WUNRN
https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/2126
CONSIDER IN THE CONTEXTS OF THE DESPERATE NEEDS OF WOMEN VICTIMS OF CONFLICT, NATURAL DISASTERS, FOR HUMANITARIAN AID:
“Today’s complex humanitarian crises require a
more active political will from the main international actors to face the power
structures that benefit from violence and conflict, by resorting to more
coherent and consensual solutions, and by limiting the involvement of military
forces in the distribution of aid and other traditionally humanitarian
activities. In a context where bilateral aid is increasingly denied to
countries that do not obey western economic and political structures and
demands, maintaining a humanitarian action that is free from political
conditionality and military constraints is even more necessary.[57] It must, therefore, be reaffirmed that
when people are actually suffering, the humanitarian imperative must prevail
over political and military objectives. At the same time, there needs to be a
search for more sustainable and positive relations between humanitarian action
and political motivations, as well as durable and coherent solutions for
conflicts.[58]”
Humanitarian Challenges & Dilemmas in Crisis Settings
FEBRUARY 18, 2015 · DANIELA NASCIMENTO
ABSTRACT: With the
end of the Cold War, both the concept and practice of humanitarian action have
significantly changed. The emergence of the so-called ‘complex humanitarian
crises’ made it clear that traditional humanitarian responses based on the
classical principles of impartiality and neutrality were not sufficient nor the
most appropriate to respond to such complex challenges. The 1990s thus saw the
emergence of a ‘new humanitarianism’, which
incorporates much broader and longer-term objectives, such as development or
peace and poses significant challenges to humanitarian actors in the field.
Most of these challenges relate to the increasing political and militarized
nature of humanitarian action that was pursued. This article aims to analyze
the evolution of the concept and practice of humanitarianism by critically
looking at the main trends that have characterized the most recent aid
paradigms and by arguing that effective humanitarian action is now facing
significant dilemmas and being undermined by this new approach to
humanitarianism.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Dr.
Daniela Nascimento is a Researcher at the Center for Social Studies and
Assistant Professor at the School of Economics of the University of Coimbra in
Coimbra, Portugal.
I. Introduction
The
international community has been permanently confronted with wars, natural
catastrophes and extreme situations that affect and endanger the lives,
dignity, and subsistence of millions of people. Throughout history, such
life-threatening events have prompted the international community to provide
humanitarian assistance in an attempt to alleviate human suffering and
distress. After the end of the Cold War, the changing internal climate
contributed to significant changes in humanitarian and emergency operations.
The emergence of the so-called ‘complex humanitarian emergencies’ made it clear
that traditional responses based on the classical principles of impartiality
and neutrality were no longer effective or sufficient to respond to such
complex needs. This change, along with a certain abuse of the ‘humanitarian’
label, has raised some confusion in relation to the true nature and purpose of
humanitarian action. In response, major international actors (Western states
individually and the United Nations collectively) proposed a more integrated
intervention approach to account for the multifaceted nature of internal
conflicts and humanitarian action. Thus, the 1990s saw the emergence of a ‘new humanitarianism’ that included broader and
longer-term objectives such as development and peace.[1]
This new
approach to humanitarianism has been applied since the mid-1990s with some
success. However, the unprincipled responses to the terrorist attacks of 9/11
reinforced “new humanitarianism’s” most negative and problematic features –
politicization, militarization, human rights conditionality, and erosion of
classical principles. These have introduced important problems and even more
complex dilemmas to humanitarian actors.[2] With this
article, we seek to trace the evolution of the concept and practice of
humanitarian action, looking at the trends that have characterized the most
recent aid paradigms. We will also consider the main dilemmas and challenges
that humanitarian action is facing, without neglecting the direct and indirect
impacts of the ‘war on terror’ as well as the
future prospects for humanitarian assistance.
