.wordpress.com/2015/06/11/press-statement-civil-society-raises-major-concerns-on-indias-engagement-with-the-massive-rcep-trade-deal/; and trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf.
The European Free Trade Association is also negotiating free trade agreements:
see www.asean.org/images/2012/documents/Guiding%20Principles%20
and%20Objectives%20for%20Negotiating%20the%20Regional%20Comprehensive%20Economic%20Partnership.pdf.
[21]
www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-secret-corporate-takeover-by-joseph-e--stiglitz-2015-05.
[22] Trade
and Development Report, 2014 p. 145. Available from http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tdr2014_en.pdf.
See also UNCTAD
World Investment Report 2015: Reforming the International Investment Regime.
[23]
See www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/business/trade-advisory-committees/index.html.;
big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/WarrenBrownTPPLetter.pdf;
corporateeurope.org/
pressreleases/2014/07/agribusiness-biggest-lobbyist-eu-us-trade-deal-new-research-reveals;
www.publicintegrity.org/2005/07/07/5786/drug-lobby-second-none;
www.citizen.org/documents/egregious-investor-state-attacks-case-studies.pdf;
and www.opensecrets.org/lobby/methodology.php.
[24]
Sarah Joseph, Blame it on the WTO? A Human Rights Critique (Oxford
University Press, 2011), p. 288.
[25]
Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton, Fair Trade for All: How Trade can
Promote Development (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 34.
[26]
Joseph (see footnote 23 above), citing Frank Garcia, “The global market and
human rights: trading away the human rights principle”, Brooklyn Journal of
International Law, vol. 7 (1999), p. 51, at p. 65. See also Jeronim
Capaldo, “The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: European
disintegration, unemployment and instability”, GDAE Working Paper No. 14-03,
Global Development and Environment Institute at Tufts University, available
from http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/policy_research/ttip_simulations.html.
[28] A/CN.9/812 and www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/
Transparency-Convention-e.pdf. The Working Group chairperson was
invited to speak at the March 2015 signing ceremony.