WUNRN
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جلال
فونديشن JALAL FOUNDATION |
An Afghan
Women-led, Women-focused Organization
With 50 NGO and Women Council
Members throughout
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Recommendations
to the Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women, re: Combined
Initial and Second Report of the Government of the Islamic
55th
Session, 8-26 July 2013
1. Introduction
Jalal Foundation is a national NGO that is
run, led and for Afghan women. It has 50 member NGOs and Women’s Councils
operating in distant localities where women are generally missed by development
interventions due to such factors as insecurity, geographic inaccessibility,
absence of communication facilities, low literacy, and patriarchal
traditions.
These recommendations were prepared to
reflect the perspectives and concerns of women in communities that are hardly
reached by development and are often missed by national reconstruction
initiatives. The analysis, comments and recommendations raised in this paper
are crucial in helping reverse the rapid down spiral of women’s rights in this
critical phase of security and political transition in our country.
2.
Resurgence of Fundamentalism and its Threats to Women’s Rights
2.1
Background: The Afghan
fundamentalist (Islamist) movement has been active in Afghan politics since
the late 1960s[1][1]. Its
power and influence over the lives of Afghans were dramatically heightened by
the sensational victory of mujahidin forces over the Red Army during the Russian
invasion of
2.2 Women’s oppression as a sub-ideology of
fundamentalism: The main
asset of fundamentalism is “radical Islam”, which provides the ideological
basis for a vision of Afghan solidarity as a nation. Unfortunately,
fundamentalism or radical Islam is totally averse to women’s rights, feminism,
or gender equality. This ideology does not recognize women as equal human
beings. It denies women of their human rights and legitimizes the use of
violence to sustain patriarchy and women’s subordination. Female
oppression/control is a sub-ideology of fundamentalism, something that came
into full fruition during the rule of the Taliban. The truth, however, is that
the sub-ideology of female oppression/control has been deeply embedded into the
fabric of social institutions and the mindset of men, leaders, and even many
women. In other words, it is an ideology that is embraced not only by Talibans
but by many institutions and citizens of
2.3 Fundamentalism
resurrects female-directed tyranny: The international intervention that began after the fall of the Taliban in
2001 endeavored to counteract female oppression by enshrining women’s rights in
the Constitution, adopting strategic policies to advance women’s status,
building their capacities, and promoting their participation in all walks of
life.
Unfortunately, these gains are now under threat of
being clawed back as fundamentalism springs back into the surface of formal and
informal decision making - in government, religion, family, and community. It
is like a hibernating monster that has been awakened by the announcement of
imminent departure by the international community at the end of 2014.
The theory that women’s rights will be sacrificed
in the name of peace is now a living reality. More than just making women’s
rights a bargaining chip, it is now clear that the peace and transition process
is just being used to justify the re-imposition of fundamentalist tenets on
women’s oppression. The following data
illustrates how the gains of the past ten years on women’s rights are now past
slipping down the drain:
· The number of reported VAW cases had increased
from 2,299 to 4,010 for the period 21 March to 21 October 2012 compared to the
number of cases for the same period in 2011[2][2].
This is a difference of 1,711 or 74.43 percent higher than the original figure
for 2011. Even if this is seen as an achievement in terms of peoples’
willingness to report VAW incidents, it is still clear that: (1) many women
still suffer from violence; (2) offenders are not fully deterred by the
presence of EVAW law because of its poor implementation; and (3) the need for
response systems to VAW survivors is increasingly becoming a compelling
imperative. Apart from these, our 50
women’s councils and NGOs scattered nationwide know for a fact that in their
respective localities, there are much more cases of VAW that are not being
reported because of complicity by family members, lack of reporting mechanisms,
and ignorance of the law and how it works.
· Increased incidents of brazen, extreme forms of
VAW (i.e., mutilation, hanging, beheading, public execution, etc.), are now
more frequently being reported in media than before. For example:
- In June
2012, MOWA Provincial Affairs Director Shah Jan Yazdan Parast, reported to
media that 11 women have been executed by Taliban in
- The barbaric public execution of a 22-year old
woman in Parwan was captured in an amateur video and widely circulated in media
in the same period, obviously, to sow fears in the hearts of women and warn
them about the return of Taliban-style control of women;[3][3]
- On 22 July 2012, Radio Liberty reported that a man
in
- Two women were be-headed by the Taliban in Kajaki
District in
- In October 2012, Mah Gul, a 20-year old woman from
The statistics are not
systematically being recorded but it does not mean that the problem does not
exist. Our partners in the field know
the situation as they are part of the daily horrors routinely experienced by
women from the Taliban and from their own families and communities. As far as
cruelty of women is concerned, it is “open season” once again in
· Assassination/killing of and constant threats to
women defenders of human rights have been more rampant and brazen than before
and have not received justice. For example:
- Lt. Islam Bibi, commander of Women’s Police
Department in the
- In January 2013, the Taliban assassinated a female
social activist in Wardak and hanged her dead body in a tree;
-
On 13 July 2012, Hanifa
- Najia Sidiqi, Acting Provincial Director of the
Women’s Affairs Department in Laghman was assassinated in 12 December 2012; and
- In September 2012, Kolsoom, a 30-year old woman
from
It has also been observed that some government
officials and state mechanisms have started to waver in their posturing to
protect women’s rights, such as:
· Threats to the EVAW law: In June 2013, the decree on the Elimination of
Violence against Women was filed for ratification by the Parliament despite its
validity and the adequacy of its coverage and punitive provisions. The law was
a product of four years of dialogue and negotiations with many sectors. It was
enacted through a presidential decree in 2009 and has since been used in
prosecuting VAW offenders. Yet, fundamentalist solons branded it as un-Islamic.