II. Humanitarianism:
from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’
The concept
and practice of humanitarian action has its origins and roots in historical,
religious, and philosophical traditions. However, we can affirm that
humanitarian action dates back to 1859 when the young Swiss entrepreneur Henri
Dunant witnessed the Battle of Solferino. Outraged and shocked by the brutality
of that particular battle, Dunant felt compelled to seek help and medical
assistance for the wounded and sick soldiers. Dunant convinced Napoleon III to
release the doctors kept as war prisoners in order to provide assistance to
wounded soldiers. After Solferino, Dunant returned to Switzerland and wrote his
memoires (A Memory of Solferino, 1862) where he proclaimed that
all nations should establish voluntary societies to assist and care for all
individuals who are injured, wounded, and sick in war. In 1862, Dunant, along
with Gustave Moynier, President of the Public Welfare Geneva Society, and
General Dufour, created a committee aimed at guaranteeing medical care and
assistance to those involved in war. At a conference in Geneva in 1863, delegates
from 17 countries established the International Committee for Relief to the
Wounded, which later became the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC).[3] These events symbolized the convergence of
four fundamental developments within the humanitarian sphere: the
crystallization of the idea of humanitarian action; the institutionalization of
that same idea with the creation of what has become the most well-known
international organization in human crises responses; the codification of the
idea of humanitarian action in humanitarian law with the definition of the
Hague Law (1899 and 1907) and the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Geneva Law); and
finally, the will of a sovereign authority to place humanitarian imperative
above national interests and security. Classical humanitarianism involves a
series of activities and legal principles that seek to restrain and limit
violence and its effects. The type is also characterized by a specific
normative and legal basis that includes international humanitarian law, human
rights law, and refugee law, all applicable in the context of armed conflicts.
Thus, classical humanitarianism and humanitarian action are concerned with the
protection of the lives and dignity of all individuals who are not part of a
conflict, namely civilians, refugees, or internally displaced persons.[4]
In light of
these characteristics, classical humanitarian activities are based on certain
underlying principles such as a commitment to provide protection and assistance
without any distinction based on race, color, religious belief, or ethnic
affiliation. Thus, it is essential for humanitarian action to be guided by the
principles of impartiality to ensure all individuals in need are assisted
equally and with sole regard given to their immediate needs.[5]
Classical
humanitarian action has been, since its origin, justified and legitimized by
some distinctive features, such as the defense of certain ethical principles
and values and a vision of the human being that is not attached to any
political ideology.[6] The notion has also been
characterized by the need for an independent and neutral involvement of
humanitarian actors. Based on these principles and assumptions, actions led by
the international civil society up until the 1980s underlined the vision that
this should be, ideally, seen as a universal and unconditional right that could
not be tainted by bureaucracy.[7] However,
the concept of classical humanitarianism has changed and become more fragmented
and complex, referring to a wider range of actions and situations. As a result,
and as suggested by Hugo Slim, humanitarian activities became no longer limited
to humanitarian agencies in their classical sense. In fact, besides
organizations like the ICRC or MSF (by principle dedicated exclusively to
humanitarian work), a multiplicity of other organizations and actors, both
governmental and non-governmental, were progressively on humanitarian concerns
and goals in their mandates.[8]
This was
particularly clear in the beginning of the 1990s. The emergence of a ‘new world
order’ was characterized by important geopolitical changes, a growing number of
violent conflicts and crises as well as by a progressive erosion of the
distinction between civilian and combatants. During this time, there were
equally significant changes at the level of the traditional vision of
humanitarianism in relation to the multiple ‘complex (political) emergencies’,
i.e. humanitarian crises of a broader, multi-causal nature involving all the
dimensions of society and of the populations’ lives. Among UN agencies, a
complex emergency is understood as denoting a conflict-related humanitarian
disaster involving a higher degree of political, economic and cultural
breakdown and social dislocation. An emergency reflecting this condition,
requires a system-wide aid response from the international community. In fact,
by 1993 there were about 50 “new” wars, mostly internal and defined by the
United Nations as “complex (political) emergencies”, i.e., major humanitarian
crisis of a multi-causal nature, all-encompassing and involving every dimension
of a society and the lives of the whole population.[1] However,
responses to humanitarian crises and conflicts were frequently chaotic and
ill-conceived, reflecting an international community concerned with the
alleviation of human suffering worldwide but, at the same time, ill-prepared
and sharing very different interests and priorities [9]. As a consequence, classical humanitarian action
has received intense criticism for responses in these new conflict scenarios.
