WUNRN
YEMEN - CHRONIC DISPLACEMENT -
CONFLICTS, DISASTERS - WOMEN & GIRLS
Displaced girls
share a simple meal of bread and pulses their mothers have cooked. Political
tensions remain high in Yemen and the country continues to face armed conflicts
both in the north and the south. This has been posing significant security
challenges and resulting in a wave of displacement.
Copyright:
WFP/Abeer Etefa
Food Assistance
to Internally Displaced Yemenis 7
_________________________________________________________________
YEMEN - INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT CONTINUES AMIDST MULTIPLE CRISES
In recent
years, Yemen has simultaneously faced intermittent internal armed conflict in
the northern governorate of Sa’ada, civil unrest and popular uprisings across
the country, a resurgent separatist movement in the south and increasingly
active Islamic militants in the south and elsewhere ( International Crisis Group,
3 July 2012; OCHA, 17 August 2012;Chatham House ,
January 2012)[1]. This in the context
of an already volatile and impoverished country with considerable development challenges
and pre-existing humanitarian needs (OCHA, June 2012; IRIN, 4 August 2011). The
resulting political instability has further limited the government's capacity
to provide basic services, contributing to increased humanitarian needs among
vulnerable groups. Fighting between various factions - government, opposition,
tribes and militants - has made these conditions worse among populations
already chronically impoverished and resulted in continuing internal
displacement in the northern, central and southern regions of the country.
The UNOCHA
estimates that there are more than 430,000 internally displaced people (IDPs)
in Yemen, many of whom have been repeatedly displaced (OCHA, 19 November 2012; OCHA, 20 October
2012; OCHA, 4-12 June 2012). The
main factors have been internal armed conflict and civil unrest, but disasters
- including flash floods, drought and land erosion – have also contributed
( OCHA, 4-12 June
2012; UNHCR, May 2012).[2] There are no
reliable estimates for the number of people displaced by disasters, but in
October 2008 flash floods in Hadramout and al-Mahra governorates forced nearly
25,000 people from their homes ( WFP , 25 Novermber-6 December
2008; OCHA, November 2008; IRIN, 24 May 2009; IRIN, 6 November
2008). Many of those displaced have since been assisted via reconstruction and
development efforts that are still on-going (Saba
Net, 17 March 2012; World Bank, January 2009)[3].
Internal
displacement has taken place in the context of an increasing socio-economic
crisis made worse by rising commodity prices. In 2011, conflict and civil
unrest restricted access to essential government services such as health care,
social welfare, education, electricity and water, and in some areas cut it off
completely. This has made severe and widespread chronic vulnerabilities worse,
particularly among those affected by conflict and including IDPs. Yemen is the
poorest state in the Arab world, with an estimated 35 per cent of the
population living below the poverty line and facing acute food insecurity and
water scarcity.
Unrest in
central and southern Yemen
Civil protests
against the 32-year rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh began in the first
week of February 2011 (Amnesty International, 14
March 2011; Reuters, 23 May 2011; ICRC, 5 May 2011; HRW, 9 March 2011; OCHCR, 31 May 2011; HRW, 6 February 2012).
Sana’a, Taiz and the neighbouring governorate of Ibb witnessed some of the
largest protests and the fiercest clampdowns (UNHCR, 13 February
2012; OCHA, 7 June 2011). As the
social unrest spread Saleh’s support base began to crumble, with increasing
defections from the armed forces and tribal factions formerly loyal to the
president.
Intense
fighting between the rival factions in Sana’a and several other urban areas,
particularly Taiz, forced an estimated 10,000 people to flee their homes during
the second half of 2011 (Al-Jazeera, 25 May 2011; IRIN, 27 May 2011; OHCHR, 31 May 2011; ADRA , June 2011).
Around half of them were displaced from Sana’a and the surrounding districts of
Arhab and Nihlin. Entire neighbourhoods such as al-Hasba in Sana'a, the
stronghold of the opposition leader Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, became conflict
zones, causing thousands to flee. Among those displaced were refugees and IDPs
who had sought refuge in the capital and were forced into secondary
displacement. In Taiz, nearly 3,000 people remained displaced as of the end of
2011 and more than 2,000 were living in partially destroyed homes ( OCHA , 13 February
2012).