One of them even warned that “there will
be blood in the streets if the law will be enacted”. Presently, the law is
under threat of being amended or repealed. In addition, division among women’s
leaders is being fomented by the debates on the legality of the EVAW law.
· Incompetence of MOWA to champion women’s rights: Amidst the heated controversies about the EVAW
law, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA), which is mandated to protect
women’s rights and mediate conflicting views from an enlightened perspective,
was disappointingly silent. It should be noted that in many issues, MOWA has
been constantly taking the side of government even if they are deleterious to
women.
· Unwillingness of President Karzai to champion
women’s rights: When
approached by women activists for help in defending the EVAW law, President
Hamid Karzai informed them that women’s rights had already brought tremendous
trouble and shame to his leadership and he will no longer be able to extend any
help.[6][6] This mindset is very alarming considering
that he is the prime State official who is ultimately accountable over the
protection of women’s rights.
· Questionable appointments to the Afghan
Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC): Recently, President Karzai appointed
Commissioners to the AIHRC who lack knowledge and commitment to women’s rights.
They include a hard line fundamentalist and former member of the Taliban
government who was jailed in Bagram by American soldiers for his insurgent
activities. He asserted that the EVAW law was un-Islamic and must be changed.
Only upon pressures from the Human Rights Watch and UN High Commissioner on
Human Rights was the said Commissioner dismissed from office by the President[7][7]. Although
this is a welcome development, it is also clear that President Karzai is
inclined to sacrifice the interests of women to placate the Taliban.
The rest of the new
appointees to AIHRC have also questionable records on human rights. One of them, QadriaYazdanparast was closely
associated, through Jamiat-i-Islami, with
RECOMMENDATIONS
a)
The Government of Afghanistan should
be asked to issue a commitment to ensure that existing laws and policies on
women’s rights will not be diluted, shelved, amended or repealed, at least in
the next five years.
b)
More appointments of
fundamentalist persons to strategic positions in government are expected to
increase, given the peace and reconciliation process and the vision of
integrating the Talibans into national politics. Noting the quick and favorable
response of President Karzai to pressures from international agencies (as
mentioned above), it is recommended that a UN agency (e.g., UN Women) be
designated to help Afghan women generate resistance to questionable
appointments by the President.
c)
International advocacy for the
dismissal of the newly-appointed Commissioners to the AIHRC must continue and
be intensified. This is very important because the AIHRC is the only
institution in the country that has the commitment and capacity to defend
women’s rights.
d)
CEDAW should call for an evaluation
of the performance of the Ministry of Women and recommend ways by which its
strategic effectiveness could be developed.
For now, considering that the Ministry of Women’s Affairs is part of the
government, it is clear that it can never be effective in serving as a champion
of women’s rights, especially during the transition process. In this
connection, the Government of Afghanistan should be advised to consider the
creation of a high level, independent mechanism linked to the Afghan
Independent Human Rights Commission to serve as effective “watchdog” of women’s
rights, at least during the period of transition.
e) In
consultation with women NGOs, the Government of Afghanistan should be required
to present a holistic strategy to protect women’s rights from the onslaughts of
fundamentalism. It should include a massive public information campaign and the
long-term transformation of values to eradicate those that are inimical to
human rights, including the rights of women. A copy of this strategy should be
sent to CEDAW before the national election in 2014.
f) For the sake of securing the rights and
lives of Afghan women, CEDAW is requested to invite the next President of
Afghanistan to a meeting in order to emphasize the importance of her/his roles
in protecting the rights of women, especially during the transition.
3.
Low performance in regard to
3.1 Afghanistan’s MDG Goal: Goal 3 of Afghanistan’s Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) states that it will promote gender equality and empower women by “increasing female participation in elected
and appointed bodies at all levels of governance to 30% by 2020”[9][9], among other strategies. More than in any other institution, this goal is
supposed to be pursued by all government entities.
3.2 Removal of quota provision in the National
Election Law: As could be
gleaned from the Initial and Second
Report of GOIRA, the government has been failing miserably in attaining this
goal in all areas, except in the Parliament, where the goal is close to being
attained. Unfortunately, this positive trend has just been seriously undermined
by the recent decision of the Parliament to delete the quota provision for
women in the election for the provincial councils. Female Parliamentarians
revealed that they were tricked to sign the version of the law which did not
contain the quota provision.
The President could veto the law and the Ministry
of Women’s Affairs could have stood up and provided an objective, enlightened
analysis on the wisdom of the quota provision.
