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UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF REPORT TO THE UN 2015 – VIOLENCE COMMITTED IN THE NAME OF RELIGION – Multiple report components important to WOMEN.
Website of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomReligion/Pages/FreedomReligionIndex.aspx
United Nations |
A/HRC/28/66 |
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General
Assembly |
Distr.: General 29 December 2014 Original: English |
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Human Rights Council
Twenty-eighth session
Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
Political, economic, social and cultural rights,
Including the right to development
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Heiner
Bielefeldt
Summary |
Violence committed “in the name of religion”,
that is, on the basis of or arrogated to religious tenets of the perpetrator,
can lead to massive violations of human rights, including freedom of religion
or belief. |
In the present report, the Special Rapporteur
first provides a typological description of various forms of violence carried
out in the name of religion. He subsequently explores root causes and
relevant factors that underlie such violence. The main message is that
violence in the name of religion should not be misperceived as a “natural”
outbreak of collective acts of aggression that supposedly reflect sectarian
hostilities existing since time immemorial. Rather, it typically originates
from contemporary factors and actors, including political circumstances. |
The Special Rapporteur also recommends
concerted actions by all relevant stakeholders, including States, religious
communities, interreligious dialogue initiatives, civil society organizations
and media representatives, in order to contain and eventually eliminate the
scourge of violence committed in the name of religion. |
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Contents
Paragraphs Page
I.
Introduction.........................................................................................................
1–2
3
II. Preventing violence committed in the
name of religion.......................................
3–82
3
A. A complex phenomenon............................................................................. 3–11 3
B. Overcoming simplistic interpretations........................................................ 12–20 5
C. Root causes, factors and political circumstances.......................................... 21–38 7
D. The human rights framework..................................................................... 39–40 10
E. Obligations and responsibilities under international law.............................. 41–59 11
F. Roles of other stakeholders....................................................................... 60–82 15
III. Conclusions and recommendations................................................................. 83–118 19
A. Recommendations to all relevant stakeholders.......................................... 86–88 20
B. Recommendations to different State institutions...................................... 89–102 20
C. Recommendations to religious communities........................................... 103–106 21
D. Recommendations to civil society organizations...................................... 107–111 22
E. Recommendations to the media............................................................. 112–115 22
F. Recommendations to the international community................................. 116–118 23
I. Introduction
1. The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief
was created by the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to its resolution
1986/20 and renewed by the Human Rights Council in its resolutions 6/37, 14/1
and 22/20.[1]
2.
In
its resolution 25/12, the Human Rights Council condemned “all forms of
violence, intolerance and discrimination based on or in the name of religion or
belief, and violations of the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or
belief, as well as any advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination, hostility or violence, whether it involves the use of print,
audiovisual or electronic media or any other means”. Against that background,
the present report, in its section II, focuses on preventing violence committed
in the name of religion and, in its section III, includes specific
recommendations addressed to all relevant stakeholders.
II. Preventing violence committed in the name of religion
A. A complex phenomenon
3. Violence committed “in the name of religion”, that is, on the basis of
or arrogated to religious tenets of the perpetrator,[2] is a complex phenomenon in
different parts of the world. The brutality displayed in manifestations of such
violence often renders observers speechless. While in some countries violence
in the name of religion remains a local or regional phenomenon, acts of
terrorism carried out intentionally to send global messages have been
increasingly prominent in recent years. In that context, prima facie “archaic” acts
of cruelty seem to be cynically “staged” in order to cater to modern media
voyeurism, which adds yet another dimension of humiliation to the suffering of
victims and their families.
4.
Violence
in the name of religion can be in the form of targeted attacks on individuals
or communities, communal violence, suicide attacks, terrorism, State
repression, discriminative policies or legislation and other types of violent
behaviour. It can also be embedded and perpetuated in the status quo in various
forms of structural violence justified in the name of religion. Perpetrators
comprise different types of non-State actors, but also State agencies or —
quite often — a combination of both. In some countries, armed groups invoke
religion to justify atrocities such as targeted mass killings, extrajudicial
and summary executions, enforced disappearances, torture, sexual violence,
indiscriminate attacks against civilians, mass expulsions, enslavement or
systematic destruction of certain communities. In other countries, vigilante
groups harass religious minorities by vandalizing cemeteries and places of
worship, grabbing lands or properties and threatening their security.
5.
The
main problem in a number of countries stems from the State’s failure in
combating terrorism or violence of non-State actors, while certain State
agencies in other countries support such violence directly or indirectly, for
example, by promoting hatred against religious minorities or by turning a blind
eye to violence, hence indulging a culture of impunity. Human rights violations
can even originate directly from the State apparatus itself, for example, when
a Government resorts to violent repression in order to “defend” a State
religion or existing religious hegemonies against perceived threats by religious
competitors or internal dissidents. The State’s involvement with violence in
the name of religion thus shows a broad variety of patterns, ranging from lack
of capacity to indirect or direct forms of complicity or deliberate policies of
religious discrimination, sometimes even culminating in formal endorsement or
systematic orchestration of such violence by the State.
6.
Violence
in the name of religion disproportionately targets religious dissidents,
members of religious minorities or converts.[3] People suspected of undermining
national cohesion are also frequent targets of intolerant violence. Attacks
will also likely increase where there is a recognized “official” or State
religion or when a religion is used as a medium to define national identity. Moreover,
vigilante groups, sometimes with the support of law enforcement agencies,
attack people, in particular women, whose ways of life are deemed “immoral”
from the standpoint of certain narrowly defined religious codes of conduct.
7.
However,
violence in the name of religion also affects followers of the very same
religion, possibly also from a majority religion, in whose name such acts are
perpetrated. Voices of moderation or critics who actively oppose the abuse of
their religion for the justification of violence bear an increased risk of
being accused of “betrayal” or “blasphemy” and having retaliatory penalties
inflicted upon themselves.
8.
The
relevance of the issue with respect to freedom of religion or belief is obvious
since violence in the name of religion is a source of many of the most extreme
violations of this human right, usually in conjunction with other human rights
violations as well. Freedom of religion or belief, due to its nature as a human
right, protects human beings rather than religions. The starting point for any
assessment of religious or belief pluralism must therefore be the
self-understandings of human beings in this area, which may be quite diverse.
9.
Victims
of violence come from all religious or belief backgrounds. They comprise
adherents to large “traditional” communities and followers of small or new
religious movements, which are often stigmatized as “sects”. Furthermore,
atheists and agnostics suffer in many countries from a climate of intimidation,
repression or violence. Another frequently neglected group of people are the
adherents to different indigenous beliefs, who are also targets of violence
carried out by State agencies and/or non-State actors.
10.
Countless
examples demonstrate that violence in the name of religion usually displays a
pronounced gender dimension.[4] Many women and girls are victims of
“honour” killings, acid attacks, amputations or floggings, sometimes pursuant
to penal codes that are based on religious laws. Women and girls also disproportionately
suffer from sexual violence, such as rape, abduction, sexual enslavement,
female genital mutilation, forced marriage, often in conjunction with forced
conversion, or other cruelties.