In November
2011, Saleh signed an agreement brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
and backed by the UN, paving the way for a transfer of power to Vice-President
Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi as leader of a coalition of government and opposition
parties[4]. Hadi's mandate, and
that of the newly-formed government of national unity was reconfirmed in
presidential elections held in February 2012. Under the terms of the GCC
agreement, Hadi and the new government were given two years to restructure the
military and security apparatus, address issues of transitional justice and
hold an inclusive national dialogue conference with the aim of revising the
constitution before new elections in February 2014 ( ICG, July 2012; USAID , 19 July
2012).
The agreement
relieved tensions somewhat in the capital, but intermittent clashes and urban
protests continued until February 2012. As of late 2011, some parts of the
country were under the effective control of armed opposition groups. In early
2012 the Yemeni authorities sought to retake them. Sana’a remained divided into
three zones controlled by the government, opposition factions including
sections of the army which had defected, and other tribal groups (ICG, July 2012). Most of
the barricades in the city had been removed by late March 2012, but tensions
persisted and sporadic clashes were reported in Arhab. Tensions also remained
in other towns and cities ( ICG, ICG, July 2012; IDMC,
interview June 2012; Yemen Times, 25 June
2012; Yemen Times, March 2012; Yemen Times, 19 July
2012). Though many of those displaced by the civil unrest in 2011 were said to
have gone back to their homes, ongoing clashes and insecurity from other
sources of conflict continued to cause new displacement both in the north and
the south, and to hamper returns and reconstruction efforts.
Unrest and
conflict in southern Yemen
Civil unrest in
southern Yemen was compounded by an intensification of Islamic militancy, with
the militants gaining considerable ground during 2011. It also took place in
the context of political upheaval that predates the Arab spring. Until 1990,
Yemen was divided into two states - the Yemen Arab Republic in the north and
the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. The two countries
fought three short wars in 1972, 1979 and 1988. In 1990, reconciliation led to
the creation of the unified Republic of Yemen with Sana’a as its capital, but
civil war broke out in 1994, leading to the displacement of 53,000 people (UN SC, 12 July 1994; UN SC, 27 June 1994). The
70-day conflict ended with the defeat of the southern separatist movement and
Sana'a reassumed control of the south. Tensions persisted, however, as
grievances held against the national government went unresolved. These included
its large military presence, the alleged appropriation of southerners' land and
the introduction of policies that failed to respond to southerners' needs.
From 2006, the
tensions led to regular mass protests across the southern governorates of Lahj,
al-Dahle, Hadramout and Abyan ( HRW, 15 December 2009),
and in 2007 a loose coalition of opposition groups established the Southern
Separatist Movement or Harak al-Salmi al-Ganoubi. Despite the movement's call
for secession from the north by peaceful means, fierce clashes broke out
between southern militants and the security forces. The fighting led to hundreds
of families being displaced in Lahj and al-Dahle during 2010 (Southern Observatory for Human
Rights , June 2011). Protesters continued to take to the
streets throughout 2011, their call for an end to Saleh's rule adding to those
of their counterparts in the north. The clamour for secession also continued to
grow (Yemen Post, 16 April 2012;
The Guardian, 22 May
2012; ICG, July 2012).
These tensions,
however, were overshadowed in 2011 by an intensification of Islamic militancy
in the vacuum created by social unrest elsewhere in the country. As the
security forces in the south were redeployed in response to the situation in
Sana’a, Ansar al-Sharia (which translates as Partisans of Islamic Law) - a
group associated with al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula - rapidly extended its
influence in Abyan. Sporadic fighting between counterinsurgency forces and the
militants had already taken place in previous years, and in September 2010 it
led to the temporary displacement of nearly 6,000 people in Shabwa governorate
(ICRC, October 2010; IRIN, 30 September
2010; UNHCR, 24 September 2010;
Southern Democratic Assembly, 3 July 2010).
In March 2011,
Ansar al-Sharia declared Abyan an “Islamic emirate” and fought government
forces for the capital Zinjibar ( NY Times, 29 May 2011).
Two months later, the militants seized control of the city along with the towns
of Ja’ar, al-Kud, Khanafar and Shuqrah and some parts of neighbouring Shabwa
governorate, displacing tens of thousands of people in the process ( Committee for Humanitarian Assistance
to IDPs of Abyen, 6 June 2011; OCHA, 7 June 2011;OCHA,
July 2011; AlertNet, 4 July 2011).
