WUNRN
UN SC Resolution 1325 in Action: Lessons Learned and Reflections on
1325 National Action Plans - Panel
By Mavic Cabrera-Balleza - July 8, 2013
H.E. Mr. Tsuneo Nishida,
Permanent Representative of Japan to the UN; Secretary Dharanidhar Khatiwada of
the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) of Nepal; Mr. Naoto Hisajima,
Minister, Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN; Ms. Hilde Klemetsdal
Councellor, Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN; Ms. Anne-Marie Goetz, UN
Women’s Chief Advisor on Peace and Security; distinguished guests and friends,
good afternoon!
Special thanks to the Permanent
Mission of Japan to the UN for co-sponsoring this event with our organization,
the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders.
This is one of the few meetings
on 1325 where the male and female ration in the audience is not 98 percent
women and 2 percent men. It’s a little more than that. However, we want to see
a 50-50 representation in our next meeting on 1325.
GNWP is actively involved in
supporting NAP processes in a number of countries including the Philippines,
Nepal, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guatemala, Afghanistan and South Sudan. Our
involvement is through the provision of technical support in drafting of NAPs,
development of indicators and
establishment of Civil Society Working Groups or Task Forces on 1325. GNWP’s
main mandate is to support civil society so that they can meaningfully and
effectively engage in the development and implementation of the NAPs. While our
work is focused on enhancing civil society capacity, when requested, we also
provide support to governments and in countries like Nepal, the Philippines and
Sierra Leone, we have very close and successful collaboration with government
actors. In our work in Localization of 1325 and 1820, a key element is
partnership with local government units; and national government actors.
Gains
There have been a lot of gains
in civil society’s work on UNSCR 1325. Resolution 1325 has become an organizing
and mobilizing instrument for many women around the world—next to the Beijing
Platform for Action and CEDAW, Resolution 1325 is the only global policy that
has galvanized women in many parts of the world. Globally, women CSOs are
taking action to raise awareness and knowledge of the resolution; demand their
inclusion in peace processes and in decision-making; urge improvements in
Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration programs; mobilize towards
security sector reform; protest against arms trade; and work towards resolving
and preventing conflicts. Most of this work has actually been done before—prior
to 1325 adoption. But Resolution 1325 has given women peace activists a higher
platform; it amplified their voices even more—and with NAPs, women have
stronger instruments which they use to hold their governments accountable to
institutionalizing the women and peace and security agenda. 2
The work on 1325 NAPs allowed
civil society and other stakeholders to challenge and influence traditional
peacebuilding processes in a positive way. As we know, most of the traditional
peace building and mediation processes are also the most patriarchal—from the
Bodong in the Philippines; Palava Hut in Liberia; to the indigenous conflict
resolution in Colombia. The work on 1325 in these countries are transforming
these male dominated traditional ways of peacebuilding into more egalitarian
practices.
Specific to the Philippines, the
work on NAP has contributed to the inclusion of women in peace processes
particularly in the peace talks between the Philippine government and the MILF.
The Framework Peace Agreement that came out of this peace talks contain provisions
that promote "the right of women to meaningful political participation,
and protection from all forms of violence; and right to equal opportunity and
non-discrimination in social and economic activity and public service…"
The Transition Commission which is the group tasked to form the Bangsamoro
Basic Law that is part of the Framework Peace Agreement also has women
members—three of whom are from WE Act 1325, a civil society coalition that is a
member of GNWP. Facilitating and mediating countries like Norway which
facilitates the peace talks between the Philippine Government and the Communist
Party of the Philippines-National Democratic Front-New People’s Army, also play
a critical role in encouraging negotiating parties to ensure women’s
participation in peace processes and integration of women-specific agenda in
peace talks.
In countries like Liberia and
the Democratic Republic of Congo, women’s groups have used 1325 NAPs to lobby
for women’s participation in elections. The election results may not have been
that positive because of many institutional and socio-cultural barriers that
women confront, but the fact that the resolution again became an instrument to
assert women’s rights to be represented in governance structure is very
promising.
Local actors are owning the
NAPs. In countries like Nepal, Philippines and Sierra Leone, we have had some
success in integrating the NAPs into local development plans. In Colombia where
there is no NAP, localization has become an alternative mechanism for implementation.
Gaps and Glitches
There are now 42 countries with
NAPs; and a number of countries are in the process of drafting. This is less
than 50% of the total number of Member States but I would like to stay positive
and see this as good news—considering that in the first 5 years of the
resolution, there was only one NAP.