This criticism, originally targeted at crises and famines in Sudan and Ethiopia
at the end of the 1980s, was mainly directed to the failed humanitarian
responses in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and, more specifically, to its merely
palliative and thus unsustainable character.[10] According
to its critics, both at the academic and practical level, these actions
emphasized the ineffectiveness and lack of professionalism characteristic of
classical humanitarian organizations that fed and perpetuated conflicts and
crises through their misuse of aid and poor resource distribution.[11]
Claiming to
correct the mistakes of the past and representing a radical rupture with the
classic conception of humanitarian assistance, a new and more political
conception of humanitarianism emerged. The movement gained importance and was
adopted by most donor governments, multilateral agencies and many NGOs. This
so-called “new humanitarianism” clearly challenged the classic paradigm. Given
the change in conflict and post-conflict circumstances, the traditional
objectives of saving lives and relieving human suffering were insufficient and
merely temporary. The basic idea was that humanitarian assistance should have
longer-term objectives such as peace building, human rights protection and
promotion and, in a last stage, peace.[12] This trend
was related to the need for a linkage between emergency and development
assistance that gained increased support and strength through this new
humanitarianism during the mid-90s. As Anderson and Woodrow suggest, far from
contributing to longer term development objectives, emergency aid was
detracting from the future of these populations. It was, therefore, necessary
to conceive and undertake emergency assistance interventions, which could
contribute, in the longer term, to development and peace.[13] With this ‘new humanitarianism’,
a clearer analysis of the contexts is defended, seeking a combination between
the immediate needs and future development, reinforcement of local services and
structures, empowerment, participation and enhancement of the populations’
capacities, human rights promotion and protection (including gender issues) and
contribution to peacebuilding. In this context, and
far from its neutral nature, the new humanitarianism emerged, as Adam Roberts
defends, “as an answer, or even as a substitute or a supplement to the liberal,
democratic ideology.”[14]
As a
consequence, in part, of its limited and apparent success, the new humanitarian
policy started shifting towards conflict resolution and post-conflict
reconstruction. The movement began developing tools and institutions that were
able to undertake transformations that would lead to violence reduction and
conflict prevention instead of humanitarian assistance per se. In fact, most humanitarian projects funded by
Western donor agencies became dependent on this merge between humanitarian and
broader security goals. The association of conflict and underdevelopment with
instability that could undermine and risk the world’s peace and stability
helped blur security and development concerns and was translated into concrete
policies by many donor agencies. As argued by Duffield, the promotion of
development has become synonymous with the pursuit of security, while at the
same time, security has become a prerequisite for sustainable development.[15] Humanitarian action is thus incorporated in
this security-development nexus, with all the implications it entails from the
point of view of its implementation and the variety of involved actors, not
necessarily all with a humanitarian mandate.[16] This
international context of experimentation and chronic instability in many
humanitarian aid recipient countries has shaped what has become known as the
1990s ‘new aid’ paradigm. In this sense, the use of “humanitarian” rhetoric has
become another instrument of foreign policy at the service of states and
reflects the growing politicisation of humanitarian assistance. The term also
contributes to a weakening of a specific mandate and objectives that undermine
humanitarian priorities. In contrast with classic humanitarianism, which tended
to ignore political contexts, this new conception emerged by a much more
political dimension of humanitarian assistance that was no longer aimed at
responding above all to the victim’s needs and suffering, but instead to stimulate
more political and social processes.[17] For that,
even humanitarian aid provided within this frame should be ‘politically
intelligent and conscious of the contexts in which it is used in order to
contribute to such objectives.’[18]
Due to the fact
that, in contemporary conflicts, humanitarian aid is increasingly tied to
political interests, effective and well-conceived humanitarian action requires
broader objectives. These objectives are defined in accordance with possible
consequences as well as with the degree of cooperation and obedience by the
recipient countries and actors to those same objectives. Furthermore, the
classical principle of ‘humanitarian imperative’ as a fundamental basis for
responding to human suffering gives place to a consequentialist logic according
to which humanitarian action should be dependent on the attainment of the
defined long-term objectives.[19] No longer
seen as a right to which people are entitled to in times of human distress,
contemporary forms of humanitarian aid ended up neglecting the principle of