11.
Furthermore,
homophobic and transphobic violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender (LGBT) persons may also be perpetrated in the name of religion.
Those perceived as LGBT may be targets of organized abuse, including by
religious extremists.[5] Violence against LGBT persons
includes brutal gang rapes, so-called “curative” rapes and family violence
owing to their sexual orientation and gender identity.[6]
There is a strong connection between discrimination in law and practice, and
incitement to violence in the name of religion and violence itself. Violence
against women and against LGBT persons is often justified and given legitimacy
by discriminatory laws based on religious laws or supported by religious
authorities, such as laws criminalizing adultery, homosexuality or
cross-dressing. The Human Rights Committee has noted with concern hate speech
and manifestations of intolerance and prejudice by religious leaders against
individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation, in a broader context of
acts of violence, including killings of LGBT persons.[7]
There have also been reports of direct violence exercised by religious
authorities against LGBT persons, although many of them are religiously
interested in practising.
B. Overcoming simplistic interpretations
1. Inadequacy of isolating “religion” as a factor
in conflict descriptions
12.
The
experience that religion is invoked in civil wars, communal violence, terrorist
acts or other violent conflicts causes some observers to use the label
“religion” broadly and loosely when analysing those phenomena. Multidimensional
violent conflicts are often described along religious lines. Although such
descriptions may capture some relevant elements of the phenomena, they fail to
understand the complexity of the issues. Headlines such as “religious
violence”, “religious civil war” or “sectarian conflicts” tend to obfuscate the
significance of non-religious factors, in particular political factors, for an
adequate understanding of the core problems.
13.
Non-religious
factors that deserve to be taken seriously may include intricate historic
legacies of a country, a climate of political authoritarianism, military
interventions, extreme poverty, social, cultural, economic and political
discrimination, exclusion and marginalization, inequalities, caste hierarchies,
ethnic fragmentation, rapid demographic changes, patriarchal values and a
“macho” culture, migration processes, a widening gulf between urban and rural
areas, the breakdown of meaningful public discourse, lack of intergroup
communication, endemic corruption and political cronyism, widespread
disenchantment with politics, general loss of trust in weak or inexistent
public institutions, and a culture of impunity and denial for past serious
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Any specific
incident of violence in the name of religion warrants a careful, contextualized
analysis of all relevant factors, including the broader political environment.
It will thereby become clear that religion is almost never an isolated root
cause of violent conflicts or attacks.
14.
An
isolated focus on religion in descriptions of violence, conflicts and civil
wars often creates the risk of nourishing fatalistic attitudes. The impression
that seemingly “perpetual” religious or denominational differences lie at the
root of respective problems can exacerbate feelings of helplessness and lead to
inaction. However, if it is wrongly assumed that certain violent conflicts have
their decisive root causes in religious strife that allegedly started centuries
or even millennia ago, this will likely distract attention from the
responsibilities that Governments, community leaders, media representatives,
civil society organizations and international agencies have today.
15.
Moreover,
it is important to avoid “essentialist” views that falsely ascribe violence to
the essence of certain religions or to religion in general. The formulation
“violence in the name of religion” in the present report is deliberately chosen
to emphasize the fact that the perpetrators of violent crimes are always human
beings, not religions as such. It is human beings — individuals, groups,
community leaders, State representatives, non-State actors and others — who
invoke religion or specific religious tenets for the purposes of legitimizing,
stoking, spreading or escalating violence. In other words, the relationship
between religion and violence can never be an immediate one; it always
presupposes human agency, that is, individuals or groups who actively bring
about that connection — or who challenge that connection.
2. Inadequacy of the instrumentalization thesis
16.
Whereas
an isolated focus on religion ignores the relevance of political and other
non-religious factors, the “instrumentalization thesis”, by contrast, from the
outset denies that religious motives can play a genuine role in incidents of
violence. Instead, it is assumed that perpetrators of such violence merely
“instrumentalize” religion for political, economic or other mundane purposes.
The term “instrumentalization” conveys the impression that religious
persuasions themselves have little, if anything, to do with the acts of
violence perpetrated in their name.
17.
However,
downplaying the significance of religious motives, fears and obsessions in this
context would be factually wrong and conceptually inappropriate in many cases.
It would furthermore mean that religious communities and their leaderships are
from the outset excluded from taking any genuine responsibility for violence in
the name of religion and, by implication, cannot contribute meaningfully
towards tackling the problem.
18.
It
remains true that acts of violence cannot be attributed to religions per se or
to any particular religion, as these acts are always carried out by human
beings pursuing certain aims in particular social, economic, political and
historical contexts. Yet it is equally true that human agency comprises a broad
range of motives, including religious ones. While in some cases violent attacks
may be orchestrated by Machiavellian strategists who whip up religious
sentiments, there are obviously religious fanatics who seem to believe that, by
torturing or killing fellow human beings, they actually perform a service to
God. Moreover, it is a disturbing reality that religious fanatics may find some
admirers and supporters within their broader communities who mistakenly resort
to violence as a manifestation of strong religious commitment. Religious
communities and their leaders, including theologians of various denominations,
have a responsibility to tackle this problem on the basis of a clear analysis
of its various root causes, including narrow-minded and polarizing
interpretations of religious messages.
3. A broad range of factors and actors
19.
The
two above-mentioned simplistic interpretations often appear in discussions
about violence in the name of religion. What both interpretations have in
common is that, albeit in different ways, they ignore relevant factors and
actors. The isolated focus on religion neglects the significance of human
agency in general, political and other non-religious factors in particular,
thus possibly leading to fatalism in the face of seemingly perpetual sectarian
strife. By contrast, the instrumentalization thesis trivializes the role that
religious motives may play in committing and supporting acts of violence,
leading to inadequate responses from religious communities and their leaders.
20.
The
Special Rapporteur is convinced that policies aimed at overcoming violence in
the name of religion must be based on a comprehensive understanding of all
underlying factors and responsible actors. This is the sine qua non for
mobilizing all relevant stakeholders to do their utmost to eliminate such
violence.
C. Root causes, factors and political circumstances
21.
Violence
committed in the name of religion is a complex reality. Given the word limits
of the present report, the Special Rapporteur will restrict himself to a few
non-exhaustive typological observations.[8]
1. Narrow-minded interpretations of religions
22.
For
many people, religion is a very emotional issue, deeply connected to feelings
of identity, devotion and group attachment. Religious convictions can drive
people to push their boundaries and perform acts of solidarity, compassion and
charity. However, this enormous potential can also turn into a destructive
force, feeding collective polarization, narrow-mindedness and violent
fanaticism.
23.
Religious
fanaticism is a danger that exists in different religions and beliefs. Attempts
to derive a propensity for violence directly from specific theological features
of particular religions are highly problematic. Not only do they fail to do
justice to the wide range of violent manifestations connected to most different
religions and beliefs, including secular worldviews; they also neglect the
decisive factor of human agency as pointed out before.
