WUNRN
Doable Fast-Track
Indicators
for
Turning the 1325 Promise into Reality
[Launched at the working meeting on
1325 on 27 July 2010
at the United States Institute of
Peace,
By Ambassador Anwarul K. Chowdhury*
Backdrop
The credibility of the United Nations rests in a major
way on its ability and capacity to get the decisions of the Security Council
implemented in letter and spirit. When in March 2000, the Security Council
expressed for the first time in its history of 55 years its conceptual
acceptance that peace is inextricably linked with equality between women and
men and affirmed that the equal access and full participation of women in power
structures and their full involvement in all efforts for peace and security,
the international community was charged with expectation.
The formal resolution followed this conceptual and political
breakthrough in October of the same year through the Council’s unanimous
agreement of all 15 members including the five permanent ones giving this issue
the attention and recognition that it deserves. It was welcomed by one and all
with considerable enthusiasm hoping that there would be progress in paying
attention and respect to the unrecognized, under-utilized and under-valued
contribution by women to preventing war, to building peace and to engaging
individuals and societies live in harmony. As such, the implementation of the
landmark resolution 1325 of the Council poses a unique and all-embracing
responsibility on the international community particularly the United Nations.
Adoption of 1325 has opened a much-awaited door of opportunity for women who
have shown time and again that they bring a qualitative improvement in
structuring peace and in post-conflict architecture.
__________________________________________________
*Ambassador Chowdhury took the initiative for the adoption of a statement by the Security Council on 8 March 2000 as its President on women, peace and security that served as precursor to 1325.
What
then can we do in the coming months and years to move forward in ensuring an
effective, real and faithful implementation of 1325 in letter and spirit?
For that, the time has come to prepare a doable, realistic, practical and actionable set of indicators to monitor and measure progress in the implementation of 1325.
What the indicators should be like
Given
the deep rooted societal and cultural as well as political challenges that the
1325 implementation has been and will be experiencing, the indicators should be
incremental and progressive in nature and with a fast-track time frame. Every
dimension of 1325 is not implementable in one go and has to be phased
realistically with the support of all actors.
Indicators should be oriented
towards engineering global and national policy changes. Those should highlight
the spear-heading role of the UN and result in a UN system wide annual work
programme for each of the relevant entities for 1325.
Involvement of the wider set of
actors, particularly civil society in laying out the indicators which should be
user-friendly and easily understandable by all concerned. Those should have
willing and enthusiastic participation of all, in particular developing
countries that are the overwhelming majority of UN member-states. These
countries should be in the forefront of reporting on 1325 indicators and not
necessarily consider those as another complex reporting arrangement aimed at
showing them in a bad light.
Presenting his set of indicators,
the Secretary-General himself accepts that during last ten years implementation
of 1325 remains slow. He adds that assessment of the progress of the
implementation is constrained by an absence of baseline data, and specific,
measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound indicators. These constraints
will not go away soon even after the Security Council passes a resolution
adopting his indicators proposed in the Report. Availability of the data
particularly in the developing countries is a major disincentive to the
implementation momentum that we need NOW after ten years.
Critique of the UN SG’s Indicators
In response to a Security Council resolution 1889 (2009), UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has submitted on 22 April 2010 to the Council a set of 26 indicators for use at the global level to track implementation of 1325.
The international community had to
wait for ten years to receive a set of indicators from the UN (actually 31 in
number as five of the indicators come in pairs) that is expected to take,
according to the Secretary-General, another two to five years – it would be for
sure five years or more all the developing countries – to be operational. He
says that making the indicators operational will require a pilot phase to
develop a baseline data collection method.
Secretary-General’s set of
indicators puts all responsibility in the hands of the governments as data
collection and statistical responsibility in most countries are handled by
them. 50% of the indicators relate to numbers, percentages and indices that
would present the statistical rather than real life change in situation on the
ground. These indicators fail to underscore the importance of policy change and
policy orientation that could trigger real action for implementation. Some
indicators ask for information that is not available realistically in conflict
affected countries. Think of indicator 16 which intends to know about
“level of women’s participation in the justice and security sector in
conflict-affected countries.”