However, a good number of the 42
countries went from NAPping to sleeping. The NAPs went to sleep. Like many
policies, they were kept on the shelves of the bureaucracy after they were
adopted. The following are some of the factors that contributed to this:
1)Lack of ownership and
political will particularly by the government agency/ies that are supposed to
lead the implementation - Changes in leadership is common in governments;
sometimes too many and too often—these happen after an election, a cabinet
revamp; or horse trading among political parties. When the NAP is not the
"baby" of the new 3
leadership meaning it was
developed or adopted by the preceding Minister, the new Minister is not
enthusiastic about implementation. The new leadership doesn’t own it and it
goes to the bottom of the priority list.
This is also true in some UN
agencies—when another agency or consortium are already known to be leading the
process, the heads of some agencies are not enthusiastic about the NAP because
it is not their pet project. Sometimes the lack of support is also due to lack
of capacity or lack of knowledge of the resolution, the NAP process itself and
the issues.
This is where civil society’s
role becomes all the more critical. Government leadership and UN leadership
change. A strong civil society constituency ensures that whoever is in the
leadership will be held accountable. In some cases, it is the CSOs who
capacitate government and UN actors. A strong civil society will always be
there to push for effective implementation.
2) Check list approach - Another
challenge is when governments adopt a check list approach in developing a NAP.
Some countries develop NAPs to comply with international norms without serious
intent to implement. They assign a junior line agency staff person with no
political clout in the government architecture. They don’t allocate funding for
implementation –they rely completely on ODA. Once they are into the NAPping
process, they tick it off the check list of their international obligations.
3) Lack or absence of funding
for implementation - The lack or absence of funding for implementation is
another major gap. Some countries develop NAPS with no budget in mind—We want
to ask: what were they thinking? Isn’t the logical process is such that you
plan, you budget, and if there is no funding available, you raise funds. In
some cases when there are funds, CSOs do not have direct access to the funds
even as they are active implementors of the NAPs. Norway is one f the donor
countries that support CSOs directly. At the national level, thorough the
embassies; and at the global level through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4) Monitoring and evaluation -
No monitoring and evaluation is being carried out is also a major gap. Even
after the development of indicators by the UN, and by regional bodies like the
European Union, monitoring and evaluation by Member States is still the
exception rather than the rule.
5) Under-representation or
exclusion of CSOs - The under-representation or exclusion of CSOs in official
National Steering Committees for NAPs during development process as well as
during implementation is yet another challenge. The contribution of CSOs is not
acknowledged, recognized and valued. In many instances, lip service is often
paid but CSOs are excluded from decision-making.
6) Weak messaging - Weak
messaging on 1325 and 1820 is also a major gap. In most discussions on the
resolutions, the protection pillar in 1325 and in 1820 is still explained as
protection from sexual and gender-based violence only; but not protection of
women and girls’ rights—which highlights their agency to protect themselves.
Moreover, prevention is 4
focused on prevention of sexual
violence in conflict but not the prevention of conflict itself. I’m happy to
note that Japan’s NAP 1325 will be explicit on the prevention of conflict.
7) Yet another big challenge is
that there are still Member States who argue that 1325 is only for countries
that are in conflict or post-conflict; or those that are current members of the
Security Council.
Recommendations and plans for the future
We have many but let me just
mention a few.
1) Sustained and institutionalized
awareness and knowledge raising on 1325, 1820 and the supporting resolutions—As
I mentioned, government and UN leadership change so training and capacity
building should be a constant component of staff development programs. It
should not be optional.
2) We need to analyze the
connection or disconnect between NAPs and the work of National Security
Council/national defense councils. In a number of countries, the lead agencies
for NAP implementation do not have a seat in the National Security Council. It is
critical for the lead implementation agencies to have a seat in this highest
decision making body on national security to ensure that security policies are
informed by the principles of the NAP 1325. This could lead to broader and more
constructive concepts of security.
3) Develop incentives (in the
form of awards or citations) for Member States who are doing well in NAP
implementation. We have an ongoing discussion with Peace Women on the
possibility of operationalizing this incentive.
4) Continue to lobby for funding
for CSOs work on NAPs 1325 including access to and representation in multi
stakeholders financing mechanisms.
5) NAP 1325 should be
mainstreamed across government agencies through internal action plan (e.g.,
What does the NAP mean for the National Housing Commission? For the Ministry of
Justice?) We need to operationalize the whole of government approach. This
should also come with the necessary funding.
6) Actualize the provisions and
purposes of NAP1325 in all relevant circumstances and at all levels of
governance, the UN and civil society’s work from local to global; and global to
local.
Some of these recommendations
are already being carried out by civil society and we hope to continue this
work.
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NATIONAL ACTION PLANS ON
UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325