humanity by allowing victims of humanitarian crisis to be left without any aid
if one considers that such action will risk medium and long-term goals.[20] Donor governments thus take control and
initiative of the humanitarian agenda. It also becomes clear that within the
framework of this ‘new humanitarianism,’ the
guiding principles of classical humanitarian action – humanity, impartiality,
neutrality and independence – are progressively abandoned and replaced by other
principles and priorities in these new contexts. They follow a new, integrated
agenda to respond to new types of violent conflicts and resulting humanitarian
crisis. These new circumstances obliged most agencies to address, more
directly, the contested neutrality as well as the independent nature of their
actions at the same time they had to adjust to an increasing legal vacuum.[21] By frequently leaving aside traditional
humanitarian concerns and principles and replacing these with development and
conflict resolution goals, the ‘new humanitarianism’ tried
to adapt itself to the complexity of the ‘new’ human crisis. ‘New humanitarianism’ adopted a more flexible type
of action according to the circumstances and the anticipated consequences of
such action.[22]Humanitarian organizations thus become confronted
with a series of difficult and uncomfortable dilemmas in their work due to an
increasing difficulty in separating their traditional humanitarian activities
from these new political constraints and broader objectives.[23]
Although
progressively defended in theory and practice, especially by donor governments,
this new framing also raised various important ethical problems since it
resulted in a distortion in the original essence of humanitarianism and limited
independent and impartial humanitarian action. ‘New humanitarianism’ also
started being questioned and challenged in its assumptions by academics and
practitioners due to the fact that decisions that had humanitarian implications
were increasingly being taken on the basis of political criteria and interests
instead of on the victims’ needs. It is exactly in this scenario of important
changes that the first criticism to the ‘new humanitarianism’ arises
focusing mainly on what were considered as its main risks and challenges:
political instrumentalization of humanitarian action, conditionality (mainly in
terms of human rights conditions attached to aid); erosion of classical
humanitarian principles and militarization.
We
will now look in more detail at the content of each of these criticisms. The
article will illustrate these with examples that, in our view, reflect many of
the challenges and dilemmas faced by humanitarian agencies and raised by this
new approach to humanitarian action.
A. Political Instrumentalization
of Humanitarian Aid
As previously
stated, the relation between aid and politics has changed significantly, with
humanitarian aid increasingly seen as being part of a strategy led by donor
governments and agencies to transform conflicts, decrease violence, and promote
peace and human rights. This ‘new humanitarianism,’ with
a focus on political analysis and on the assumptions of liberal development,
market economy and participative democracy, was put forward as an alternative
to the supposedly failed paradigm of classical humanitarianism. The paradigm
was a new model to govern, and to a certain extent, control the borderlands of
the international system.[24] The main
problem is that this broadening of humanitarian goals was not accompanied by a
revitalized and effective international commitment towards conflict prevention
and conflict resolution in order to develop more stable states. Instead, for
most donors and political actors, humanitarian action was from then on viewed
as the main form of political action to avoid and
respond to new conflicts. Again, in most Western countries, there has been a
convergence between development and security concerns which was based on the
idea that underdevelopment was one of the main causes of conflict, thus
threatening international peace and security. As a result, peace and security
could only be achieved and maintained only through a liberal development model.[25] Simultaneously, and in relation to NGOs, this
convergence made it more difficult to separate their own humanitarian
activities from the security objectives and concerns of the northern donors. In
these circumstances, attempts by aid agencies to promote development in the
context of these new assistance framings reinforced their subscription to
political and economic criteria and constraints, namely for funding purposes.
In this sense, according to Duffield, humanitarian action becomes an instrument
of international regulation, obeying new strategic interests incorporated in
the emerging complex networks and structures that constitute liberal peace and
development models.[26] In the words of Tony
Vaux, “politicization of aid is an important aspect for debate.” Humanitarian
aid workers do not necessarily want to be detached from politics, but they
expect to know if they are being manipulated or not by interest they do not
necessarily support, as well as the risks resulting from the political agendas
they are involved in.[27] This seems to be a real
and problematic trend with serious implications at the level of humanitarian
action, but also at the level of the relations between donors and recipients,
and of the perceptions of humanitarian action by the international community.