However, up to the present, the President and the Minister of Women have
both been silent about the deletion of the said quota provision. A fundamentalist
Parliamentarian was quoted by local newspapers as saying that the quota
provision is un-Constitutional because it will allow women with lower votes to
win over men with higher votes. This is a reflection of the prevailing
ignorance of the Women Convention’s provision on affirmative action and
threatens to obstruct the power of the Parliament to advance women’s
status.
3.3 Lack of political will and strategy to
promote women in decision making: The attainment of MDG Goal 3 is being hampered, allegedly, by the lack of
qualified female candidates. This is only partly true. The fact is, women who
have been given the opportunity and training all rose up to the challenge.
Within government, women in decision making
positions comprise only around 8.2 percent of the total[10][10].
This figure could be easily increased by the President by appointing women to
decision making positions. For example, instead of only three (3) female
ministers, he could appoint more women to meet the 30 percent goal within his
Cabinet. He could do the same with vice presidents (now both males); deputy
ministers (now with only 3 females); governors (only 1); town mayors (only 1);
district mayors (only 1); etc. He should
also make sure that women comprise at least 30 percent of other appointed
positions for key bodies, such as the Independent Election Commission,
Independent Administrative and Civil Service Commission, National Peace
Council, and Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission.
RECOMMENDATIONS
a)
The Government of Afghanistan
should ensure that the High Level Appointments Board includes representatives
from the women’s movement. These representatives should be selected by women
NGOs themselves. The TOR of this Board should also be modified to include the
responsibility to assist the President in ensuring that women comprise 30
percent of all appointed positions. Moreover, its search and screening
guidelines must explicitly carry an affirmative bias for women.
b)
The President should be
encouraged to immediately appoint more women in various posts until he leaves
his office, a legacy that he could leave to compensate for all his failings in
defending women’s rights. He should also be encouraged to issue a call for all
political parties to include the protection of women’s rights in their party
platforms.
c)
The Government of Afghanistan should be asked
to submit a comprehensive sex-disaggregated statistics on senior appointed and
elected positions, showing the percentage of women in each of such positions.
d)
President Karzai should be asked to
veto the National Election Law and ensure that the quota provision is
re-integrated into it.
4. Widows
and Female Heads of Household
4.1 Widows and Female Heads of Household have been
recognized as the poorest and most vulnerable population of the country, along
with the Kuchis. State support to them is guaranteed under Article 53, Section
2 of the Afghan Constitution[11][11].
However, they receive very little attention in terms of national policy
and decision making, social protection and support, service delivery, and
political participation. This is partly because they lack representation and a
comprehensive study on their situation has not been conducted to inform
policy/decision making and programming.
4.2 Based on available data, there are around 1.5
to 2 million war widows in the country. “Those
widows, whether heads of households or not, are relatively young, with an
average of 35 years. Ninety nine percent of them are unable to read and write.
Around 90% of Afghan widows have children, and many of them are in a great
difficulty in supporting their children”.[12][12]
According to a UNIFEM study in 2006, 65 percent of the 50,000 widows
settled in
4.3 The Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) program of government does not include widows even if their
situation is a direct consequence of the war.
Likewise, there is no specific allocation to women heads of households
in any of the government-distributed township which are managed by Mujahideen
leaders and commanders[14][14].
4.4 Around two percent of households in
RECOMMENDATIONS
a)
Request the Government of Afghanistan
to progressively increase the public allocations and the number of widows and
female heads of households who are covered by social protection and support by
the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled.
b)
Require the Government of Afghanistan
to submit a comprehensive, evidence-based analysis of the situation of widows
and female heads of households, to include accurate statistical figures;
analysis of their socio, economic, and political status; and corresponding
policy options to address the challenges that they continue to experience.
c)
Request the Government of Afghanistan
to come up with a dynamic national data base on widows and female headed
households that could intelligently inform advocacy, policy and decision making
and programming for them and their families.
5.
Comments on the Composition of the Delegation
We express concern about the composition and
leadership of the
· First, it is not acceptable to us that the
delegation of
· Second, we are also very concerned that the
highest official of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the Minister of Women, is
not part of the delegation. The Minister
of Women is the highest decision maker in the agency of government that is
answerable to the women of
· Third, we are not pleased that there are only two
female members of the delegation. This
is an international session on women and it is only fitting that the delegation
be dominated by women. It shows how women are being marginalized by the Afghan
government in the composition of its international delegations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
a) The attention of the Government of Afghanistan
should be called regarding its decision to send an Adviser as head of
delegation rather than the most senior public official who holds primary
accountability over the implementation of CEDAW.
b) The Government of Afghanistan should be asked to
create a sex-disaggregated list of international events and conferences to
which the government sent a delegation and to indicate the position/role in the
delegation by the female and male representatives.
c) The Government of Afghanistan should be asked to
present a long term strategy for promoting the appointment of Afghan women to
international bodies.
6.
Conclusion
We thank CEDAW for giving us the opportunity to
share our views on the work of the Government of Afghanistan in the
implementation of the Women’s Convention. Should you have any question, please
contact massoudajalal@rocketmail.com.
We remain optimistic and will continue to be strengthened by your support.
More power!