24.
Although
most religions claim a transcendent — and in this sense “trans-human” — origin,
religious sources and normative codes of conduct always accommodate different
readings that are actively undertaken by human beings. Thus, human agency is
inevitably involved in interpreting religious traditions, dogmas, laws or
identities. Open-minded interpretations that encourage tolerance, empathy and solidarity
across boundaries may exist alongside narrow-minded interpretations of the same
religion, which lead to polarized worldviews and a militant rejection of people
holding other persuasions. Whatever the ultimate origins of a religious belief
are thought to be, human beings bear in any case responsibility for the
practical consequences that they draw from the interpretation of their faith.
This particularly applies to religious teachers, preachers and community
leaders, whose influence should always be connected with an enhanced sense of
responsibility.
25.
Whenever
violence is justified by the invocation of religion or arrogated to religious
tenets, the specific interpretations, for example, religious ideas, concepts,
images or anxieties, should be taken seriously. Although they should not be
seen in isolation from broader political and other factors, it would be too
easy simply to dismiss polarizing religious interpretations as mere excuses for
acts of aggression. At the same time, the pitfalls of essentialism can be
avoided by bearing in mind that it is always human beings, in their various
roles and positions, who remain the responsible agents for any justifications
and commission of violence.
2. Loss of trust in public institutions
26.
The
seeds of religious fanaticism fortunately do not always find fertile ground.
Whereas in many societies those promoting religious narrow-mindedness, violence
or even terrorism do not succeed in mobilizing many followers, in other
countries their opportunities may be higher. There are societies in which the
voices of fanaticism resonate strongly and in some countries they have even
managed to infiltrate important parts of the State apparatus or to lead the
Government.
27.
One
main factor, which typically makes larger groups of people receptive to
messages of religious extremism, is a general loss of trust in public
institutions. What often starts with endemic corruption and political cronyism
may end up in a total disenchantment with State politics by large parts of the
population. However, if people have lost any trust in the fair functioning of
public institutions, they will try to manage their lives by resorting to their
own support networks. Frequently, such networks are defined along ethnic or
religious lines.
28.
When
overarching public institutions lose their credibility, groupings defined by
ethnic and/or religious loyalties at the same time gain more importance. Such
fragmentation processes typically produce inward-looking mentalities,
collective anxieties and attitudes of general suspicion against everything
happening outside of the boundaries of one’s own group. Where the willingness
to trust people is gradually shrinking to an internal circle, collective
narrow-mindedness will be a likely consequence. In this situation, polarizing
apocalyptic religious messages may become “attractive” since they actually seem
to match the mind-set of people who feel that they live under siege in a
hostile and dangerous political environment. Everyday anxieties and militant
religious messages may thus blend into each other.
29.
In
such a precarious constellation, a sudden crisis such as an incident or even
mere rumours can easily ignite mass-scale violence, including atrocious acts of
barbarism justified in the name of religion. Owing to the lack of trustworthy
overarching public institutions, political hysteria may set in and further
poison the relationship between competing communities. The end result of this
vicious cycle can be a climate of political paranoia in which militarized
groups fight each other by using all available means, including religious
condemnation and demonization. Militarized group identities defined along
religious lines and dichotomized religious worldviews can thus reinforce each
other.
30.
The
absence of trustworthy public institutions often goes together with a decline
of public communication. If negative rumours remain unchecked by any
counter-evidence that could be presented and discussed in public discourses,
they may harden into fully-fledged conspiracy projections. In such situations,
apocalyptic images and violent messages, which can be found within different
religious traditions, may provide interpretative patterns for assessing
contemporary anxieties, thereby becoming an additional factor of violent
escalation.
3. Policies of exclusion
31.
While
many of the most extreme acts of violence in the name of religion currently
occur in the context of failing or failed States, State agencies can also be
directly involved in violent sectarian polarization. This is often the case
where the State understands itself as the guardian of one particular religion.
If this is compounded with an “official” or State religion, the negative impact
on people belonging to religious minorities tends to be even worse. Whereas the
followers of the protected religion(s) usually receive a privileged treatment,
adherents to other religions or beliefs may suffer serious discrimination, such
as underrepresentation in public employment, exclusion from higher education or
even deprivation of citizenship. The experience of systematic exclusion almost
inevitably leads to divisiveness within the society.
32.
Policies
of exclusion in the field of religion exist under different auspices. On the
one hand, there are a number of Governments that base their legitimacy on their
role as guardians of certain religious truth claims. Those people who do not
adhere to the protected religion or those who follow interpretations deemed
“deviant” may be publicly attacked as “infidels”, “apostates” or “heretics”;
some State may even exercise pressure in order to forcibly convert them to the
official religion of the country.
33.
On
the other hand, there is an even broader group of States, including formally
secular States, which promote a particular religious heritage as an inherent
part of their national identity, without resorting to specific truth claims.
Such national heritage can either consist of one religion, which has largely
shaped the national history, or comprise a number of different religions or
beliefs, which are officially recognized as constituting the “traditional
religious mosaic” of the nation. In fact, the fault lines resulting from
harnessing religion for the promotion of national identity often run between
“traditional” and “non-traditional” religions, including religions or beliefs
of immigrants. Individuals or groups perceived as not fitting into the
traditional self-understanding of the nation may be suspected of undermining
national cohesion or even acting as fifth columns in the interest of “foreign
powers” or “foreign donors”.
34.
Policies
of exclusion are often manifested in hostile public statements made by populist
politicians, usually in conjunction with incitement to religious hatred in the
media. Sometimes, even very small minorities are demonized as allegedly posing
a dangerous threat to the long-term survival of the nation, or they are accused
of being involved in clandestine conspiracies. The Special Rapporteur has often
noted a pronounced gender dimension in hate speech, for example, the stoked
fear of far-reaching demographic changes allegedly in a strategic attempt of
minorities to get the upper hand in the long run, and as a result of a
hyperbolic sexual drive ascribed to members of religious minorities, who
thereby are depicted as “primitive”. LGBT people have also been falsely
portrayed in religious discourse as “threatening” the survival of a nation or
being part of a “conspiracy” to control population growth.
35.
Policies
of exclusion may also manifest themselves in formal acts of administration or
legislation. For instance, unwelcome religious minorities may confront
insuperable obstacles when trying to obtain a legal personality status without
which they cannot develop an infrastructure needed for running their community
affairs in a sustainable manner. Sometimes the very existence of such
communities in a country is deemed “illegal”. As a result, people belonging to
such discriminated minorities typically suffer systematic harassment and
intimidation. A factor that further increases the likelihood of harassment is anti-blasphemy
laws or anti-proselytism laws, which may threaten criminal punishments for
vaguely circumscribed “offences”. Countless examples demonstrate that such laws
disproportionately affect minorities. Meanwhile, they may encourage
self-appointed vigilante groups to commit acts of violent aggression,
frequently with direct or indirect support by law enforcement agencies.