A number of indicators focus on the numbers
and percentages of instructions, codes
and regulations – if past experience is any guide, such recommendation will
result in shrewd move by the concerned authorities to create and adopt all the
needed rules without the will in their real implementation. One can recall
cases of countries that have become parties to many human rights treaties but
at the same time are the worst violators of those rights.
A good number of indicators has
presumed existence of “human rights bodies”, “courts equipped to try cases of
violations of human rights of women and girls”, “transitional justice
mechanisms”, “national mechanism for control of small arms” etc. In reality not
many developing countries, particular those going through or coming out of
conflicts, have any such real institutional support system. Even for quite a
number of the existing institutions, there is no mandate to cover the areas the
indicators are expecting to track progress.
Take
indicator 14 that asks for “Index of women’s and girls’ physical
security” and goes on to explain that given the difficulty of collecting
reliable data on perceptions of physical security, it is proposed that data on
this indicator be collected through consistent, replicable and ethical surveys.
The UN secretariat should know better that it is easier said than done.
Indicator
15 seeks to measure “extent to which national
laws protect women’s and girls’ human rights
in line with international standards”. Given the current global situation, how
unrealistic one could be to expect national laws protecting women’s and girls’
rights in line with international standards which in any case remain
ill-defined.
Again,
indicator 22 aims at knowing about “extent to which strategic planning
frameworks in conflict affected countries incorporate gender analysis, targets,
indicators and budgets”. It seems that the Secretary-General decided to ignore
the reality on the ground in a conflict-affected country.
Most indicators ask for very complex set of data in
conflict- ridden countries – such data are unavailable even for many of the
normally peaceful countries. For such countries data gathering is one of their
last priorities. Even the Secretary-General himself admits that “a number of
measurements will require system-wide changes to track the necessary information”
and requires “direct data collection and specialized and careful technical and
conceptual development.”
Indicators mention a good number of
times about measuring national level resources and budgetary allocation and
disbursement, but not increase in funding. Given the inherent economic and
financial distress that most developing countries face, these proposals have
the recipe for creating the conscious indifference of commitment by those
countries.
Curiously, while a major
responsibility has been put at the national level, support to developing
countries by the international community through increase in funding has not
been put in the indicators – there is no indicator to show the progress in
official development assistance (ODA) support for the 1325 implementation.
.
In short, such indicators are
utopian in nature, totally out of reality oblivious of the situation in
developing countries, and will provide an opportunity to the countries to
ignore there implementation. A serious reality check is needed here.
Advocates for 1325 implementation
believe that the Secretary-General’s indicators, if approved by the Council,
will result in prolonging the frustration and agony of all concerned about the
insignificant implementation of 1325 so far.
Practical action proposals in four areas
Articulated below are four major actors that will play crucial
role during next five years, as the
issues of data collection, national institutions and country
programmes/national action plans are being addressed. The particular benefit of
these indicators/proposals is that action could be taken right away on these
without waiting for years.
1. UN Secretary-General’s role:
There is an urgent need for the
UNSG’s genuinely active, dedicated engagement in using the moral authority of
the United Nations and the high office he occupies for the effective
implementation of 1325.
a) Number of substantive policy
pronouncements and directives on 1325 by the Secretary-General
b) Number of dedicated communication
sent by the Secretary-General to Heads of State/Government on 1325 – how many
responses received and reminders sent to those from whom responses not received
c) How many world leaders (various
levels) were briefed by SG on 1325 during his round-the-year meetings, visits
and participation at global forums like G-20, Organization of Islamic
Conference(OIC), Arab League and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
How many such meetings were followed
up in substantive manner?
In how many instances the UN
Resident Coordinators were instructed to follow up such meetings with
respective national governments
d) Secretary-General’s leadership as
the chair of the Chief Executives Board(CEB) to institute system wide priority
to be attached to 1325 and ensure regular monitoring of its reflection in
policy decisions throughout the UN system
e) 1325 to be discussed at the
Secretary-General’s Senior Management Group meetings on a bi-monthly basis as
the Under-Secretaries-General take lead in their respective areas to monitor
its implementation
f) Secretary-General’s Special
Representatives (SRSGs) in charge of the peace operations on the ground should
be specifically and clearly entrusted with the full responsibility with regard
to prevention and participation as envisaged in 1325 in their respective
command areas.