Duffield expresses these same concerns by affirming that political
humanitarianism is viewed ‘more as a reaffirmation of a technocratic authority
in a mechanical universe than as a way to face complex and permanently mutating
systems’.[28] As a consequence, criticism emerges as to the
effectiveness and ethical dimension of this ‘new humanitarianism’ based
essentially on the vision of humanitarian aid as a very limited instrument that
should be used to prevent and respond to human suffering, rather than to attain
other broader political goals, namely security-related ones.[29] The main problem of such politicization of humanitarian
aid relates to the fact that humanitarian agencies and NGOs run the risk of
being seen as a resource channel and as a mechanism to provide aid depending on
the political will of the main donor countries.[30]
In this
debate, many humanitarian agencies and actors have defended the idea that
humanitarian action should not be primarily an instrument or a substitute of
political action and that there cannot be humanitarian solutions to problems
that are mainly political.[31] Despite
the many limitations and practical difficulties that humanitarian action has to
face, its values and principles, even if not always seen as absolute, should
not be founded upon a political agenda since we can end up being confronted
with very difficult choices between greater or lesser evils.[32][33] In other words, instead of a coherent use
of the potentialities of humanitarian action as a way to secure structural
changes in such volatile and complex scenarios, one resorts to humanitarian
rhetoric as a new control tool by developed countries and major donors. The
tool imposes conditions and behaviors on the recipient countries that are often
incapable of reacting to such authority.
Several other
examples illustrate the negative effects of this political use of humanitarian
aid. One of these examples is the case of Afghanistan in the end of the 1990s,
which was still ruled by the Taliban regime and where the population was
subjected to neglect and lived under a very difficult humanitarian situation.
According to Mohammed Atmar, although there has been a complex historical
relation between aid and politics in Afghanistan, this is a case that
demonstrates how humanitarian policies and practices have increasingly been
determined by western political objectives. It is also an example of the
negative implications of political conditionality to humanitarian aid in which
donor countries that are hostile to the fundamentalist Taliban regime and its
poor record in terms of human rights have contributed to a clear
marginalization of the civilian victims of the humanitarian crisis in the
country.[34]
This political
use of humanitarian aid can be found in different forms that the involvement
and commitment of donor countries in Afghanistan has assumed. One example is
related to minimum responses to the Afghan civilian war that undermined the
countries’ already precarious humanitarian conditions without seeking coherent
and comprehensive political solutions to the problems. Instead, priority was
given to isolating the Taliban at any cost, including through punitive
conditionality. The result, also acknowledged by Atmar, was prolonged civilian
conflict, which underestimated the role of humanitarian agencies as impartial
and neutral.[35] The negative nature of this political use of
aid and resulting imposition of sanctions was itself ranging from security
concerns – due to increasing working conditions for humanitarian agencies which
led most donors to significantly cut aid- and development and capacity building
issues. In this case, the main reason to impose conditions and withdraw
necessary humanitarian aid was the fact that these actors were dealing with an
illegitimate regime, which was responsible for discriminatory and repressive
policies towards its own population. However, the results were obviously
negative from the humanitarian point of view since the lack of response to
conditionality by the Taliban regime led to the suspension and withdrawal of
most humanitarian projects in the country with all the entailed human
consequences for the population that was left without access to necessary aid.
Another
example of the most questionable side of this politicized ‘new humanitarianism’ was the international
response to the Balkans war in the 1990s. In this case, the political interests
and imposed conditions by the European countries created distinctions between
the various vulnerable groups thus creating clear patterns of inclusion and
exclusion when it came to access to humanitarian aid. As an example, some donor
countries interpreted the provision of humanitarian aid to the Serbs as being
in contradiction with their external political interests fearing that aid would
again be channeled to the government. In our view, this action reflected the
incapacity to distinguish between humanitarian assistance provided to the Serbs
in need and the underlying political situation represented by the Serb
authorities.
These
short examples clearly show that the political use of humanitarian action,
especially in the context of complex political and humanitarian emergencies,
can have very negative and counterproductive effects and to a certain extent
question and limit an impartial, neutral and effective humanitarian action.
B. Conditionality and Human
Rights
As analyzed
before, the increasing and more explicit political nature of humanitarian aid
within the framework of the ‘new humanitarianism’ raises
serious problems to the activities led and implemented by humanitarian agencies
in the field. Nevertheless, this is not the only aspect of the ‘new humanitarianism’ that puts humanitarian
agencies in face of very difficult decisions and choices. The inclusion of
negative conditionality in humanitarian action implied very similar dilemmas.