4. Impunity, trivialization and the culture of
silence
36.
A
major problem underneath violence in the name of religion is a culture of
impunity that exists in quite a number of countries. Often, victims and their
families report that the authorities do not provide efficient protection, that
police reach the scene of violence late or become bystanders watching the
places of worship being torched or people attacked by an aggressive mob. It is
not always clear whether impunity results from a lack of capacity or even
reflects a certain degree of complicity by parts of the State apparatus.
37.
An
additional factor that further aggravates the situation is the tendency of
certain Governments to ignore or downplay the systemic root causes of violence
in the name of religion. When addressing the issue, they may trivialize it as
“sporadic incidents” allegedly caused by a few irresponsible individuals,
without acknowledging the broader structural or political dimension of the
issue. Official statistics displaying the frequency and patterns of violence,
including disaggregated data on the underlying motives, often do not exist.
38.
In
a climate of fear and intimidation in some countries — either caused by
aggressive non-State actors or by repressive Governments — the population may
largely refrain from even talking about violence committed in the name of
religion. This constitutes yet another layer of the problem. The growing
culture of silence, often exacerbated by restrictive laws, prevents responsible
stakeholders from tackling the problem publicly and strategically. Overcoming
the culture of silence is a major precondition for holding Governments
accountable for relevant political actions and omissions, including situations
of impunity.
D. The human rights framework
39.
The
scourge of violence in the name of religion calls for concerted action of
States, religious and belief communities, interreligious initiatives, civil
society and the media to contain and eventually overcome this phenomenon. Human
rights provide the normative framework in which any policies tackling the
problem and its root causes must be developed. Their potential in this regard
is manifold:
(a) Human
rights represent a broad moral consensus endorsed by the international
community and are binding under international law, thus combining moral
persuasiveness with legal force;
(b) Human
rights are connected with the establishment of infrastructure-relevant
institutions at the global, regional, national and subnational levels. This
complex infrastructure facilitates strategic cooperation between different
stakeholders in the implementation and monitoring of human rights;
(c) The
infrastructure of human rights institutions and mechanisms at different levels
— from global to local — can furthermore help to build or restore trust among
people, particularly in situations in which public institutions in a society
have largely ceased to function adequately;
(d) Although
human rights as legal norms do not themselves constitute an overarching
belief-system, the underlying principles — such as the respect for human
dignity, the equality of all human beings and the aspiration to universal
justice — have substantive overlaps with many religious, culture and
philosophical traditions. Human rights may therefore provide incentives for
strengthening the awareness of the charitable messages contained in different
religions or beliefs in order to build resilience against messages of hatred
and violence;
(e) Freedom
of religion or belief, in conjunction with other human rights, provides the
normative basis for the coexistence and cooperation of people belonging to most
different religions or beliefs and obliges the State to provide an inclusive
framework. Furthermore, freedom of religion or belief assures that different
communities and subcommunities will receive protection.
40.
This
non-exhaustive list shows the potential of human rights to bring together
various stakeholders who, in concerted actions, should do their utmost to
combat violence in the name of religion. Below, the Special Rapporteur
discusses specific roles of some relevant stakeholders in this area.
E. Obligations and responsibilities under international
law
1. Overarching obligations of the State
41.
The
State is not just another stakeholder alongside various other actors and
institutions. As the formal guarantor of human rights under international law,
the State has an overarching obligation that can be divided conceptually into
three levels, that is, the obligations to respect, to protect and to promote
human rights.
(a) Obligations to respect
42.
For
the context of the present discussion, the obligations to respect chiefly
require that the State abandon all sorts of — formal or informal — policies of
exclusion by which persons belonging to certain groups suffer discrimination.[9]
This has manifold consequences. In particular, Government representatives must
clearly refrain from any statements that may be perceived as condoning or even
encouraging acts of violence that target religious dissenters, religious
minorities or other groups of people. Legislation that renders the existence of
certain religious communities as such “illegal” in the country or prevents them
from developing a sustainable infrastructure is incompatible with the universal
right to freedom of religion or belief and should be revoked. Such legislation
furthermore fuels resentments and may encourage acts of intimidation, including
by law enforcement agencies. Moreover, the State should repeal anti-blasphemy
laws, anti-conversion laws and criminal laws that discriminate against certain
people according to their religious affiliations or beliefs or criminalize
their “dissident” practices. Apart from further increasing the vulnerability of
marginalized groups or individuals, these laws may give a pretext to vigilante
groups and other perpetrators of hatred for intimidating people and committing
acts of violence. Textbooks used for school education should not contain
stereotypes and prejudices that may stoke hostile sentiments against the
followers of certain religions or beliefs and groups that suffer systematic
discrimination, including women and LGBT persons.
43.
In
order to operate as a credible guarantor of freedom of religion or belief for
everyone, the State should not identify itself exclusively with one particular
religion or belief (or one particular type of religions) at the expense of
equal treatment of the followers of other faiths.[10]
As ample experience demonstrates, the use of religion in the context of
national identity politics always harbours aggravated risks of discrimination
against minorities, for instance, against members of immigrant religious
communities or new religious movements, thus creating divisiveness within the
society. Any exclusivist settings should therefore be critically addressed and
finally replaced by an inclusive institutional framework in which religious
diversity can unfold without discrimination and without fear.
(b) Obligations to protect
44.
Violations
of human rights do not only originate from the State; they are quite often
carried out by non-State actors. Nonetheless, the State bears a responsibility
for such acts inasmuch as they may reflect inadequate human rights protection.
45.
A
first step towards providing protection against violence in the name of
religion is a quick and unequivocal condemnation of any such acts, whenever
they occur, by high representatives of the State. State representatives should
indeed take the lead in rejecting violence, expressing sympathy for victims and
providing public support for targeted individuals or groups. Violent attacks
targeting members of groups that face systematic discrimination in the name of
religion should be understood as attacks on the entire society. Public messages
to that effect, however, can only be credible if they openly address the root
causes, including systemic political conditions, which may become enabling
factors of violence. Unfortunately, some Governments display a tendency to resort
to policies of trivializing violence by ascribing the incidents to just a few
irresponsible individuals without acknowledging the broader political
dimensions of the issue. Overcoming such trivialization is the sine qua non for
designing effective preventative and coping strategies.
46.
A
major issue in the context of protection against violence in the name of
religion is the fight against impunity, wherever it exists. Those who commit,
or are complicit in, acts of violence must always be brought to justice. This
requires training for law enforcement agencies and the establishment of an
efficient and independent judiciary. Moreover, anti-discrimination legislation
plays an indispensable role in protecting the equality of all in their
enjoyment of human rights, across religious or denominational divides, thus
preventing or overcoming divisiveness within society.
47.