As of early May
2012, the number of people displaced by the ongoing conflict in Abyan who fled
to the neighbouring governorates of Aden, Lahj, Shabwa, Hadramout and al-Bayda
was put at more than 210,000. A further 100,000 people were believed to be
unable to flee Abyan and at serious risk (ICRC,
6 June 2012; UNHCR, May 2012;UNHCR, 14 April 2012).
In April 2012,
the security forces in coordination with the Abyan popular defence committees -
led mainly by tribal factions - launched a campaign to retake control of
territory from Ansar al-Sharia. They recaptured Zinjibar, Ja’ar and Shuqrah in
June 2012, and many militants reportedly fled to neighbouring governorates. The
conflict was marked by intense fighting in urban areas, including extensive
aerial bombardments. Preliminary assessments revealed substantial destruction,
particularly in Zinjibar, which was left without electricity and water. The widespread
presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and landmines constitutes a further risk
to displaced populations hoping to return.
Between July
and November 2012 more than 80,000 IDPs were reported to have returned to
Abyan; however neighbouring governorates and areas within Abyan continue to
host close to 120,000 (OCHA, 19 November
2012; USAID , 30 September
2012). Humanitarian agencies expect returns to continue in the coming months,
despite ongoing concerns such as UXO and landmines, extensive damage to
infrastructure and a lack of security, basic services and livelihood
opportunities.
The effects of
the conflict have spilled over into the south of the country as a whole. As of
October 2012, the situation in several southern governorates remained fragile,
with some areas, especially Abyan and Shabwa, experiencing continued civil
unrest, localized violence and lawlessness ( Yemen Times, 25 October
2012). Some of the insecurity stems from the protracted period of Ansar
al-Sharia control, but it is also linked to the complexity of tribal structures
in the south and the ongoing sensitivity of the north-south divide. Many of
these issues are interlinked, and play out against a backdrop of the collapse
of public services including health care, education, water and sanitation
( OCHA, 5-12 July 2012)
Intermittent
conflict in northern Yemen
The al-Houthi
movement has been engaged in successive rounds of armed conflict with the
Yemeni army and government-backed tribes in Sa'ada governorate since 2004. The
group, however, developed into an opposition movement, and there have been six
rounds of fighting, the last from August 2009 to February 2010, when a
ceasefire was reached.[5] The ceasefire
remains in force, but intermittent clashes between al-Houthi and tribal groups
continue to take place (Yemen Post, 22 September
2012).
The conflict
began in 2004 with isolated clashes in Sa’ada, but by February 2010 it had
spread to the governorates of Amran, Hajjah, Sana’a and al-Jawf, and the
south-western Saudi border province of Jizan ( Rand Corporation, 3 May
2010). The intensity of the conflict increased with each round of fighting and
the Saudi Arabian armed forces became directly involved in the last outbreak,
which saw fierce clashes in heavily-populated towns (HRW, 7 April 2010; HRW, 19 November
2008; Irish Times, 13 November
2009). Human rights organisations have reported violations perpetrated by all
parties to the conflict, including indiscriminate shelling, the recruitment of
children and forced disappearances (HRW, 19 November 2008;HRW, October
2008; AI, 2 December 2009).
More than
320,000 people were reportedly displaced across the northern governorates (Yemen Post, 28 June 2010;IRIN, 24 June 2010; OCHA, 14 June 2010).
Checkpoints
manned by all parties have restricted return movements, as have the extensive
damage to property and infrastructure and the presence of land mines. Villages
within 15 km of Yemen’s northern border with Saudi Arabia were reportedly
rendered inhabitable, with thousands of people displaced. In Jizan, more than
30,000 people were displaced (Reuters, 13 November 2009;Al Shorfa, 15 September
2010; Al Shorfa, 20 March
2012). [6] Following the
February 2010 ceasefire, large areas of Sa’ada remained under al-Houthi
control, though the government retained Sa’ada city. In June 2010, the two
sides signed a reconciliation agreement to reinforce the ceasefire and
encourage IDPs to go back to their homes (Shabwar Today, 7 July 2010;Yemen Post, 19 June
2010; UNHCR, 23 July 2010).
Returns, however, have been negligible.