The use of conditionality in development aid has been an established practice
within the donor community including UN agencies, Oxfam or USAID. However, as
development aid has significantly decreased since the end of the 1980s,
humanitarian aid has borne the burden of becoming an important channel for
donor countries.[36] As the borders between
the various types of aid were blurred, it also became more legitimate for aid
donors to concern themselves with the internal functioning of recipient
countries. The political and economic conditionality associated with
humanitarian aid is a clear sign of that move. By supporting the possibility to
resort to conditionality, the ‘new humanitarianism’ was
seen as an important source of normalization of violence since it tended to
trivialize human suffering or justify a passive stance towards violence and
human rights violations if the conditions imposed were not met. This type of
politics often means ignoring human rights and humanitarian law norms in the
name of greater and more important objectives.[37] By
pursuing long-term objectives, humanitarian action becomes managed on the basis
of a ‘stick and carrot’ strategy with which donor countries reward or punish
recipient countries and internal actors according to their behavior and
receptivity to the political and economic conditions and criteria defined by
donors.[38] As a consequence of all these factors, it is
almost inevitable that a tension emerges between the use of humanitarian aid
with a long-term strategic vision aimed at combating the root causes of
conflict and stimulating development on one hand; and on the other hand, the
imperative dimension of humanitarian action viewed almost as an obligation to
provide emergency assistance on the basis of the victims’ needs only.[39] For example, towards the end of the 1990s,
Afghanistan exhibited mainly punitive humanitarian and human rights approaches
and ended up punishing the people already suffering extreme poverty and famine
rather than the main target of those conditions. The main reasoning was that
without changes in human rights policies, or the disappearance of the Taliban
regime, no peace would be achieved and, therefore, no aid should be provided to
undertake development goals including education, agriculture or even health
issues in the country. These would be conditioned to clear political changes
within the Taliban regime. In this context, perhaps the most controversial
issue of conditionality from a human rights perspective in its relation to
humanitarian action was the fact that donors focused on gender equality claims
on the part of the Taliban regime as a condition for the provision of
humanitarian aid. Committed to punish the regime and lacking other type of
policy instruments, donor governments saw humanitarian aid as the primary, if
not the only, means to fight gender discrimination. What followed was, in the
words of Atmar, massive politicisation in the form of ill-informed
conditionality by donors and aid agencies[41]. The World Food
Programme, for example, made part of its food provision conditional upon the
Taliban’s change of policy and practice to respond favourably to UN appeals on
basic rights for women. As a consequence, several food programmes were
restricted or simply curtailed because of the inability or unwillingness of the
regime to fulfil the conditions imposed. A second example is related to
UNICEF’s action; in face of Taliban’s restrictions on girl’s access to
education, the incapacity to change this policy, as well as its own inability
to continue its work based on the impartiality principle, this agency decided
to discontinue its national-level support that it had been undertaking for the
education of Afghan boys only. The results of conditionality have worsened the
situation, since the Taliban decided to expand the restrictions to boys
nationwide. This has raised difficult ethical dilemmas to humanitarian actors
as to whether it was allowable to protect the rights of girls to education by
violating the right of boys, especially given the ineffectiveness of such policies
in changing the Taliban’s attitudes and policies. One final example relates to
Oxfam’s activity in the country and the decision to suspend their clean water
program. One primary reason for this suspension was that it would be impossible
to maintain it according to their human rights principles and policies, and
which resulted in the death of about 2000 lives as Afghans were forced to drink
polluted water after the suspension of the programme.[40]
These are only
a few examples, but in our view representative of the problems and dilemmas
posed by the politicisation and conditionality of humanitarian assistance. No
matter what form it has taken, this type of conditionality has placed obvious
limits, not only to the independent, impartial work of NGOs and humanitarian
agencies in the field, but also to the notion of humanitarian assistance as an
imperative. At the same time, these changes and actions were in no way helpful
for the promotion and advancement of human rights and peace. On the contrary,
the reluctance of donor governments to provide timely and effective
humanitarian assistance to the people suffering extreme famine and poverty has
proved ineffective, unhelpful, and has cost the loss of human rights,
especially children and women.[41]
C. Erosion of Humanitarian Principles
As mentioned
before, there are fundamental principles guiding classical humanitarianism ever
since its origins: neutrality, impartiality and humanity. In practice, however,
clearer commitments and compromises are often necessary since humanitarian
actors are not always capable of ensuring full respect and fulfillment of these
principles. [42][43] To some extent, some
donors and humanitarian actors felt that the strict interpretation of this
principle, along with the absolute respect of the confidentiality vows, had
become an obstacle to the effective protection of the victims of humanitarian
crisis and conflicts as well as to the accomplishment of broader and
longer-term objectives. However, progressively taking over of humanitarian
action, politicization and conditionality in the name of human rights have also
significantly questioned impartiality. In Bosnia, for example, the imposed
conditionality by donor governments, which was based on the risk of Serbian
military distorting aid, damaged the impartial action of humanitarian agencies,
leaving thousands of people without any type of help. These actions led the
Serbs to view humanitarian aid provided by humanitarian agencies as a political
instrument of western countries and not as a neutral and impartial action.[44]
In this sense,
and in the context of the ‘new humanitarianism’,
both the theory and practice of most humanitarian principles were highly
questioned in crisis scenarios like Bosnia. The risk of creating a moral hierarchy
of victims who do or do not deserve assistance is one of the most perverse
consequences of this new political impulse to humanitarian action.[45] Even if donor governments and agencies have
emphasized the importance of impartiality and neutrality, many humanitarian
organizations have argued that respect and compliance to these same principles
is almost impossible due to very complex and unpredictable operational
conditions in the field. Others have argued that when such principles are not
respected and fulfilled, humanitarianism is but a façade.[46] Whenever these principles are absent,
political actors end up dictating the nature and scale of external assistance
and humanitarian action becomes political action.