While
the States’ obligation to protect human rights requires them to take effective
measures to combat terrorism, the Special Rapporteur would like to reiterate
that States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism fully
complies with their obligations under international law, particularly human
rights, refugee and humanitarian law. In this context, the targeting of
specific groups, including members of particular religious communities through
so-called religious profiling, is of concern.[11]
(c) Obligations to promote
48.
Beyond
respecting and protecting human rights, States should also take a broad range
of positive measures aimed at facilitating their effective implementation. This
includes providing an appropriate framework in which other stakeholders,
including religious communities, interreligious initiatives, civil society
organizations, human rights defenders and media professionals, can unfold their
specific potential.
49.
Moreover,
the State itself should use all available means — including formal and informal
education and community outreach — in order to promote a culture of respect,
non-discrimination and appreciation of diversity within society. In close
consultation with all relevant stakeholders, the State should develop national
action plans against violence in the name of religion. A useful document in
this context is the Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence.[12] The Rabat Plan of Action, elaborated with broad
participation by experts, Member States and civil society organizations under
the auspices of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, can provide guidance on how to build resilience in society against
incitement to religious hatred and concomitant acts of violence. Building
resilience requires a broad range of activities, including educational efforts,
early warning capacities and policies on crisis preparedness, by establishing channels
of communication that enable relevant actors to respond strategically and
swiftly.
50.
National
human rights institutions are particularly suited for the promotion of human
rights. Some of them have an explicit mandate for also promoting intergroup
relationships. The Special Rapporteur would like to encourage them, including
their International Coordinating Committee, to take an active ownership of the
Rabat Plan of Action and develop strategies to eliminate the root causes of
violence in the name of religion.
51.
Furthermore,
States should safeguard the memory of all population groups, and of religious
communities in particular, including by developing and protecting national
archives, memorial museums and monuments.
2. Responsibility to protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity
52.
At
the 2005 World Summit, Heads of State and Government committed to the
responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity.[13] This entails the responsibility of
States to protect their own populations from atrocity crimes; the
responsibility to help other States do so through the provision of
international assistance; and the responsibility to take collective action when
a State manifestly fails to protect its population. In particular, the word
“populations” refers to all people living within a State’s territory, whether
citizens or not, and including religious groups. The principle builds on existing
obligations under international law and embodies a political determination to
prevent and respond to atrocity crimes, but does not itself have an independent
legal character.
53.
In
his 2009 report on implementing the responsibility to protect (A/63/677), the
Secretary-General established a framework for implementing the responsibility
to protect principle on the basis of three equal, mutually reinforcing and
non-sequential pillars. The first pillar encompasses the responsibility of each
individual State to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity. The second pillar focuses on the
provision of international assistance on the basis of paragraphs 138 and 139 of
the 2005 World Summit Outcome, which asserts that the international community
should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this
responsibility, and that the international community should also support the
United Nations in establishing an early warning capability and assist those which
are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. The third pillar
outlines options for taking collective action, in a timely and decisive manner
and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, should peaceful means
be inadequate and where national authorities are manifestly failing to protect
their populations.[14]
3. Obligations of non-State armed groups
(a) International human rights law
54.
While
international human rights law traditionally focused only on the obligations of
States,[15] an evolving approach recognizes the importance
and impact of certain non-State actors, arguing that some human rights
obligations also apply to them, including non-State armed groups with (or
arguably even without) effective control over a territory. In that regard, the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women stressed in its
general recommendation No. 30 (2013) on women in conflict prevention, conflict
and post-conflict situations, that “under certain circumstances, in particular
where an armed group with an identifiable political structure exercises
significant control over territory and population, non-State actors are obliged
to respect international human rights”.[16]
55.
Special
procedures and commissions of Inquiry have also addressed human rights
violations committed in the name of religion by armed groups with effective
control over territory.[17] “Effective control” means that the
non-State armed group has consolidated its control and authority over a
territory to such an extent that it can exclude the State from governing the
territory on a more than temporary basis.[18] Furthermore, armed groups without
effective control over territory have been held to have committed human rights
violations.[19] In May 2014, a report by the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South
Sudan[20] stressed that the most basic human rights obligations, in particular
those emanating from peremptory international law (jus cogens), bind both the
State and armed opposition groups in times of peace and during armed conflict.
(b) International humanitarian law
56.
In
the event that a non-State armed group is party to an armed conflict,
international humanitarian law can also be invoked. Article 3 common to
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 defines certain minimum guarantees that all
parties involved in a non-international armed conflict should observe,
including to treat in all circumstances persons who take no active part in the
hostilities humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on religion or
faith. Furthermore, a number of norms contained in the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and the Additional Protocols I and II of 1977 have reached the status of
customary international law and, as such, are binding on all parties to the
armed conflict.[21]
57.
Most
notably, international humanitarian law requires that both the State and
non-State armed groups take all measures to minimize the impact of violence on
civilians, respect the principles of distinction and proportionality when
carrying out military operations and ensure the safety and protection of
civilians by enabling them to leave areas affected by violence in safety and
dignity as well as to access basic humanitarian assistance at all times.[22]
(c) International criminal law
58.
Certain
conduct of members of non-State armed groups may also trigger individual
responsibility under international criminal law. The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court provides definitions of “genocide” in
article 6, of “crimes against humanity” in article 7 and of “war
crimes” in article 8. These provisions also include several references to
the terms “religious” or “religion”, for example, in article 6 (“acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a […] religious group,
as such”), article 7, paragraph 1 (h), (“persecution against any
identifiable group or collectivity on […] religious […] grounds”) as well as
article 8, paragraphs 2 (b)(ix) and (e)(iv), (“[i]ntentionally directing
attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, […] provided they are not
military objectives”).
59.
Individual
criminal responsibility is essential to ensuring accountability for gross or
serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. However,
according to article 25, paragraph 3 (f), of the Rome Statute, “a
person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the
completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute
for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily
gave up the criminal purpose”. Hence, this provision in combination with the
threat of possible international prosecution may hopefully influence individual
members of non-State armed groups to abandon their efforts to commit
international crimes.
F. Roles of other stakeholders
1. Religious communities and their leaderships
60.
Perpetrators
of violence typically represent comparatively small segments of the various
religious communities to which they belong, while the large majority of
believers are usually appalled to see violence perpetrated in the name of their
religion. It is all the more important for the majorities and their leaders,
who do not endorse the violence, to speak out against it. In some countries,
religious communities organize broad demonstrations and use all available media
to publicly condemn religious justifications of violent atrocities. However,
there are also situations in which the silence of the majority and their
leaders is quite “deafening”, thus factually leaving the public stage to small
aggressive groups.[23] Speaking out in these situations
often requires courage, determination and the ability to seize opportunities to
intervene at the right moment when violence arises and can still be contained
and curbed.
61.
Overcoming
a culture of silence, wherever it exists, in the face of violent attacks is of
paramount importance. Often, perpetrators of violence pretend to act on behalf
of a “silent majority”. Religious fanatics furthermore like to portray
themselves as “heroes” and a religious avant-garde that ultimately promotes the
interests of their community. As long as the majorities and broader communities
remain largely silent, extremists can easily play this game. They may feel that
they have carte blanche to perform acts of violence and to sell these
atrocities as manifestations of religious devotion.