Number of sexual abuse and sexual
violence taking place under each SRSG's jurisdiction to be reported.
g) The mandate of the SRSG appointed
under Security Council resolution 1820 should also specifically include 1325
implementation. As a matter of fact, her mandate flows directly from the mother
resolution 1325.
h) Development of a public
information strategy for global application so that adequate awareness is
raised on 1325 with due focus on working with media at the country level.
Number of working relationship with
country level media on 1325 to be reported.
i) In his recommendation to the
General Assembly on the functions of the new women’s entity, the
Secretary-General should assign the entity the coordinating role for 1325
implementation. A mere consolidation of existing UN offices dealing with women’s
issues is not enough, the new entity needs to have a substantive role so that
it can make a real difference
j) Secretary-General should appoint
competent women who have internalized the values of peace, development and
human rights for all. It is not only quantity, but quality too.
k) Secretary-General should ask the
Security Council to review every resolution that it has adopted - and would do
so in future - to see how it affects women and its impact on women
l) Meetings with women’s groups on
1325 implementation should be on the agenda of all UN missions undertaken by
the Secretary-General, his SRSGs, his Senior Management Group members and
Security Council missions
2. United Nations system:
a) Number of Executive Boards of
Funds and Programmes for operational activities and governing bodies of the UN
Specialized Agencies that adopted substantive policy directions in respect of
1325 within their relevant mandates.
Heads of these entities should take
leadership responsibility in this regard.
b) Number of areas in which UN
Resident Coordinators have been work closely with national level partners to
include 1325 implementation in their respective country programme along with
needed resource allocation.
As a country programme process is
long – special supplementary country programmes should be presented to relevant
governing bodies by 2011 for all interested countries.
Donors and civil society should be
mobilized for making the country programmes meaningful for 1325.
c) The global and regional
programmes of the Funds and Programmes should launch a 1325 Capacity
Development Initiative with a special priority
d) The Peacebuilding Support Office,
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Political Affairs and
the University for Peace should set up special units aimed at giving priority
to 1325 implementation
e) The UN Regional Commissions
ensure important policy
focus on the implementation of 1325
in their respective regions.
3. UN Member States:
a) Number of countries according
substantive commitment and support at Heads of State/Government level to
1325
Number of countries that placed 1325
at the cabinet meetings agenda for discussion and decisions for country level
implementation.
b) Number of countries that adopted
national action plans, that are preparing national plans on a top priority
basis and countries that are in the preliminary stages of preparation.
UN Secretary-General should write to
member states requesting attention to 3 a & b and raise these with the
country leaders when he meets them. (ref. UN SG’s role)
c) Number of national parliaments
that considered substantive implementation of 1325.
d) National coordination for 1325
implementation should be in the responsibility of a high level body, preferably
headed by the Head of Government
e) Number of national delegations that
make substantive references to 1325 at the General Assembly, Security Council,
ECOSOC and Specialized Agencies as well as at other major international forums.
f) Law enforcement and justice
system authorities as well as defense and military forces should internalize
the full implications of 1325 in their work.
4. Civil society and other actors:
We should not
forget that when civil society is marginalized,
there is little
chance for 1325 to get implemented in the real sense.
a) UN Secretary-General needs to
take the lead in setting up six-monthly inclusive consultative process for 1325
implementation with the civil society organizations at all levels for all
relevant UN entities.
b) All relevant NGOs are to be
mobilized at country level by the national coordination body supported by the
UN Resident Coordinator
c) UN Regional Commissions Executive
Secretaries will take lead in forming regional networks with civil society and
other partners for advancing regional implementation process for 1325
d) Organizations like NATO and
African
e) Private sector and business
community should ensure that their profit-motivated activities at least do not
work against the objectives of 1325 implementation
f) As increasingly deeper
involvement of private companies and individuals are taking place in the war
and security sectors, albeit wrongly, they should fully respect the 1325
implication in their work
g) Universities and other academic
institutions, relevant research organizations and think tanks should be
encouraged to expand the knowledge base for 1325 in all its implications.
University for Peace can take the lead in this process.
h) Intergovernmental and regional
organizations other than the UN system should be approached by the
Secretary-General and, as appropriate, by UN Regional Commissions to link up
the formers’ activities with the implementation process for 1325.
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