D. Militarization of Humanitarian Action
Another
controversial and problematic feature of the ‘new humanitarianism’ has
been the recent and direct involvement of military forces in humanitarian
activities. Although the support of military forces in humanitarian action has
been a relatively common phenomenon, this has become much more active and
explicit ever since the mid-1990s, as a complement of an increasingly political
humanitarian action. In these new contexts, and in relation to a new type of
conflict, of a more internal nature, the dominant logic is that military forces
should create the necessary conditions to allow for the work of humanitarian
organizations in terms of conflict resolution and social reconstruction[47] all framed in the peacebuilding framework. As a consequence,
external military forces start assuming various degrees of humanitarian roles
in large-scale operations, as in Kosovo, Timor Leste, Afghanistan or Iraq.
Examples of these broader mandates include providing food or health assistance
to populations in need, or even education infrastructures for children in
refugee of displaced camps. This new trend of military intromission into what
is traditionally considered ‘humanitarian space’ raises a few principle issues
and problems, as well as important operational questions from the point of view
of its impact on the work of the humanitarian organizations themselves. In
fact, this situation raises questions about the existence of different roles
and functions between military personnel and humanitarian agencies, as well as
the need for a more coherent, independent and impartial response to extreme
needs situations.[48]
All these
dilemmas and challenges to an effective humanitarian action seem to have been
reinforced in the post- 9/11 international scenario and especially after the ‘war on terror’.[49] The way in
which the United States and other countries have responded to this phenomenon,
including through the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, have
shown how the most concerning trends of the ‘new humanitarianism’ have
been reinforced: a humanitarian action increasingly conditioned on geopolitical
and geostrategic interests of the main international actors; an increasing
confusion between the civilian and military spheres resulting from the
performance by military forces of traditionally humanitarian activities
(providing food, water, shelter); a setback in the respect for humanitarian
principles, human rights and international humanitarian law; as well as a clear
shift in international security priorities making it harder to respond to the
crises at the margins of the international system, which became increasingly
perceived as not important or non – existing.[50]
Another
problem with this increased militarization of humanitarian action relates to
the consequences that arise from the different approaches and cultures that
characterize both the military and humanitarian actors. While NGOs often regard
the military as being too bureaucratic and inappropriate, the military tends to
regard aid workers as undisciplined, disorganised and resistant to military
coordination.[51] Furthermore, in the context of humanitarian
action, this blurring of roles and confusion of local perceptions of
humanitarian agencies and military forces can endanger and undermine the
purpose and aim of the activities of humanitarian personnel. This has been a
real concern in the context of the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq
in 2003 where civilians tended to associate humanitarian actors with military
forces and vice versa.[52] Dropping food while
bombing military targets, for instance, blurs the line between humanitarian
action and hidden political agendas. Authors like Barry and Jefferys argue that
this merging of roles and goals is inevitable and desirable for the better
achievement of conflict resolution and peace-building objectives.[53] However, with the attempt to bring political,
military and humanitarian objectives within the same framework, there is a
danger that humanitarian objectives and principles will be totally compromised
by a strategy that makes aid delivery a means of achieving politico-military
objectives and by a blurring that creates increased security risks for the
humanitarian workers in an already highly insecure environment.[54] In such complex circumstances, it becomes
necessary to rethink the role and place of military forces in the framework of
humanitarian action since these may well perform a very useful and important
role in the immediate restoration of vital infrastructures and of the security
conditions, especially in contexts where the capacity of aid channels is
limited. However, it is important that, in humanitarian terms, such
contribution is limited to guaranteeing the protection and security conditions
of humanitarian organizations instead of assuming broader (and more sensitive)
humanitarian mandates.