62.
Overcoming
the culture of silence is not an easy task and, depending on the specific situation,
such attempts can be quite risky. One problem is that extremist religious
groups typically receive or seek to use broad media coverage, whereas voices of
peace and reconciliation often remain at the margins of public attention.
Although this can be a highly frustrating experience, it should never serve as
an excuse for remaining silent. The cynical belief that bad news makes for good
sales must not prevent other members of religious communities from bringing
forward their views actively. Moreover, in a climate of intimidation, many
believers, for fear of reprisals, may refrain from speaking out publicly. In
such situations, fellow believers living in safer political environments should
lend their voices and clearly condemn violence committed in the name of their
religion.
63.
The
Special Rapporteur has seen impressive anti-violence statements issued by
representatives of religious communities, that is, statements which are clear,
theologically profound and passionate.[24] However, he has also come across public
rejections of violence which remain disappointingly abstract, because they are
based on the problematic assumption that violence results from a mere
“instrumentalization” of religion and, accordingly, has little, if anything, to
do with religious motives. Yet, such rejections based on a trivialization of
religious motives will themselves remain trivial. As discussed earlier, the
instrumentalization thesis one-sidedly attributes the problem to external,
non-religious factors while too quickly discarding the potential relevance also
of religious obsessions and theological views.
64.
Religious
communities and especially their representatives and intellectual leaders
should not succumb to the temptation to reduce the issue of violence in the
name of religion to mere “misunderstandings” and external abuses. This would
amount to an irresponsible trivialization of the problem. Instead, when dealing
with the issue of such violence, theologians and religious leaders should
actually expose themselves to the disturbing fact that perpetrators of violence
— or at least some of them — may be convinced to perform an act of service to
God when killing fellow humans. Taking seriously these ideas, however bizarre
and distorted they may seem, is the precondition for giving sufficiently
profound responses. Only by confronting the perverse “attractiveness” of
violent religious extremism for some people, including people living in
precarious and volatile political circumstances, will it be possible to tackle
the various root causes of violence, including polarizing religious
interpretations and incitement to religious hatred.
65.
Beyond
a clear condemnation of violence committed in the name of religion, communities
and their leaders should positively promote empathy, tolerance and an
appreciation of diversity. They should challenge the religious extremists’ authenticity
claims by exposing the ignorance of their views of the charitable core messages
contained in religious traditions. Religious communities and scholars may also
play an important role in rehabilitation and reintegration programs for violent
extremist offenders and foreign fighters who returned to their country of
origin, also with a view to neutralize possible future radicalization efforts.[25]
2. Interreligious initiatives
66.
The
potential of interreligious communication for overcoming violence in the name
of religion is enormous.[26] Many examples demonstrate that
violence frequently occurs in the absence of any trustful communication across
religious or denominational boundaries, and the related vacuum of ideological
power. The reasons for the lack or decline of intergroup communication can be
manifold, ranging from broader processes of societal fragmentation and policies
of exclusion to the demonization of others in polarizing religious
interpretations. Whatever the reasons in a particular situation may be,
initiatives aimed at improving the relationship between different religious
communities can substantially contribute to preventing violent escalation.
In-depth research into a number of cases of communal violence has led to the
conclusion that acts of violence could be contained to a certain degree in
localities where communities had developed a sustainable culture of
cross-boundary communication. Apart from its preventative potential, intergroup
communication therefore also helps to alleviate situations in which mass-scale
violence actually occurs.
67.
For
interreligious communication to be productive, partners should meet on an equal
footing and there should always be room for a meaningful exchange beyond mere
ritualistic encounters. A broad representation, including gender balance and
participation of different generations, can ensure that larger populations can
take active ownership of such initiatives, thus enhancing their sustainability.
There is much space for improvements in this regard, since women, including
feminist theologians, are typically very underrepresented in interreligious
dialogue initiatives. Their voices are sadly absent in many projects. The roles
of women human rights defenders should also be promoted as they can contribute
to a less patriarchal interpretation of religions that disproportionately
affect the rights of women, girls and LGBT persons.
68.
Projects
that involve interreligious cooperation can have far-reaching impacts. One very
positive recent development is the enhanced interreligious cooperation in
providing aid for refugees and internally displaced persons.[27]
Apart from supporting people who are living under dire conditions, such
cooperation also sends a much-needed message of hope to these communities and
to the international community, and constitutes good practices that may inspire
others.
69.
Some
initiatives have led to the formal establishment of interreligious councils in
which people of different religious and denominational backgrounds meet regularly.
This can be useful to ensure a sustainable cooperation and keep the forces of
violent extremism at bay. At the same time, there are also many illustrations
of informal grass-root initiatives with the purpose of cherishing trustful
relations. Quite surprisingly, everyday communication across religious divides
may even exist at the local level in countries that are torn by religious
extremism and violent conflicts. Figuratively speaking, even in a desert of
violent political paranoia, people communicating across boundaries can uphold
certain oases of common sense that certainly deserve to be acknowledged,
strengthened and supported politically.
70.
Interreligious
communication and intergroup cooperation have a key function in all agendas to
overcome violence in the name of religion. Although people who meet regularly
across boundaries will not necessarily agree on all issues, they will realize
that followers of other religions and denominations are not “aliens” with
totally different mentalities or feelings. This is an important experience and
a precondition for overcoming hostile stereotypes. Discovering common concerns,
worries and interests may also be the first step for developing joint action
plans for tackling the root causes of violence more strategically.
3. Civil society
71.
Civil
society organizations differ from religious communities in that they
predominantly locate themselves in the “civil” sphere. What brings people
together in civil society organizations is not, or not primarily, a common
religious belief or practice, but rather joint commitments to address issues of
common concerns, including human rights. This does not preclude the possibility
that quite a number of civil society organizations at the same time understand
themselves as being faith-based.
72.
The
expertise gained by civil society organizations is indispensable for assessing
the human rights situation, including freedom of religion or belief. For
victims of human rights violations and people living under conditions of
constant intimidation, it is reassuring to know that civil society
organizations monitor their situations and alert relevant authorities and the
public when necessary. They provide information, advice, guidance, assistance
and sometimes protection, including by following up on individual cases. The
findings of civil society organizations can also assume an early warning
function, notably in volatile situations.
73.
Moreover,
in the face of violent aggression, civil society plays a major role in
overcoming a culture of silence wherever this exists. It is important for
individuals and groups targeted by incitement to religious hatred and violent
attacks to experience solidarity support and that others speak out on their
behalf. Overcoming silence is likewise needed to challenge the claims of
perpetrators of hatred to act in the name of a “silent majority”. Speaking out
against such violence, and the broader political or religious dimensions
involved with these problems, can be dangerous. Therefore, local civil society
organizations may need international networks to defend them in situations
where they are threatened.[28]
74.