By April 2011,
as a consequence of the government's focus on the civil unrest in Sana’a and
other areas, al-Houthi had taken complete control of Sa’ada city, along with
the majority of al-Jawf, almost half of Amran and large swathes of Hajjah
governorates. An all-out conflict was averted and the central tenets of the
February 2010 ceasefire seem to remain intact, but localised armed clashes have
continued ( OCHA, 16 August
2011; USAID-DCHA , 10
August 2011; IRIN, 23 March 2011).
Sporadic fighting has been reported in the governorates of Sa’ada, Hajjah,
Amran and al-Jawf between al-Houthi on the one hand, and Salafist militants and
members of the al-Islah party on the other. Both groups are closely aligned
with the government and were staunch supporters of President Saleh.
The clashes
took on a sectarian character in late November 2011 as fighting intensified
between al-Houthi and the Salafists, leading to the displacement of around
50,000 people in Sa’ada and Hajjah governorates (IRIN, 31 January
2012; IRIN, 16 February
2012; OCHA , 13 February
2012). In February 2012, the two sides reached a fragile truce, but clashes
have continued, leading to further displacement (IRIN, 8 May 2012; Yemen Times, 23 April
2012). The al-Houthi movement has raised concerns that neighbouring countries
and the government in Sana'a were intending to re-launch the war for Sa'ada and
has warned against a seventh round of fighting. That said, after months of
hesitation it agreed in June 2012 to take part in the national dialogue
launched by the transitional government, though its full-fledged support for
the process remains fragile.
Natural
disaster related displacement in Yemen
Yemen is prone
to disaster-induced internal displacement caused by both and slow and
sudden-onset natural hazards ( World Bank, September
2012; UNHCT, 2012). Its arid
climate, mountainous terrain in the east and large areas of low-lying coastal
plains make it highly susceptible to drought, desertification, flash floods,
earthquakes and landslides. In October 2008, flash floods in the eastern
governorates of Hadramout and Mahra killed 80 people, displaced more than
20,000 and affected more than 100,000. More than 10,600 households had their
homes destroyed or damaged, and more than 5,100 households lost means or assets
contributing to their livelihoods ( World Bank et al, January 2009; WFP , December 2008).
Recovery continues to this day (SabaNet,
17 March 2012).
Natural hazards
also increase protection risks for IDPs displaced by other causes, and makes
them vulnerable to further displacement. In early 2010, severe storms destroyed
or damaged hundreds of IDPs' shelters in camps in Hazzrah, stretching already
limited resources ( IDMC , August 2010).
In April 2012, flash floods inundated settlements affecting at least 76
internally displaced families, including 200 children (UNICEF, September
2012; Yemen Post, April 2012).
Yemen is one of
the world's most water-stressed countries. It suffers severe shortages in
several urban areas, including Sana’a, and in the drier western and southern
regions (IRIN, 13 August
2012; Climate Investment Funds,
October 2011). UN estimates in 2012 put the number of people facing acute water
shortages at 13 million, and the number facing food insecurity at ten million (OCHA, 20 October 2012).
Information on internal displacement related to drought and desertification is
sparse, however ( Yemen Times, August 2009),
and the number of people affected or at risk is unknown. That said, the
livelihoods of subsistence farmers are highly vulnerable and displacement has
been reported: for example, in Mahwit governorate, north-west of Sana’a, an
extensive year-long drought in 2008 caused the displacement of thousands of
households from their mountain villages (OCHA, May 2011; IRIN, May 2008).
Existing
legislation and policy frameworks relevant to disaster-induced internal
displacement are far from comprehensive. Some proactive measures have been
taken towards setting up national frameworks for disaster management, and in
integrating disaster risk reduction into development programmes, but
significant gaps remain in terms of resource allocation and capacities (Government of Yemen, 17
April 2011; World Bank et al, January
2009). The inclusion of disasters as a cause of displacement and an aggravator
of risk for vulnerable IDPs in the current drafting of a national IDP policy
would provide a framework within which to respond to such situations.
Understanding displacement risks, including displacement associated with
slow-onset disasters, and IDPs' concerns should also be included in the efforts
of major donors such as the World Bank and UN agencies including UNHCR, which
are currently working in partnership with the Yemeni authorities to build
national capacity for disaster risk management, improve urgently-needed water
governance practices and plan for climate change adaptation.