III. Conclusion
What can be
concluded from this analysis is that policy makers, diplomats and aid workers
are increasingly struggling to develop appropriate responses to humanitarian
crisis and conflict in contexts characterised by state breakdowns and competing
military and para-military structures. But what comes out very clearly from the
humanitarian experience in the past three decades is that the international community
does not know yet how to deal with such dysfunctional states, particularly
those which have limited strategic interests[55] and even
less in complex human crisis contexts. Without undermining its potential
positive contribution to peace and stability in the longer term, one must be
aware that the assumption that humanitarian action is the answer to
underdevelopment and conflict may not be so linear and may entail a few
dangers. In the absence of effective, coherent and committed political efforts
and mechanisms by the international community to solve complex political
emergencies, the simple intervention in internal ongoing conflicts using
humanitarian assistance may, as proved, be problematic and insufficient.
Although a new practice of humanitarianism was required to approach the
significant changes in the international context and crisis requiring large
scale intervention, the results and implications of this new approach do not
appear to be satisfactory.[56] What has
been experienced and promoted by this ‘new humanitarianism’,
is essentially a misconception of the need for humanitarian aid by an
international system that simultaneously denies its own role in sustaining or
addressing complex emergencies and threatens further the capacity of victims of
conflict-related disasters to have access to humanitarian assistance and to the
enjoyment of their human rights.
Today’s
complex humanitarian crises require a more active political will from the main
international actors to face the power structures that benefit from violence
and conflict, by resorting to more coherent and consensual solutions, and by
limiting the involvement of military forces in the distribution of aid and
other traditionally humanitarian activities. In a context where bilateral aid is
increasingly denied to countries that do not obey western economic and
political structures and demands, maintaining a humanitarian action that is
free from political conditionality and military constraints is even more
necessary.[57] It must, therefore, be reaffirmed that when
people are actually suffering, the humanitarian imperative must prevail over
political and military objectives. At the same time, there needs to be a search
for more sustainable and positive relations between humanitarian action and
political motivations, as well as durable and coherent solutions for conflicts.[58]
Observing
the state of humanitarian action ever since the second half of the 90’s, two
potentially contradictory conclusions can be drawn: one is that the
difficulties and challenges in providing aid are largely caused by the
disregard for much of the applicable international human rights and
humanitarian law of combatants and the international community; a second is
that with the proliferation rather than the containment of major man-made
crises in many areas of the world, humanitarian action is likely to be even
more necessary. In these contexts, it is important to underline that
humanitarian action will remain essential not only to save lives and help
people enjoy the most basic rights to food, shelter and water, but also equally
important rights to health and education, and equal opportunity which are
translated into international human rights law and international humanitarian
law. It is also important to stress the need for better and more effective
coordination and complementarity between different actors in current
humanitarian crisis scenarios in order to achieve more effective responses.
This is even more important in a context where human rights advocates, humanitarian
workers, development agencies and military forces literally stumble into each
other while performing their mandates, that often overlap, and as they
increasingly compete for resources and visibility.
As Sanahuja
correctly affirms, in the collective imagination, humanitarian action is one of
the most direct, effective and immediate forms of expression of the principle
of solidarity and commitment with life and human dignity that calls for
generous and equitable aid.[59] By
providing it, donor governments and humanitarian agencies are somehow giving
people hope that the circumstances can improve, that they will be able to enjoy
their rights, and that they will participate fully in their own development and
future well-being. It is, thus, essential that the various obstacles which
effective humanitarian action is facing today are not seen as inevitable, but
rather as an opportunity to overcome these challenges, rethink the role and
goals of humanitarian agencies and, contribute to the improvement of the potential
and effectiveness of humanitarian action.