Different
faith-based and secular civil society organizations work together and have
created common platforms. Beyond the pragmatic advantages of joining forces,
such cooperation also demonstrates that a commitment to human rights can create
and strengthen solidarity across all religious, cultural and philosophical
divides. This is an important message in itself. The Special Rapporteur has come
across impressive examples in this regard, for example, initiatives taken by
Christian civil society organizations in support of atheists or Buddhists under
threat and public statements made by Bahá’í representatives against the
persecution of Shia Muslims. Such acts of solidarity have a highly symbolic
value.
4. Contributions by the media
75.
While
the media, including the Internet, are frequently used to stoke intergroup
hostilities by spreading false, biased or partisan information and hateful
messages that incite violence, they can also be harnessed to foster
cross-boundary communication and promote policies of tolerance, reconciliation
and cooperation. In short, the media are a part of the problem, but they must
certainly be part of the solution.
76.
Hostile
media campaigns can have disastrous effects on people’s mindset and in the long
run can undermine people’s common sense, creating a climate of confusion and
collective hysteria. The most important antidote to hostile media campaigns targeting
religious minorities or other groups is the diligent research of facts.
77.
Fact-finding
may also include a public analysis of collective historical traumas. Meaningful
communication across boundaries requires the possibility that people can agree
— or at least partially agree — on important facts concerning intricate
historic legacies. It is no coincidence that reconciliation commissions usually
also have the aspiration of “truth” in their titles (typically being called
“truth and reconciliation commissions”), because only on the basis of agreeing
on at least some elementary historic facts can communities tackle traumatic
historic legacies that otherwise would have the potential of tearing societies
apart. The “ghosts of the past” can only be put to rest by public debates based
on a careful research of facts. Here again, public discourse facilitated by a
rich landscape of independent and critical media has an important function.
78.
The
media play an indispensable role in bringing about a culture of public
discourse. Where such a culture remains underdeveloped or even non-existent,
prejudiced messages against groups that face systematic discrimination usually
find fertile ground, because hostile rumours remain unchecked by factual
evidence, and fearful narratives can hardly be exposed to public scrutiny or
counter-narratives. Positively speaking, a developed culture of open and frank
public communication across boundaries is a prerequisite necessary for
preventing resentments from escalating to fully-fledged conspiracy projections.
79.
The
media are moreover needed for overcoming the culture of silence, wherever it
exists, in the face of violence in the name of religion. In conjunction with
civil society organizations, representatives of the media should openly address
incidents of violence, their root causes and political circumstances. Since a
culture of impunity and a culture of silence often go hand in hand, putting an
end to such silence may also be a first step towards tackling the problem of
impunity. Journalists and other media workers who operate in dangerous
environments require networks to defend them against violent threats.
80.
Moreover,
impressive media projects bear witness to the enormous positive potential of
the media in facilitating cross-boundary understandings. This may also include
the production of fiction aimed at overcoming societal divides. Particularly
after experiences of traumatic collective violence, positive media initiatives
can help restore the faculty of empathy by making people aware that the members
of other religions or beliefs, far from being “aliens”, in fact have quite
similar fears, hopes and feelings. Generally, the potential impact of media
work across religious or other divides can hardly be overemphasized.
81.
Freedom
of religion or belief cannot flourish without freedom of expression, and the
human rights enshrined in close neighbourhood in articles 18 and 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights mutually reinforce each other. Like most other human
rights, freedom of expression is not without possible limits, and there can be
situations in which the State has to impose restrictions, for instance, in
order to protect targeted minorities against advocacy of religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. However,
bearing in mind the high value of free communication and the indispensable
functions of the media to facilitate public discussions, any limitations
imposed on freedom of expression must be enacted with a high degree of
empirical and normative diligence. Limitations must meet all the criteria
enshrined in article 19, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant, which
are further spelled out by the Human Right Committee in its general comment no.
34.[29] Moreover, the Rabat Plan of Action also sets a
high threshold for any restrictions on freedom of expression, including for the
application of article 20, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant.[30]
82.
Indeed,
the best antidote to hate speech is “more speech”, in the sense of nuanced and
precise media reporting, self-regulating bodies and a fair representation of
religious and other minorities within the media, careful fact-finding in order
to dispel myths and check negative gossiping, public statements by civil
society organizations, sustainable interreligious communication and clear
anti-violence messages sent by religious communities, as elaborated above.
III. Conclusions and recommendations
83. Violence in the name of religion
does not “erupt” in analogy to natural catastrophes and it should not be
misconstrued as the inevitable result of sectarian hostilities that supposedly
originated centuries or millennia ago, thus seemingly lying outside of the
scope of the responsibility that different actors have today. It is important
to overcome fatalistic attitudes that often stem from simplistic descriptions
of the phenomena. Rather than being rooted in seemingly “perpetual” religious
antagonisms, violence in the name of religion is typically caused by
contemporary factors and actors, including political circumstances, which
provide the fertile ground for the seeds of hatred.
84. While it would be wrong to focus on
religion in isolation when analysing the problem, it would be equally
simplistic to reduce religious motives to mere “excuses” for violent crimes
perpetrated in their name. What is needed is a holistic understanding of the
various factors involved in violence committed in the name of religion. Typical
factors are the lack of trust in the rule of law and fair functioning of public
institutions; narrow-minded and polarizing interpretations of religious
traditions that may bring about societal fragmentation processes with
far-reaching negative repercussions on social relations; and policies of
deliberate exclusion, often in conjunction with narrowly defined national
identity politics and other factors; denial and impunity for serious violations
of international human rights and humanitarian law.
85. Only a full account of the various
root causes of the problems can build an awareness of the joint responsibility,
which a broad range of actors have in fighting violence committed in the name
of religion. Against this background, the Special Rapporteur formulates the
recommendations below addressed to the various stakeholders.
A. Recommendations to all relevant stakeholders
86. Government representatives,
religious communities, civil society organizations, the media and other
relevant stakeholders should reject and speak out promptly, clearly and loudly
against any acts of violence committed in the name of religion as well as
related incitement to violence and discrimination in law and practice, thus
overcoming the culture of silence that exists in some countries. They should
act swiftly and in concert to deter and stop such violence.
87. Public condemnations against
violence committed in the name of religion should be made on the basis of an
adequately complex analysis of the problem, including its underlying systemic
root causes.
88. The different stakeholders should
jointly contribute to the containment and eventual elimination of violence
committed in the name of religion by making creative use of their space and
specific potential. They should also cooperate in neutralizing any possible
radicalization efforts that target foreign fighters who returned to their
country of origin.
B. Recommendations to different State institutions
89. States have the responsibility to
protect its populations, whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement.
90. States have the obligation to act
swiftly to stop acts of violence committed in the name of religion, against
individuals, groups and places of worship. Overcoming a culture of impunity,
wherever it exists, must be a priority. Those who commit or are complicit in
acts of violence must be brought to justice.
91. States should safeguard the memory
of all population groups, and of religious communities in particular, including
by developing and protecting national archives, memorial museums and monuments.
92. States must respect freedom of
religion or belief and all other human rights when undertaking actions to
contain and combat against violence in the name of religion.
93. Legislation that renders the
existence of certain religious communities “illegal” in the country should be
revoked.
94. States should repeal anti-blasphemy
laws, anti-conversion laws and any other discriminatory criminal law
provisions, including those based on religious laws.
95. States should provide disaggregated
data on acts of violence committed in its jurisdiction, including on possible
religious motivations.
96. In order to operate as a credible
guarantor of freedom of religion or belief for everyone, the State should not
identify itself exclusively with one particular religion or belief at the
expense of equal treatment of the followers of other faiths. Any exclusivist
settings should be replaced by an inclusive institutional framework in which
religious diversity can unfold without discrimination and without fear.
97. Anti-discrimination legislation
should protect the equality of all in their enjoyment of human rights, across
religious or denominational divides, thus preventing or overcoming divisiveness
within society. States should in particular take steps to assure that the
rights of all will be protected so that all can feel safe in their religions or
beliefs.
98. In close consultation with all
relevant stakeholders, States should develop national action plans on how to
prevent violence committed in the name of religion, but also other forms of
religious persecution carried out by State agencies or non-State actors.
99. Textbooks used for school education
should not contain negative stereotypes and prejudices, which may stoke
discrimination or hostile sentiments against any groups, including the
followers of certain religions or beliefs.
100.
States should use all available means, including education and community
outreach, in order to promote a culture of respect, non-discrimination and
appreciation of diversity within the larger society.
101.
National human rights institutions are encouraged to take an active
ownership of the Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence, for the development of strategies
towards eliminating the root causes of violence committed in the name of
religion.
102.
States should refrain from stoking violent religious extremism in other
countries.
C. Recommendations to religious communities
103.
When religious communities and their leaders address any violence
committed in the name of their religion, they should take seriously the
relevance, inter alia, of religious motives often stemming from narrow-minded,
polarizing and patriarchal interpretations of religious traditions.
104.
In situations in which speaking out against violence may be dangerous,
fellow believers living in safer political environments should lend their
voices and clearly condemn violence committed in the name of their religion.
105.
Religious communities and their leaders should promote empathy, respect,
non-discrimination and an appreciation of diversity. They should challenge the
authenticity claims of religious extremists by exposing their views as being
ignorant of the charitable core messages contained in religious traditions.
Additionally, they should share with others their beliefs in the importance of
respecting the rights of others, thereby contributing to a sense that the
rights of all will be respected.
106.
Religious communities should feel encouraged to start initiatives of
interreligious communication and cooperation, including the establishment of
interreligious councils. A broad representation, including gender balance and
participation of different generations, can ensure that larger populations can
take active ownership of such initiatives.
D. Recommendations to civil society organizations
107.
Civil society organizations should continue to collect information about
the situation of human rights and support people living under conditions of
intimidation by following up on their cases.
108.
The findings of civil society organizations should be more
systematically used in their early warning function, notably in volatile
situations.
109.
Civil society should continue to play a role in overcoming a culture of
silence in the face of violence committed in the name of religion, thereby
sending a signal of solidarity to targeted individuals and groups.
110.
Faith-based and secular civil society organizations should work
together, including by creating common platforms, thereby demonstrating that a
commitment to human rights can create solidarity across all religious, cultural
and philosophical divides.
111.
Human rights defenders operating in dangerous situations deserve
particular attention and support by networks designed to defend the defenders.
E. Recommendations to the media
112.
In close collaboration with civil society organizations, representatives
of the media should defend their independence, professionalism and integrity
and address incidents of violence, their various root causes and the political
circumstances in which they take place.
113.
The media should help to bring about a culture of public discourse that
is a prerequisite to checking hostile rumours and fearful narratives, which
should be exposed to public scrutiny or counter-narratives in order to prevent
them from escalating to fully-fledged conspiracy projections.
114.
Careful fact-finding is the most important antidote to negative media
campaigns that target religious minorities or other groups. Such fact-finding
may also include a public analysis of collective historical traumas.
115.
The media can help restore the faculty of empathy by making people aware
that the members of groups facing systematic discrimination, far from being
“aliens”, have quite similar fears, hopes and feelings.
F. Recommendations to the international community
116.
The international community is reminded of its duty to assist and build
the capacity of States in fulfilling their commitments to the responsibility to
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity, as concluded in the 2005 World Summit.
117.
Human rights mechanisms, including the special procedures, treaty bodies
and universal periodic review, are encouraged to address the issue of violence
in the name of religion and State involvement in such violence.
118.
The international community should hold States and non-State armed
groups to account and make them aware of their existing obligations under
international law, including human rights, humanitarian, criminal and refugee
law.
[1] For an overview of the activities of the
Special Rapporteur between 1 August 2013 and 31 July 2014, see A/69/261,
paras. 4–22.
[2] By contrast, violence “on the grounds of religion or belief” is based
on the religious affiliation of the victim (see A/HRC/13/40, para. 33).
[4] See, for example,
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10522&LangID=E,
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14125&LangID=E,
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14618&LangID=E,
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14936&LangID=E
and www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15094&LangID=E.
[14] See also
www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml; and A/69/266,
paras. 78-85.
[17] See, for example, A/56/253, paras. 27 and
30, concerning the Taliban; A/HRC/2/7, para. 19, concerning Hezbollah;
A/HRC/18/48, para. 31, concerning Al-Shabaab; and www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/HRC_CRP_ISIS_14Nov2014.pdf,
concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.
[18] See article 42 of the Regulations
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land; CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13,
para. 10; and CAT/C/GC/2, para. 16.
[19] See
www2.ohchr.org/SPdocs/Countries/LRAReport_December2009_E.pdf and
www2.ohchr.org/SPdocs/Countries/LRAReport_SudanDecember2009.doc, concerning the
Lord’s Resistance Army.
[20] See
www.unmiss.unmissions.org/Portals/unmiss/Human%20Rights%20Reports/
UNMISS%20Conflict%20in%20South%20Sudan%20-%20A%20Human%20Rights%20Report.pdf.
[21] See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules,
International Committee of the Red Cross (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), with rules 3, 27, 30, 38, 40, 88, 104 and 127 specifically
referring to “religious” issues.
[24] See, for example, A/HRC/25/58/Add.1,
para. 35 (Sierra Leone) and A/HRC/25/58/Add.2, para. 16 (Jordan).
[25] See, for example,
www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/38330/Rome+Memorandum-English. and
www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/140201/14Sept19_The+Hague-Marrakech+FTF+Memorandum.pdf.
[27] For example, cooperation between the
organizations Lutheran World Federation and Islamic Relief Worldwide; see
www.lutheranworld.org/news/lwf-and-islamic-relief-sign-memorandum-understanding.